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socially unsustainable. 
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Bottom-up Regional Economic Development: 
Competition, Competitiveness and Clusters  
Imre Lengyel 
 
In the economies developing and transforming as a result of globalisation processes, 
increasing localisation represents one of the most marked processes: while the importance of 
national economies (relatively) is decreasing, the economic role of regions and cities seems 
to grow. Global competition has intensified also in space, especially with the growing 
importance of knowledge-based economy. Interregional competition, which means the 
competition of regions and cities for scarce resources, global aims and so on, is increasingly 
prevalent. The economic characteristics of interregional competition differ form those of the 
competition of companies or on the labour market; consequently, the improvement of 
competitiveness can be described differently in the case of regions. 
After reviewing the most important features of global competition, the present paper 
provides a detailed analysis of the concept and characteristics of interregional competition. 
Departing from the criteria of interregional competition, it reviews the concept of regional 
competitiveness and gives the pyramidal model serving the improvement of regional 
competitiveness. Based on this model it also outlines the development ideas, so called ‘UFO 
model’, aiming to improve the competitiveness of regions with different development levels. 
 
Keywords:  interregional competition, regional competitiveness, cluster-based regional 
economic development 
1. Introduction 
Increasing regionalization represents one of the most spectacular processes of the 
economies that develop and transform as a result of globalisation processes: while 
the (relative) importance of national economies is decreasing, the economic role of 
regions and cities seems to grow. Global competition has intensified also in space, 
especially with the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy. 
Interregional competition, which refers to the competition of regions and cities for 
scarce resources, global aims and so on, is increasingly prevalent. The modes of 
improving regional competitiveness and the regional economic development 
strategies are heavily dependent on the type of the given regions. 
Regional economic development strategies are especially important for the 
new member states of the EU, since between 2007 and 2013 they will receive 
significant subsidies from the European Union’s regional development funds to 
improve the competitiveness of their lagging regions. The analysis of this issue calls 
 Imre Lengyel 
 
14
for clarifying various questions for the less develop d regions. What do we mean by 
regional competitiveness and how can it be described and measured? Do the 
economic, social and institutional background and the cultural characteristics of a 
region influence regional economic development strategies? Which development 
strategy can most significantly improve regional competitiveness in the lagging 
regions? 
After reviewing the most important features of interregional competition, this 
study provides a detailed analysis of the so-called “UFO model” serving as a cluster-
based improvement of regional competitiveness. On the basis of this model we 
outline the regional economic development ideas aiming to improve the 
competitiveness of regions with different development l vels. This model is suitable 
for the systematization of both top down regional policy and bottom-up regional 
economic development ideas, consequently it was also applied for the planning of 
the economic development strategies of the different r gion (nodal region) types of 
the Southern Great Plain region in Hungary. 
2. New economics of competition 
Globalisation has radically transformed the criteria and characteristics of market 
competition as well; the majority of new economic political answers and of the 
strategic answers of companies to newly emerging questions generated by global 
challenges depart from a novel understanding of competitiveness. As a result of 
global competition, the formerly characteristic territo ial processes of the economy 
also changed; a ’global economy’ is being shaped, where the former role of 
territorial levels undergoes reinterpretation. Dicken appropriately calls this newly 
emerging (world) economy ’new geo-economy’, which is characterised by an 
increasing, unprecedented and intense unification pr cess of economic activities; the 
world economy may be seen as a new organic unit of nterconnected elements 
(Dicken 2003). 
Intensifying competition, which characterizes the global economy, 
significantly shapes the theory and also the practice of regional economic 
development. This brings us to several fundamental questions. Is there interregional 
competition, and if yes how can it be characterized? Are lagging regions able to 
compete with developed ones, and what sort of strategy should they develop? 
Market competition amongst companies can easily be interpreted, but it is 
questionable whether the long existing rivalry of cuntries and regions should be 
considered competition or not. Two opposing views exi t in this respect. According 
to the first opinion, while in the case of companies the concept of market 
competition is unambiguous, in the case of cities, regions and countries it is 
impossible to talk about real competition. In the other view competition among 
regions and cities exists, but its features essentially differ form those of the market 
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competition existing among companies. The basic position of the trends departing 
from comparative advantages demonstrates the first approach well, while the 
schools accepting competitive advantages support the second one (Camagni 2002, 
Neary 2003, Pike et al 2006b, Sheppard 2000, Török 2006).  
Figure 1. Transitions in competition 
 
Source: own construction on the basis of Porter (2001, pp. 139-141.) 
 
According to the theory of comparative advantages, if countries in 
international trade specialize in producing the goods and products, in which their 
relative labour productivity or their relative expenditure cost is more favourable, that 
leads to the development of an international division of labour, from which each 
country benefits (Krugman 1994, Krugman–Obstfeld 2002). This means that there is 
no competition among countries ince free trade and the market automatisms 
governed by the ’invisible hand’ generate a balanced d velopment and create a 
favourable situation for each country that recognises its comparative advantages. 
 Imre Lengyel 
 
16
Therefore, it is useless to talk about competition among countries and to talk about 
competitiveness. Krugman’s abovementioned thoughts are widely acknowledged 
and it has become commonly accepted in regional science that the rivalry of 
countries and regions cannot be compared to companies’ market competition 
(Polenske 2004). 
On the other hand, there is also relative consensus about the idea that there is 
not only rivalry among regions, but ’competition-like’ features have also emerged: 
due to the effects of globalisation, the ’traditional’ rivalry among cities, regions and 
countries has gained a new meaning by today (Begg 1999, 2002; Camagni 2002; 
Cheshire–Gordon 1998; Lever 1999; Malecki 2002, 2004). 
The theory of competitive advantages reflects to the new conditions of the 
global competition. Michael Porter claims that today the theory of comparative 
advantages does not provide an acceptable explanation bout the international 
division of labour (Porter 1990, 1998, pp. 322-324.). Porter’s proposal to 
development is the theory of competitive advantages, which systematizes the 
development phases of countries and the new elements of the international (and 
regional) division of labour. The competitive advantage of a given country or region 
depends on economic structure, the development level of the institution system and 
the quality of its operation, governmental economic policies and ideas on regional 
development.  
The competitive strategies of globally competing companies and the regional 
clusters exploit dynamic agglomeration economies. Defining the new economics of 
competition, Michael Porter (2001, pp. 139-141.) highlights six fundamental factors 
(Figure 1). 
Formerly, the acting space of economic players and the conditions of 
competition were controlled mainly by macro-economic aspects like balanced 
budget, foreign trade balance, economic policies developed on the basis of inflation 
(monetary, fiscal, customs and industrial policies, tc). Today, however, economic 
growth and the development of a given country are pimarily defined by 
microeconomic bases like the strategies of the dominant global companies and the 
local business environment. Obviously, governmental economic policies remain 
important but these have become highly similar in different countries (e.g. in the 
EU’s member states) and their acting space has narrowed down due to the formation 
of global capital markets and the predominance of transnational corporations. The 
recognition of this has brought along a fundamental ch nge in the economic policy 
of developed countries: instead of traditional investment promotion, industrial 
policy, infrastructural development, etc. that influence productivity merely in the 
short run, the main focus shifted to supporting theformation of a business 
environment that improves innovation skills and capacity b  helping the business 
realisation of new ideas, the emergence of new lines of business and applying more 
effective company strategies. The improvement of prductivity in a region depends 
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on what types of new goods are produced, which new market needs are satisfied and 
not on the more effective production of old products.  
The new economic policy does not focus on economic se tors and large 
companies, the ownership and market relations of which it can hardly comprehend 
and influence, but rather on improving the sources of the competitive advantages of 
companies. These competitive advantages derive mainly from company 
collaborations and positive local externalities. Furthermore, they are highly specific 
depending on localness, which can be exploited in a flexible way only by clusters, 
networks and SMEs. Formerly, improving economic conditions was almost 
exclusively the task of economic policy, while social policy mostly dealt with 
’spending’ the budgetary earnings, and the institutions, their agents and ministries 
representing the two policies were also distinct. Today, economic and social policies 
must work together, the two are closely intertwined, therefore, need to set a shared 
objective: to improve the welfare of the local population. It is impossible to design 
separate economic and social policies because in case of differing objectives these 
weaken each other, which quickly leads to deterioration in the given country’s 
position in global competition. 
Nowadays, besides national economies (and partly instead of these), 
supranational economies crossing national economies ( .g. the EU) and 
(subnational) regional economies have become dominant territorial units. Partly 
related to this, the sources of the competitive advantages of global companies are 
mainly local and depend on the local environment, which means that the external 
economies of scale (local externalities, agglomeration advantages) and the overflow 
of knowledge have become important. The recognition, that innovation processes 
basically have ’double ties’ partly depending on the local environment (the local 
innovation climate) and on global networks (mainly among knowledge creation city 
regions), also seems more and more common (Varga 2006). 
The above-mentioned thoughts related to the new economics of competition 
cannot be regarded as fully mature, but should rathe  be interpreted as tentative 
proposals or research concepts (hypotheses). However, real economic processes 
more and more justify these observations and it seem  that the traditional approach 
to competition fails to describe reality. The strong competition generated by 
globalisation processes and the changed economic circumstances force economic 
players to come up with new answers. 
According to Porter (1996), regions do not compete with one another like 
national economies, which means that they do not use various governmental 
(monetary, fiscal, customs, export promotion, tax, investment and other) economic 
policies, since they do not even have such policies. But their competition is not 
similar to that of companies either, since there is no single decision making centre in 
the region that designs and executes a regional competition strategy by focusing on 
prifit maximizing. Regions and cities compete by creating a business environment 
that fosters the productivity improvement and contributea to the success of the 
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region’s firms: specialised institutes of education, effective special infrastructure, 
information services facilitating innovation, enterprise-friendly administration, 
developing research and development institutes that meet the profile of clusters. 
Networks consisting of the various local groups (chambers, institutes, universities 
and so on) participate in creating the business enviro ment.  
3. Interregional competition 
In connection with the territorial units we need to distinguish between competition 
among countries and among the different (sub-nationl) regions of a country. When 
analysing regional competition and competitiveness, Malecki (2002) underlines the 
fact that the regions seem to separate from the national economy more and more: 
today the development pace of the national economy depends on the economy of 
regions and cities as successful ’regional motors’ and not vice versa. Companies can 
choose from a great variety of locations, therefore citi s compete in ’attracting’ the 
scarcely available profitable companies: not only financial benefits (tax discounts, 
promotion, etc.) but mainly the favourable business conditions (the quality of the 
infrastructure, the flexibility and standard of inst tutes in education, transparent legal 
regulations, etc.) are the decisive factor in the competition. „In short, competition 
among cities is real and has become ‘fiercer’” (Malecki 2002, p. 930.). Interregional 
competition is a special type of competition that cn be characterised with easily 
producible parameters and regional competencies (Budd–Hirmis 2004). 
In the competition among the different regions within a country scarcity 
derives from two interrelated factors: investments made in the new market segments 
demanding special expertise and talented experts (Malecki 2002, p. 930.). The 
competition of regions is a skill ‘sticking’ or attracting investments and talented 
labour force and the main goal is “to sustain their att activeness to both labour and 
capital” (Markusen 1999, p. 98). Not only the attrac ion of capital and creative 
employess from outside the region is necessary, but the attraction of tourists as well, 
and the local entrepreneurial skills also need stimulation. The results of interregional 
competition are similar to those of the competition among countries: in the 
successfully competing regions thewelfare (living standard) improves, employment 
and incomes (wages) are high, new investments take place, talented young people 
and successful businessmen move there, etc. (Malecki 2004, Polenske 2004).  
Based on the abovementioned features the definition of interregional 
competition may be conceptualized as the following (Cheshire 2003, Cheshire–
Gordon 1998, Gordon–Cheshire 2001, Lengyel 2003a): a process that occurs among 
territorial units aiming to increase the welfare of the people living in the cities or 
regions by promoting the development of regional and local economy, a 
development that certain groups try to influence explicitly or often implicitly 
through local policies by competing and rivalizing with other territorial units.  
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The definition of interregional competition described above is relatively 
general and can be interpreted for a wide range of territorial units. Taking into 
account also the practical characteristics of interregional competition, the following 
factors are important in interpreting the definition (Lengyel 2003a): 
1. The aim of interregional competition is to improve the welfare of the 
population living in the region, what calls for the p rmanent increase of the 
income produced there. This income is distributed to a wide range of the local 
population especially through a high rate of employment.  
2. The players of interregional competition are the territorial units: regions and 
cities, the interests of which are represented by local groups often competing 
with one another. Besides the local government, city ouncil and its 
institutions, the representatives of the local economic scene and civil sphere 
are also involved jointly constituting a so-called regional network. The (city 
or county) local government’s coordinating role is indispensable in this 
network.  
3. We can only talk about interregional competition in case of a bottom-up 
regional and local economic development, when the local players design and 
implement their competition strategy independently. 
4. The main instrument of interregional competition is the development and 
implementation of local economic development ideas facilitating the 
economic development. The creation of a business environment that generates 
an improvement in the income generating capacity of the local economy is 
obviously essential. The city or region’s vision of future together with the 
ideas that lead to it must be made public so that enterprises and households 
can make their decisions (of implicit effect) with awareness.  
5. Interregional competition is a process, which means that it has a dynamic 
approach and needs adaptation to constant changes. Th refore, it is necessary 
to rephrase actual goals regularly and shift focus among local groups based on 
which of them can best achieve the realization of these goals.  
6. Interregional competition occurs primarily among the territorial units of the 
same hierarchical level (NUTS-system) and in the same competitive phase, so 
among cities or regions of similar development level and size. Therefore, an 
industrial region, for instance, is not a direct competitor of an agrarian region 
or a city region operating as a logistics-financial entre. Indirect competition 
among regions at different development levels also occurs but only 
temporarily, for the duration of certain projects. 
7. Interregional competition does not zero-sum game, which means that winners 
do not necessarily gain advantages to the disadvantage of losers; instead, 
economic development is possible in each region or city simultaneously. 
Consequently, besides competition, conscious cooperation and harmonized 
development strategies (e.g. an airport in case of a larger scale infrastructural 
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investment) may prove beneficial, especially among neighbouring territorial 
units.  
8. Beyond a conscious development strategy, interregional competition may also 
be influenced by implicit (indirect) developments not included in community 
programmes and unforeseeable synergic effects, especially the consequences 
of the decisions made by enterprises and households.  
 
It is essential that interregional competition mostly occurs based on economic 
aspects and the major goal of the players participating in the competition is to 
generate a long-term and stable increase in the income of the region or city, that is, 
successful economic development. A region or city does not participate in this 
competition as a whole, but is divided in various interest groups often with 
conflicting interests.  
The results of interregional competition are similar to those of the 
competition among countries: in the region successfully competing welfare (living 
standard) improves, employment and incomes (wages) are high, new investments 
take place, talented young people and successful businessmen move there, etc. 
(Camagni 2002, Malecki 2004). Naturally, in the less successful regions just the 
opposite occurs: welfare (living standard) deteriorates or stagnates, incomes fail to 
increase, there is a reduction in the number of work places, no new investments 
occur, unemployment increases, talented young people and successful businessmen 
leave, the population grows older, etc. However, contrary to company competition 
the results of interregional competition become apparent slowly, usually after long 
decades, especially owing to the low mobility of households. 
Summarizing the competition among regions: it occurs with economic goals 
to achieve the constant improvement of welfare (living standard). In this competition 
regions compete by creating a business environment calculable and attractive for 
companies, by attracting or keeping successful enterpris s and talented labour force. 
Each region must develop a bottom-up competition strategy: they must design a 
vision of future, concept and programmes and achieve wide public awareness this 
way orienting the local population, the inhabitants and enterprises excluded from 
active regional networks (Rechnitzer 1998). Regions can only be successful by 
actively implementing a bottom-up development strategy that departs from a widely 
accepted vision of future and harmonizing projects that have different economic 
development effects with the help of dynamic regional networks. 
4. UFO model: cluster-based regional economic development 
Successfulness in competition, or in other words, competitiveness has been one of 
the key concepts often used and quasi ’fashionable’ in many areas of economics 
over the past two or three decades partly due to the acumination of global 
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competition. It is a fashionable term the use of which seems nowadays to be nearly 
obligatory. In Iain Begg’s apt formulation: “improved competitiveness, as we all 
know, is the path to economic nirvana” (Begg 1999, p. 795.). 
The objective of regional and local economic development is the 
improvement of the standard of living and quality of life of the region’s inhabitants. 
Hence economic development and competitiveness are strongly connected, only 
those kinds of programmes belong into the competenc of economic development 
which improves regional competitiveness. 
Two major issues emerged in the debates aiming at the interpretation of 
competitiveness: on one hand, how to define regional competitiveness and what 
indicators should be used to measure it? On the other hand, how can regional 
competitiveness be improved, which governmental and local interventions may be 
regarded as successful? These two questions usually lie in the background of other 
professional debates too; while representatives of academic economics concentrate 
on the first one, experts of regional policy tend to focus on the second one.  
There were a number of attempts to define the new notion of competitiveness 
according to new global competition conditions in the mid 1990s. The standard 
notion of competitiveness in the Sixth Regional Periodic Report of EU (EC 1999): 
‘The ability of companies, industries, regions, nations and supra-national regions to 
generate, while being exposed to international competition, relatively high income 
and employment levels’. In other words ’high and rising standards of living and 
high rates of employment on a sustainable basis’ (EC 2001). In the European 
Competitiveness Report (EC 2008, p. 15.): “Competitiveness is understood to mean 
a sustained rise in the standards of living of a nation or region and as low a level of 
involuntary unemployment, as possible.” In the report of Regional Competitiveness 
Indicators of UK (DTI 2002): ‘Regional competitiveness describes the ability of 
regions to generate income and maintain employment levels in the face of domestic 
and international competition’. 
Hence the substance of regional competitiveness: the economic growth in the 
region, which growth is generated by both a igh level of labour productivity and a 
high level of employment. In other words, competitiveness means economic growth 
driven by high productivity and a high employment rate.  
The notion of competitiveness obtained in this way c nnot be used, however, 
to identify factors responsible for regional competitiveness or areas which are to be 
strengthened or developed by regional development policies and programmes for 
improved competitiveness. Since the notion of competitiv ness can be seen as 
refining that of economic growth, it can often be observed that proposals for 
improved competitiveness combine traditional means of economic development 
with methods based on endogenous development.  
The pyramidal model of regional competitiveness eeks to provide a 
systematic account of these means and to describe the basic aspects of improved 
competitiveness (Figure 2). ‘This model is useful to inform the development of the 
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determinants of economic viability and self-containment for geographical 
economies’ (Pike et al 2006a, p. 26.). ‘This is an aggregate notion, …, in a regional 
context, labour productivity is the outcome of a variety of determinants (including 
the sort of regional assets alluded to above). Many of these regional factors and 
assets also determine a region’s overall employment rate. Together, labour 
productivity and employment rate are measures of what might be called ‘revealed 
competitiveness’, and both are central components of a region’s economic 
performance and its prosperity (as measured, say, by GDP per capita), though 
obviously of themselves they say little about the underlying regional attributes 
(sources of competitiveness) on which they depend’ (Gardiner et al 2004, p. 1049.).  
Figure 2. The pyramidal model of regional competitiveness 
 






























Source: Lengyel (2000, 2004) 
 
The standard of living, prosperity of any region depends on its 
competitiveness (Begg 2002). Factors influencing regional competitiveness can be 
divided into two groups of direct and indirect components. Of particular importance 
are programming factors with a direct and short-term influence on economic output, 
profitability, labour productivity and employment rates (Huggins 2003, Lengyel 
2004). But social, economic, environmental and cultura  processes and parameters, 
the so-called ‘success determinants’, with an indirect, long-term impact on 
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competitiveness are also to be taken into account (Enyedi 1996,  
Jensen-Butler 1999). 
The elements of regional competitiveness are systematized by the pyramidal 
model, which reduces the components of economic development to connected 
factors (Enyedi 2009, Pike et al 2006b). Can competitiv ness be improved by 
developing the same factors in all kinds of regions? What determines the success a 
regional development strategy? 
The vitality of regional development strategy in a region is depend on regional 
innovative capacity. ‘This capacity is not simply the realized level of innovation but 
also reflects the fundamental conditions, investmens, and policy choices that create 
the environment for innovation in a particular location” (Porter–Stern 2001, p. 5.). 
The regional innovative capacity depends on three broad elements: common 
innovation infrastructure, cluster-specific conditions, and quality of linkages  
(Figure 3). Porter has argued that traded regional clusters are capable of improving 
competitiveness and therefore proposed a cluster-based approach to regional 
economic development (Porter 2003b).  








Source: Porter–Stern (2001, p. 5.) 
 
In line with the structure of the pyramidal model and element of regional 
innovative capacity, we distinguish between four leve s of bottom-up regional 
economic development programmes aiming to improve regional competitiveness 
(Figure 4): success factors, common innovation background, cluster specific 
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conditions, and linkages. While on the basis of the pyramidal model the 
competitiveness can be measured and the influencing factors can by systematized, 
cluster-based development enhances the basic industries of the regions, an by doing 
so it reinforces specialization necessary for meeting the challenge of global 
competition.  
On the basis of UFO model (Unconventional Framework of Operational 
programming) we outline the regional economic development ideas aiming to 
improve the competitiveness of regions with different development types. The UFO 
model suitable for the systematization of both regional planning and cluster-based 
regional economic development ideas, consequently it can be also applied for the 
planning of the economic development strategies of the different subregion (nodal 
region) types. 


































Source: own construction 
 
Four levels of UFO model can be distinguished with regard to the objectives 
of regional development strategies and the various characteristics and factors 
influencing regional competitiveness (Figure 4): 
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- Success determinants: on the basis of the pyramidal models, the reinforcement 
of certain absent or weak background conditions of region’s economy, which 
are the bottlenecks of regional development. Regarding these actions 
interregional competition does not emerge, fundamental public utilities and 
amenities must be guaranteed in the least developed regions as well. Thus 
within the meaning of cohesion all the regions must be supported that are in 
need. 
- Common innovation background: such programmes aiming at the 
improvement of regional competitiveness, systematized on the basis of the 
development factors of the UFO model, that further  reinforcement of most 
of the industries’ and enterprises’ competitive advantages in the regions. The 
regional development strategy of the common innovati n background depends 
on the development/competitive type of the region (see next shapter). In 
connection with the improvement of the common innovation background 
interregional competition can be observed among the similar regions. This is 
why the regional organization of bottom-up economic development is 
important, in order to support solely those regional programmes and projects 
that are able to improve regional competitiveness the most. 
- Cluster specific conditions: in more regions it is possible that innovative 
clusters will emerge. In other regions the emergence of manufacturing and 
tourism clusters can be expected. Clusters generate very intense interregional 
competition. To develop similar industries are endeavoured also in other 
regions of the country, therefore only those regional economic development 
strategies will be able to succeed that are based on regional consensus and 
unity and that aim to improve the competitive advantages on the given 
industry’s enterprises.  
- Linkages: it is essential that there should be interdependence between 
programmes aiming to improve the common innovation background and 
clusters, because only this approach can result in the development of regional 
competitiveness. 
 
The UFO model can successfully be applied as a demonstration shame in 
purpose of systematizing development programmes of regions for improving 
regional competitiveness. Because of the interregional competition, however, in the 
nodal regions cluster-based programmes must also be dev loped and constantly 
managed with the involvement of the concerned enterprises. 
5. Competitive regional development  
Different ’market places’ also occur in the global competition of countries, regions 
and cities. Tödtling and Trippl (2005, p. 1209.) describe three types of regions by 
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problem areas and regional innovation deficiencies: peripheral region 
(organisational thinness), old industrial regions (lock-in), and fragmented 
metropolitan regions. In 2003 one of the research projects of the EU analysed the 
factors influencing regional competitiveness and how dominant the elements 
determining competitiveness are in different region types in order to create the 
foundation of regional policy between 2007 and 2013. During the research four 
’theoretical’ region-types were distinguished based on two dimensions, density of 
population and the growth rate of GDP (Martin et al 2003 p. 6-23.): non-productive 
regions, regions as production sites, regions as sources of increasing returns, and 
regions as hubs of knowledge. 
Based on the characteristics of competitive advantages, Porter (2003b) 
distinguishes three stages in the countries’ development built upon one another. On 
the basis of the amount of specific GDP and the competition strategies of global 
industry branches these are (Figure 5): factor-driven, investment-driven and 
innovation-driven phases. The three phases of competitive development designed for 
countries can also be applied in the case of regions (Lengyel 2003a). And these 
types are very useful to underlie the bottom-up regional development strategies of 
the regions.  
 
Figure 5. Stages of competitive development of countries/regions 
 
 
Source: own construction on the basis of Porter (2003b, pp. 26-28.) 
 
The division of labour among the subnational regions f a country is different 
from that of different countries. A region cannot develop own economic policies; 
instead, its economy specializes as a consequence of market processes and central 
governmental development decisions. Nowadays, knowledge-based economy 
strongly shapes the specialization patterns of a country’s regions with different 
development levels, and also changing the former characteristics of interregional 
competition (Grosz et al 2005, Lengyel–Leyesdorff 2010). Consequently, the three 
phases of competitive development should be specified based on the processes of the 
knowledge-based economy by using the specialisation of the postfordist economy 
(Cooke 2001, Lengyel 2003a). 
Based on the differences among regions it is preferabl  to differentiate where 
knowledge is created and where it is only adapted (Asheim 2001, Bajmócy 2006, 
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Lengyel B. 2005). In the case of competitive regional development only in the 
innovation-driven phase can it be stated definitely that competitive advantages 
derive from knowledge creation, while in the investment- and factor-driven phases 
they originate from the mere adaptation of knowledge. Less developed, lagging 
regions are in an exposed situation, certain featurs of the knowledge-based 
economy are present, but neofordist characteristics are decisive (Lengyel 2003a). 
In harmony with the phases of competitive development three types of 
postfordist regions must be distinguished (Asheim 2001, Lengyel 2003a,  
Martin et al 2003): 
- Neofordist region: factor-driven phase (regions with low income and i put 
cost), regions as production sites, 
- Knowledge transfer region: investment-driven phase (regions with medium 
income and efficiency), regions as sources of increasing returns, and  
- Knowledge creation region: innovation-driven phase (regions with high 
income and unique value), regions as hubs of knowledge. 
 
Neofordist and knowledge transfer regions differ from knowledge creation 
regions not only in terms of the sources of competitiv  advantages, but also because 
they are economically exposed and fragile, first of all in the transition economies 
(Enyedi 1996, Papanek et al 2008, Rechnitzer 2000). The decision centres of global 
companies hardy occur in less developed regions, so they demand knowledge less; 
rather the executive type activities of global companies are present here. Besides 
assembly plants, units of global companies selling products and performing service 
activities on the local market, local branches of international banks and insurance 
companies, and sometimes subsidiaries engaging in minor research activities also 
operate here. Naturally, most regions are ’mixed’, but while neofordist and 
knowledge transfer activities and companies also exist in knowledge creation 
regions, the number of firms based on knowledge creation is close to zero in 
neofordist regions (Lengyel 2003b). 
In the course of the debate on interregional competition, it is increasingly 
acknowledged, that regions with similar state of development compete with each 
other, while amongst the different types of regions there is rather rivalry (Camagni 
2002, Malecki 2004, Polenske 2004, Hall 2001). Competition is especially intense 
among metropolises, but within the EU or a country there also exist interregional 
competition amongst nodal regions with similar state of development.  
Concerning the three region types reviewed above, different development 
strategies must be applied, which means that e improvement of competitiveness 
demands different measures based on the different types of regions. These steps 
correspond to the phases of competitive regional development and at the same time 
indicate that competitiveness can be improved only with the help of complex 
programmes. The UFO model systematizes those economic development priorities 
that adjust to the real social-economic situation and the achievable (realistic) aims of 
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the different region types. The improvement of regional competitiveness depends on 
the consistent realisation of these development stra egies. 
6. Bottop-up economic development with different types of regions 
In the course of describing the features of interregional competition we emphasised 
that those regions compete with one another that have similar economic structure 
and are at the same level of development. At the same time, it is not enough to 
measure the competitiveness of regions, but we also need to outline what can be 
done to improve competitiveness. Furthermore, a special version of the UFO model 
can be designed, the elements of which are built upon the real opportunities of the 
given region type and may contribute to improving the competitiveness of the 
region. The elements of the common innovation background (basic factors of 
pyramidal model) are different in each sub-type.  
The neofordist region is underdeveloped, it corresponds to a semi-periphy, 
the generated income (GDP/habitant) is low, and the economy is typically in the 
factor-driven phase. The development of infrastructure is insufficient, the education 
level of the labour force is low, the members of company management are not 
competitive internationally and part of the qualified labour force and talented young 
people leave the region (Lengyel 2002). The major goal focuses on developing the 
technical infrastructure (transportation network, energetics, etc.) and attracting the 
sites of global companies with prepared industrial areas, low local taxes, low wages, 
etc.  
Local companies do not need research & development in neofordist regions, 
but as already mentioned, all of them purchase older technologies from abroad 
(Figure 6). Therefore, these companies do not have R&D units and they are not 
closely linked to development institutions either. Since there are no local company 
assignments, local university research and the related laboratories and equipment 
must be financed from governmental funds. In such regions support should target 
basic research, especially at local universities, and certain outstanding research 
laboratories to solve minor applied R&D tasks.  
Regarding the elements of infrastructure and human capital s development 
factors, such regions should concentrate on developing the transportation networks 
that are usually less established and of low quality. Mainly motorways, airports, 
railroad systems, ports, logistic centres must be created that are essential for making 
the divisions of global companies targeting cost advantages settle. It is also 
advisable to design industrial areas (industrial parks) containing concentrated 
infrastructure, partly owing to environmental reasons. Vocational training cannot be 
transformed based on special company needs, but rather the quality of task-oriented 
schemes offering wide basic training in existing institutes must be improved. 
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In the case of investments coming from outside the region, the divisions of 
companies must be attracted that are able to generat  regional multiplicator effects 
by establishing a new activity. In the region these divisions and activities can work 
as the starting points of a structural change, which the local economic sphere is 
unable to achieve by itself. The embedment of global companies’ divisions, the 
development of local business and personal relations must be encouraged with the 
help of various events, forums to enable information fl w that can also be followed 
by business transactions later on.  
In neofordist regions very few small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
are present in the traded sector, neither the busines  environment, nor the 
preparation level of these companies is enough for global competition. SMEs have 
insufficient international knowledge; therefore, the wide dissemination of modern 
entrepreneureal skills and enterprise culture is essential for their development. This 
should be understood as a le rning process, SMEs can learn not only at courses but 
also from one another and from global companies too. One of the most important 
objectives is for SMEs to become the business partner or contracted supplier of 
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settled global company units, because this way theycan win a stable market and 
gain modern knowledge and business experience. 
In a neofordist region the institutions and social capital are not market-
friendly enough. Public administration organisations must be made to have 
’enterprise-friendly’ customer services. As for training programmes available in 
higher education institutions, the technical, busine s, economic training necessary 
for the successful operation of enterprises is either missing or is of poor quality, so 
support must be lent to launch, strengthen and disseminate these programmes, so 
that modern business training can become part of the curriculum in each higher 
education scheme.  
Knowledge transfer regions are usually medium developed, the most 
important goal of economic development lies in continuing the structural change by 
keeping existing companies and creating work places with higher added value. 
These regions are in the investment-driven phase, they have traded large companies 
with local headquarters, which already have a network of local SMEs as their 
contractors. Transportation infrastructure is develop d; therefore, the improvement 
of the local business environment is in focus. The education level of the labour force 
and the training structure already correspond to the needs of the economic sphere, 
retraining programmes and courses to improve managerial skills are frequent 
(Lengyel 2009). 
In knowledge transfer regions the need for research & development has 
already emerged, local traded companies also create d velopment units assigning an 
increasing number of applied research part-tasks to local development companies 
and research institutes (Figure 7). In the course of ec nomic development, the 
harmonised research and development activity of companies and institutes must be 
encouraged. In order to assist smaller companies th establishment of agencies, 
institutes and other bodies dealing with technology transfer must be facilitated. 
Infrastructure and human capital are relatively developed and the 
transportation network has been established. Support must focus on the institutions 
and agencies of the business infrastructural background (training institutions, 
consulting companies, etc.) that satisfy actual company expectations. In harmony 
with the emerging R&D needs, institutions contributng to the improvement of 
innovation capacity (innovation centres, incubators) must be created  
(Bajmócy et al 2007). Strengthening local strategic industry sectors can define their 
needs precisely concerning the qualification of the labour force, so special training 
programmes related to these must be developed.  
Among the investments coming from outside knowledge transfer regions, only 
those need promotion, whose activities are in harmony with the developing regional 
strategic industry sectors already present. The embed ent of companies with bases 
outside the region must be encouraged by increasing the circle of SMEs acting as 
local contractors. This way more and more elements of he global companies’ value 
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chain can be present in the region, what not only stimulates the economic growth, 
but also helps to improve employment.  
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In knowledge transfer regions more and more small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) operate in the traded sector, and are prepared for global 
competition. In order to strengthen these SMEs, the development of their horizontal 
networks, clusters must be helped. The formation of start-up companies related to 
the activities of developing strategic industry sectors must also be encouraged 
mainly with business incubator programmes. 
In these regions the role of institutions and social capital is increasingly 
important. Fast and reliable public services are essential for the successful global 
competition of developing strategic industry sectors and strengthening SME 
networks. Therefore, it is necessary to decentralise administration, since only 
regional and local governments present in the region can take measures effectively 
and flexibly. Local higher education must be encouraged of design training modules 
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corresponding to the labour force needs of strengthening local strategic sectors this 
way ensuring the prepared labour force supply for companies.  
In knowledge creation regions economic output is high, these regions are in 
the innovation-driven phase and the regional centres of significant global companies 
are situated here. Administration is decentralised, a cluster-based economic 
development is set as an objective partly due to this to improve the business 
environment necessary to strenghten the competitive advantages of global 
companies with local headquarters. Developing the background of innovation 
capacities is in focus, scientific parks, universitie , incubator programmes, venture 
capital and other schemes have an important role.  
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In knowledge creation regions research & development is of high quality, 
governmental and business R&D performs harmonised research based on the needs 
of clusters (Figure 8). The innovation environment is developed, the institutional 
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system and the local society equally place emphasis on upporting collaboration in 
the frameworks of research programmes (Török 2006, Varga 2009).  
Infrastructure and human capital equally follow innovation expectations. 
Transportation and business infrastructures are developed, the most important 
objective lies in improving the scientific infrastructure: to establish scientific parks 
and communications networks. In the traded sector vocational training, especially 
retraining must shift from task-oriented to become problem-oriented, since more and 
more innovative experts are needed who are able to make individual decisions and 
perform work independently.  
Among investments coming from outside th  region the most important effort 
targets attracting the decision centres of internatio l and governmental 
organisations and global companies. The settlement of supporting and related 
industries must be encouraged in order to strenghte clusters. To improve 
employment, support must be lent to cooperations among SMEs and global 
companies with local headquarters.  
The rate of small and medium-sized enterprises of traded nature is high, their 
competitive advantages must be strenghtened by creating clusters. The growing 
number of innovative SMEs demand various forms of venture capital, therefore, it is 
important to encourage the creation of such services. Spin-off companies departing 
from universities and employing creative graduate and doctoral (Ph.D.) students and 
young lecturers must be assisted with different incubator programmes.  
The institutions and social capital equally support cluster-based economic 
development. Higher education satisfies the needs of local strategic sectors and 
clusters striving to launch training and research programmes of high scientific 
quality. Regional networks operate effectively and regional identity is strong. 
Mechanisms have been developed to handle conflicts emerging in the collaboration 
of the various organisations of the decentralised administration and the private 
sector, the local economic governments and non-profit organisations.  
Concerning the three region types reviewed above, different economic 
development programmes must be applied, which means that the improvement of 
competitiveness demands different strategies based on the different types of regions 
(Table 1). These steps correspond to the phases of competitive regional development 
and at the same time indicate that competitiveness can be improved only with the 
help of complex bottom-up programmes. The UFO systema ises those economic 
development priorities that adjust to the real social-economic situation and the 
achievable aims of the different types. The improvement of regional competitiveness 
depends on the consistent realisation of these developm nt programmes. 
Every contry is heterogeneous, since it consists of ubnational regions with 
significantly different state of development. Due to he strong interregional 
competition, bottom-up strategies must be developed in all regions. These should 
refer to reinforcement of clusters beside the common innovation background. This is 
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the only way that provides an opportunity for the improvement of regional 
competitiveness. 
Table 1. Elements of common innovation background of the distinct types of regions  
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7. Summary 
This study reviewed the most important questions related to interregional 
competition and regional competitiveness. Globalisation processes, their 
interregional characteristics and global competition lead to the development of a 
’new economic space’. With the emergence of the knowledge-based economy the 
international division of labour also transforms and the role of regions in the 
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postfordist economy must be reconsidered. Three basic region types can be 
distinguished that participate differently in the international division of labour. The 
acceleration of global competition has resulted in the increase of competition among 
regions, or more precisely, nodal sub-regions.  
Due to the special characteristics of global competition, the concept of 
regional competitiveness must also be defined. There is abundant literature on 
competitiveness with certain well-known approaches, out of which especially the 
concept of standard competitiveness common in the European Union seems 
adequate in case of the regions not only for scientific analyses but also for regional 
economic political applications. The concept of standard competitiveness is partly 
linked to the thought of economic growth; therefore, it also leans on theoretical 
economics, although it also has strong regional political and economic development 
aspects that brings it close to the questions of business sciences as well. 
For the interpretation of regional competitiveness a pyramidal model was 
established that offers a complex frame for the measurement and improvement of 
competitiveness. It does not only make a proposal concerning the indicators 
applicable for measuring competitiveness, but also systematises economic 
development ideas depending on the types of regions. The logic of bottom-up 
regional economic development is demonstrated by the UFO model, which connects 
the approach of competitiveness and the practice of cluster development in the 
different types of regions. 
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Measuring Regional Disparities on  
Competitiveness Basis  
Miklós Lukovics  
 
Several economic theories and empirical analyses have been put forth about the nature and 
principles of regional disparities. Analysts often apply GDP per capita, as a quasi absolute 
indicator to explore regional disparities, albeit spatial processes have become more and 
more complicated and complex in the globalized economy. Parallel to the catching-up 
process of the countries at the national level, there is another spectacular process at the 
regional and local level: regional disparities are widening because the growth of the most 
developed sub-regions is increasing while the less favoured sub-regions are lagging behind. 
Consequently, regional analyses must devote increasing attention to studying sub-regions. 
The present paper is aiming to develop a complex method on analyzing regional 
disparities, based on the notion of regional competitiv ness and its closed logical system, 
correctly chosen theoretical model (the pyramidal model of regional competitiveness) and 
statistical data. To carry out the analysis, I use K-means cluster analysis, and its output. 
 This is the first time ever that this has been used for this purpose.  
 
Keywords:  regional disparities, Williamson-hypothesis, regional competitiveness  
1. Introduction 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion are increasingly important segments of the 
European Union’s regional policy, deriving from the istory of the European 
integration: “The Community shall have as its task […] to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities” (EC 1997, Article 2). According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union shall 
promote economic, social and territorial  cohesion, instead of the former 
terminology: economic and social cohesion (EC 2007).  
At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), there had not been a 
declared common regional policy, the treatment of regional inequalities started at the 
national level in the 1960s (Rechnitzer 1998). The multi-step enlargement process of 
the European Union, and particularly the joining of the Mediterranean countries 
resulted in deepening spatial inequalities in the European Economic Area. 
This, together with the effect of globalization, which increased the importance 
of locations, made the community-level regulation of the problem inevitable. The 
article 130 of the 1987 Single European Act declares the main objectives of the 
common regional policy, out of which the aim of “reducing disparities between the 
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various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions” excels  
(EC 1987). After forming the central fund system of Structural Funds1 to treat 
regional disparities on the basis of uniform principles at the end of 1980s, the Treaty 
of Maastricht unfolded the concept of cohesion: economic convergence and social 
cohesion (EC 1992). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam devotes a distinct title (XVII.) to economic and 
social cohesion: “in particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities 
between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of 
the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas” (EC 1997, Article 158). 
The European Spatial Development Perspective approved in 1999 mentions 
economic and social cohesion as one of its three main objectives (EC 1999). 
The forth cohesion report is already talking about “economic, social and 
territorial cohesion” (EC 2006), and by doing so it highlights an important problem. 
Namely after the 2004 enlargement serious territorial d sparities characterize the 
whole European Union regarding both output, productivity and employment. 
It is also an essential mega-trend that nowadays the local level is sensibly 
gaining importance as a territorial level that houses core-competences, where the 
long-term competitive advantages of firms are concentrated, and where local actors 
are able to give effect to their economic development conceptions. The primary 
analytical unit of economic advantages is therefore the local unit where one can 
change their workplace without changing their domicile (Lengyel 2003). 
In the present paper, by responding to the above mentioned challenges, we 
attempt to introduce such an analytical method thatis able to detect territorial 
disparities of the local level in their complexity, using a multi indicator based 
approach. Before this we gain insight into the background of the conventional single 
indicator-based analyses. But first of all we review the r levant economic theories 
that are needed to understand the nature and change of territorial disparities.  
2. The nature of territorial disparities’ evolution 
Despite the fact that the multi-step enlargement of the European Union has drawn 
attention to regional policy’s need for concentrating significant resources to reduce 
territorial disparities, we must consider the economic regularity well-known as 
Williamson-hypothesis, which says that territorial disparities will grow until a 
certain state of development (Figure 1). According to Williamson’s concept that was 
put forth in 1965 economic growth first induces regional divergence and in the later 
phases convergence (Kiss–Németh 2006, Davies–Hallett 2002, Szörfi 2006, Nemes 
Nagy 2005).  
                                                   
1 The common denomination of the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, the European Regional Development Fund and the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. 
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Source: Davies–Hallett 2002, Nemes Nagy 2005 
 
In connection with the Williamson-hypothesis we must note that its 
consequences are inconsistent with the conceptions of certain theoretical schools, 
moreover the convergent phase of the Williamson curve can be interpreted in 
different ways within the conceptual background of the distinct bodies of theorizing. 
Zsolt Fenyővári and Miklós Lukovics (2008) reviewed eight theor tical schools in 
order to examine – among others – the occurrence of t rritorial convergence within 
the given theoretical interpretations2 (Fenyővári–Lukovics 2008):  
1. In the classical economic theory the efficiency advantages of the regions 
deriving from the comparative specialization will eventually contribute to the 
reduction of territorial disparities in a way that is advantageous for all the 
participating regions. 
2. In the neoclassical economic theory, due to the presumption of the absolute 
mobility of the factors of production (including technology), all the 
inequalities in the model – embracing any kind of developmental disparities 
between regions – decease in the long run. 
3. In the Keynesian economics the reduction of regional disparities can not be 
interpreted as the result of spontaneous market processes. The desirable 
processes are much more linked to the result of certain intended institutional 
interventions. 
4. Endogenous growth theory interprets the productivity growth as an outcome 
of the spatial diffusion of knowledge and technology, which does not infer 
any automatism for the reduction of territorial inequalities. However the 
regional (economic) policy aiming at the deliberate d velopment of the 
                                                   
2 Similarly, the research of Málovics and Ván (2008) examined the connection between the concept of 
competitiveness and sustainability from the viewpoint f some highlighted economic theories.  
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endogenous factors (technology, knowledge and the internal resources of the 
region) can become efficient means of reducing regional disparities. 
5. New trade theory states that the spatial variation of productivity derives from 
the varying levels of regional specialization, agglomeration and cluster 
formation. The spatial equilibrium shaped by centripetal and centrifugal 
forces is Pareto-efficient, therefore there exist no market automatisms that 
would induce spatial disparities.  
6. In the new institutional economics, due to the constant change deriving from 
the dynamic interaction of the narrowly meant economic processes and 
institutional conditions, the deepening or the reduction of territorial disparities 
can be well interpreted within the frame of the model. 
7. The Porterian corporate strategy economics originates the regional disparities 
from the basic industries and clusters of the regions. Since it focuses on the 
“microeconomic foundations” (the resource munificen of the region gains 
highlight as well), the reduction of territorial disparities characteristically does 
not occur through market automatisms. 
8. In an evolutionary economic view the change in the intensity and extent of a 
region’s innovative activities can significantly shape the regional disparities 
(Bajmócy 2008). Such changes may occur as a result of spontaneous market 
processes. Therefore in the evolutionary thinking the reduction of territorial 
inequalities through the market automatisms can be i terpreted. 
 
Numerous successful attempts have been carried out for the empirical 
verification of the Williamson-hypothesis (Kiss–Németh 2006, Davies–Hallett 2002, 
Szörfi 2006, Nemes Nagy 2005). Several authors managed to confirm on large 
samples and long-run time series that from the initial state of relative-
underdevelopment regional disparities increase for a while, and when reaching a 
certain state of development the divergent process turn  into a convergent one. 
At this point we necessarily come to the question that is to say what is that 
certain “state of development” where the divergence turns into convergence? It is
equally important to establish whether in the relatively underdeveloped regions this 
point exists at all, or in the divergent phase the development potential of these 
regions decreases to such an extent which makes their later close-up impossible.  
This threat is much realistic, because the more devloped areas have increased 
ability to become an integral part of the global economy, foreign direct investments 
also flow first into these regions (Enyedi 2000, EC2004). This results in the real 
danger of the widening of the regional inequality gap. “In Hungary territorial 
disparities significantly deepened in the early 1990s after the changing of the 
political system” (Rechnitzer 2000, p. 13.). This process has not deceased by the 
early 2000s.  
Measuring Regional Disparities on Competitiveness Ba is  5 
3. Single-variable analysis of the evolution of territorial disparities 
One of the most widely used (one might say conventional) method for examining 
the evolution of territorial disparities is the analysis of the temporal and spatial 
change of per capita GDP (Sala-i-Martin 1996). According to the method we gain a 
picture about the evolution of territorial disparities by analyzing the dynamics of 
standard deviation values computed from the natural logarithm of per capita GDP 
data measured in PPS3, compared to the Hungarian counties’ and regions’ averages. 
If the computed standard deviation values rise year by year, it indicates that the 
values deviate from their average in a growing extent, therefore the disparities of the 
observation units’ per capita GDP data (measured in PPS) rise year by year. 
Considering the Hungarian NUTS-2 level regions, NUTS-3 level counties and 
LAU-1 subregions as observation units, the growth of territorial disparities can be 
detected according to the results of a standard deviation analysis of the per capita 
GDP, measured in PPS on time series from 1996 to 2006. During the analysed time 
period the curves of both counties’ and regions’ standard deviation values are 
positive gradient, thus the observation units’ state of development measured in GDP 
are shifting away from each other, in other words they show divergence (Figure 2). 
The execution of the standard deviation analysis for LAU-1 sub-regions brings 
us to similar consequences. We must add however one extr mely important notice: 
instead of the indicator used in case of counties and regions (GDP), we have to 
apply a similar-in-content indicator, the gross value added4 (GVA), because GDP 
data are not available for aggregation-levels lower than counties (NUTS-3). 
Similarly to the standard deviation of counties’ and regions’ GDP, the standard 
deviation of sub-regions’ GVA data can be characterized by a positive gradient 
curve in the 1996-2005 interval. This underlies the growth of territorial disparities 
in the sub-region level as well. 
This statement is true both when the population includes all the 168 sub-
regions5, and when the analysis is carried out without the Budapest sub-region. We 
certainly receive significantly higher standard deviation values for the population 
that includes Budapest compared to the case when we carry out the analysis without 
the sub-region of the capital. This also underpins the well-known fact that Budapest 
and its agglomeration, which excel in the Hungarian spatial system and grow faster 
than the country average, significantly contribute to the widening of Hungarian 
territorial disparities. 
                                                   
3 The guiding methodology of GDP computations is ESA 1995. The per capita GDP expressed in PPS 
(Purchasing Power Standard) is the value computed on the basis of purchasing power parities, 
expressed in Euro (Eurostat 2004). 
4 The gross value added produced by the economic units adding taxes on products and subsidies, 
subtracting the charge of financial intermediation results the value of gross value added computed on 
market prices, the indicator of gross domestic product (GDP). 
5 At the time of this paper’s submission the data are not yet available for the 174 new sub-regions 
defined by Act CVII of 2007. 
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Figure 2. Change in the regional disparities of the Hungarian egions, counties, sub-
regions 
 
Note: calculated with natural logarithm  
Source: own calculations on the basis of HCSO (2009) 
 
The standard deviation values computed both from regional and county GDP, 
and sub-regional GVA provide the possibility of calculating trend-curves, in other 
word to demonstrate regularities in the evolution of data points. On the basis of  
R square as a control indicator it can be declared that the logarithmic trend fits well 
in all the four cases on the empirical data. It delineates in all the four cases the left 
side of an U-shape curve (Figure 3). By comparing these results and the 
Williamson-curve on the basis of the per capita GDP data we can state, that 
Hungarian territorial processes are in the divergent phase yet, in all the examined 
levels of aggregation6.  
                                                   
6 A convenient situation would be resulted if the stati ical toolbar, by using trend-extrapolation, was 
able to define the point where the Hungarian territorial processes turn from the divergent to the 
convergent phase in the certain levels of aggregation. However trend forecast would be misleading in 
this case, since the logarithmic trend curve fitted on the past empirical data approximates to a zero-
gradient linear curve when fitted on future points (where t→∞). 
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Figure 3. Logarithmic trend of the change of the Hungarian regional disparities  
 
Note: calculated with natural logarithm  
Source: own calculations on the basis of HCSO (2009) 
 
In the foregoing the examinations of territorial disparities were restricted to 
the analysis of a single indicator, the GDP per capita (or in sub-regional level the 
GVA). We are convinced that spatial processes are much more complex than they 
could be described by one highlighted indicator. The trend in the literature of spatial 
analyses apparently shows that it is insufficient to use single-variable approaches to 
measure the territorial process. Instead, the application of complex indicator-
systems is required to reach sophisticated conclusions (Lengyel–Lukovics 2006, 
Lukovics 2007, Lukovics 2008). 
4. Methodological background of territorial disparitie s’ multivariable  
analysis 
In the following we demonstrate an approach for analysing territorial disparities that 
is much more complex than the pure examination of per capita GDP data.  
The method applies a complex indicator-system which is based on the concept of 
competitiveness. In order to assure the greatest pos ible accuracy of the analysis, the 
criterion of choosing an indicator into the basic indicator-system of the analysis can 
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not be based on the subjective considerations of the analyst. It is required to 
endeavour to minimize the analysts’ subjectivity. 
Miklós Lukovics and Péter Kovács (2008) developed a methodology for 
implementing regional competitiveness analyses, which is based on a closed logical 
system and where the mathematical-statistical background ensures the minimizing 
of analyst’s subjectivity. The closed logical system of the applied method is assured 
by the fact that indicator selection is coordinated by a model unfolding the standard 
definition of competitiveness, the pyramid-model. 
The data set serving as the foundation of the analysis is designed on the basis 
of the standard definition of competitiveness, and the pyramid model unfolding it. It 
is important, that the final database – that serves as the basis of multivariable data 
analysis methods – emerges as a result of a multiple-stage process  
(Kovács–Lukovics 2006). The first step defines the basic data that can be 
considered in the case of surveying competitiveness on the sub-regional level. These 
data can be defined on the basis of a deeper consideration of competitiveness as a 
concept and economic considerations, taking into account the most important 
experience of the reviewed international and nationl a alyses. The fact that certain 
data are absolutely unavailable on the sub-regional level limits the inclusion of a 
great number of data as actual basic data; therefor, actual basic data are made up of 
the basic data available on the sub-regional level. These basic data may be 
considered as raw data, from which potential indicators can be produced with the 
help of simple mathematical operations. Selecting potential indicators with the help 
of principal component analysis leads to the actual, relevant indicators that finally 
serve as the basis of the analysis. The database reches its final form after the 
standardizing and weighting of the relevant indicators (Figure 4). 
Similarly to the variable-selection method we used principal component 
analysis to make an objective weighting system. The determination of the weights is 
based on the following train of thought. If we substitute the standardized variables 
with principal components, the principal components represent the model in reduced 
dimensions. As an output of the principal component analysis we receive the values 
of the communalities. Since the communalities are pactically coefficients of 
multiple determinations in a linear regression model, where the dependent variable 
is the given variable, and the independents are the principal components, the square 
roots of those are coefficients of multiple correlations. In general the coefficient of 
multiple correlation quantify the correlation between the effective (empirical) and 
the estimated values of the dependent variable. Thus it also quantifies the correlation 
between the dependent variable and the set of indepen ent variables. Especially the 
coefficient of the multiple correlation means the correlation between the given 
standardized variable and the set of principal compnents, which represent the 
pyramid model. Thus, the coefficients represent the correlation between the 
variables and the model, namely the weight of the variables. 
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Figure 4. Creating the database of the analysis 
National and international indicatorsystemsDeeper consideration of















Basic data that can be considered ( )n
Availability of the data on sub-regional level
 
Source: Lukovics (2008, p. 116.) 
 
After successfully accomplishing selection and weighting we receive a 
database in a structure that is in line with the pyramid model unfolding the standard 
definition of competitiveness, and that consists of 78 selected (therefore relevant 
regarding competitiveness), standardized, and weighted variables. As an empirical 
application of the developed method, we carried out the complex grouping of the 
168 Hungarian sub-region on the basis of their competitiveness. This also provided 
an opportunity for the multi-variable analysis of territorial disparities. 
5. Multi-variable analysis of territorial disparities  
The model is expected to ensure comparability in time, which means that beyond the 
relative competitiveness of the different sub-regions, its changes and through this 
the change of the regional disparities can also be examined by introducing the latest 
statistical data to the database consisting of the sel cted system of indicators.  
I intend to draw conclusions about the evolution of territorial disparities by 
examining the changes within the complex competitivness classification of 
Hungarian sub-regions between two dates: 1998 and 2004. I use the well-known 
method of cluster-analysis, which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been used 
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for this purpose before. The closed logical method describable by the objective 
selection and weighting process of indicators based on the pyramid model of 
competitiveness also offers a chance to complete an annual assessment of the 
changes in the relative competitive position of Hungarian local administrative units 
and the changes of the regional disparities. 
In our analysis, we compared the types of competitiv ness of the different 
sub-regions in 1998 and in 2004. We studied which are the sub-regions whose 
competitiveness changed so much in the examined two years that their position 
assumed in clustering was also modified. Looking at the period between 1998 and 
2004, only ten sub-regions were found whose ranking in clusters based on complex 
competitiveness changed by 2004 compared to its state in 1998.  
Certain peculiarities must be emphasized though, which significantly 
influenced my endeavour: 
1. Similarly to territorial GDP data, sub-regional GVA data are available also 
with a two-year delay. At the time of implementing the analysis – in the 
middle of 2007 – the most up to date territorial GVA data were from 2004. 
Therefore all the other data included to the database refer to 2004 as well. 
2. The Government decree 244/2003 defined 168 sub-regions n Hungary7 
contrary to the earlier 150, which existed in 1998. This hindered the 
comparison of data in the level of sub-regions, buty aggregating the 
municipality-level data we managed to create data also for the previous years 
that are suitable for the new structure. 
3. Since the database contains numerous specific indicators, it is very important 
that population data has significantly changed from 1998 to 1999. The reason 
for this is the recount of the previous estimated (forward counted) data. 
4. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s (HCSO) registration of enterprises 
by staff categories significantly changed between 1998 and 2000. 
5. The calculation of unemployment rate has been in harmony with the ILO 
recommendation only since 1998. The HCSO previously provided the data of 
the Employment Offices (referring to registered unemployed). 
6. Certain indicators (the number of ISDN main lines, simplified corporate 
taxes) are not available for 1998. In these cases I included data from the 
closest possible year to 1998. 
7. Data of the 2004 model deriving from the 2001 population census are 
displaced by data from the 1990 population census in the 1998 model. 
 
In order to draw conclusions with reference to the evolution of territorial 
disparities on the basis of change in the complex competitiveness classification of 
Hungarian sub-regions between 1998 and 2004, first we must carry out the 
                                                   
7 The Act CVII of 2007, which defined 174 sub-regions, has not been passes at the time of the 
examination.  
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classification separately for the two years. I sorted he 168 Hungarian sub-regions 
for both 1998 and 2004 into three clusters by applying K-means cluster 
methodology based on 78 selected and weighted indicators in line with the Pyramid-
model. For both 1998 and 2004 data less than 10 iterations were sufficient to 
develop a steady structure, hence the cluster affiliation of the territorial units based 
on their competitiveness is considered to be unambiguous. 
Although the number of objects belonging to each clusters are the same for 
the two examined year, the distance of clusters from each-other and the membership 
of the cluster show difference to a certain extent. 
If we analyse the evolution of the Euclidean distance of the cluster centres for 
the given years, we receive a new approach of the examination of territorial 
disparities (Table 1). Whether the distance of cluster centres rise from one point in 
time to the other, the relative competitiveness of the region-types move away from 
each-other. This is equivalent with the statement tha erritorial disparities increased 
between the examined points of time, and vice versa.  








Relatively weak competitiveness  8,672 (8,511) 34,968 (40,772) 
Medium competitiveness 8,672 (8,511)  28,997 (35,110) 
Relatively high competitiveness 34,968 (40,772) 28,997 (35,110)  
Note: Data of 2004 are in brackets 
Source: own calculations 
 
Based on the Euclidean distance of the final cluster centres, it must be 
underlined that in 1998 the three clusters were situated closer to one another than in 
2004. Between 1998 and 2004, the distance of the cluster with relatively weak 
competitiveness and the one with medium competitiveness did not change 
significantly, however, the Euclidean distance between the clusters of the sub-
regions with medium competitiveness and the one with relatively strong 
competitiveness grew significantly, and the same happened in the case of the 
clusters of sub-regions with relatively weak competitiveness and those of relatively 
strong competitiveness. This observation, in a way, proves the increase of spatial 
disparities. This recognition not only shows the growth of spatial inequalities, but 
also confirms the fact that the cluster of Budapest with relatively strong 
competitiveness underwent much more dynamical development in he examined 
period than the sub-regions constituting the other two clusters. 
It can be stated about the spatial concentration of competitiveness and 
urbanization that there is no significant differenc between the results based on the 
data compiled in 1998 and in 2004: the only sub-region with relatively strong 
competitiveness (the capital) is surrounded by the ring of sub-regions with medium 
 Miklós Lukovics 12
competitiveness, 90% of which are urban in both years. Furthermore, the urban sub-
regions with medium competitiveness are on the one hand the sub-regions of the 
chief towns of counties and the sub-regions of large towns. Sub-regions with 
medium competitiveness (urban and rural alike) are concentrated in both years in the 
vicinity of developed Western centres and highways. Beyond this, it can also be 
stated that in 1998 and in 2004 a concentration of sub-regions with medium 
competitiveness can be found in the North-Western and Central regions of the 
country, while sub-regions with weak competitiveness are situated in the zones 
along the Northern and Eastern country borders. According to the data compiled in 
1998 the dominance of the lake Balaton can be stated: significantly more sub-
regions with medium competitiveness concentrated along the lake in 1998, than in 
2004.  






































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
We also studied which are the sub-regions whose competitiveness changed so 
much in the examined two years that their position assumed in clustering was also 
modified. Looking at the period between 1998 and 2004, only ten sub-regions were 
found whose membership in clusters based on complex competitiveness changed by 
2004 compared to its state in 1998. It should be underlined, that presumably the 
competitiveness of more than ten sub-regions changed in the examined period, but 
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the degree of change only resulted in cluster membership changing in case of 10 
sub-regions (Figure 5).  
From the ten sub-regions mentioned above, five (Bicskei, Dabasi, Ercsi, 
Monori, Szarvasi) improved its competitiveness cluster membership, five 
(Balatonföldvári, Csepregi, Fonyódi, Hajdúszoboszlói, Kőszegi) worsened it. The 
realignment of the competitiveness types is also rema kable: the competitiveness 
position of the wider Budapest-agglomeration improved. 
6. Summary 
In the present paper we attempted to introduce a method for analysing territorial 
disparities based on the concept of regional competitiveness, which analyses the 
spatial processes by using (within the model)an objectively selected and weighted 
system of indicators. The essence of the method – beyond the multi-step creation 
process of the database – is that it analyses the evolution of territorial disparities on 
the basis of the final output of a multi-variable data analysis (namely the Euclidean 
distance of cluster centres), contrary to the most c mmonly used standard deviation 
values of per capita GDP. 
According to both single-variable standard deviation analysis and 
multivariable examination, regional divergence can be reported in Hungary on a 
sub-regional level. Sub-regions with relatively high competitiveness increase their 
competitiveness, while sub-regions with relatively weak competitiveness fall behind. 
Furthermore it can be stated that the competitiveness of sub-regions in 
“convergence” regions is much heterogeneous: the competitiveness “engines” of 
these areas are the sub-regions of county centres and towns with county authorities, 
while the competitiveness of other, mainly rural sub-regions is weak and degrading 
in tendency. 
These results necessarily call for the continuation of recent research: does the 
competitiveness potential sub-regions with relatively weak competitiveness degrade 
to such an extent as a result of the growth in territorial disparities that is may hinder 
the future catching-up. 
It is necessary to survey in these sub-regions the factors that may contribute to 
the development of their competitiveness. For this purpose those elements of recent 
selected and weighted set of indicators that map the “development factors” and 
“success determinants” of the Pyramid-model provide a possibility. As a result of a 
competitiveness analysis based on the above indicators (that represent the possible 
directions of development strategies), it can be found out, whether sub-regions with 
relatively weak competitiveness possess merely a weak ex-post competitiveness, or 
also a faint catching-up potential. 
If the results showed that also the opportunities for improving competitiveness 
are scarce in the sub-regions of relatively weak competitiveness, there would be a 
 Miklós Lukovics 14
real danger of the economic degradation of these areas. In this case the realistic aim 
for these sub-regions is not the catching-up, but the ceasing of further falling-behind. 
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As cluster-mapping – identifying potential and existing clusters in a region’s economy – has 
found its place in foreign literature, several attempts have been made in Hungary to reveal 
the economic structure of the country, a specific region or county, and to find their high-
points. Despite the fact that an effective regional or local development process with the 
rational use of the resources at hand ideally needs the outputs of a thorough study revealing 
the true drivers of the economy, in practice the toolkit of cluster-mapping is often ignored. 
The reason is the difficult and problematic adaptation of the tools introduced in the foreign 
literature: statistical databases have their shortcmings, primer data collection is rather 
costly. 
An inquiry into Szeged and its subregion and Csongrád County has been done on the 
basis of this toolkit, however. Besides the awareness of deficiencies and difficulties, this 
study gives results based on exact data. These results may also form the starting point of 
further studies. The economic structure of the region is analysed from different aspects, 
which together lead to certain consequences and also to the identification of the potential 
“Human resource”, Construction and various processing ndustry clusters of the region. The 
study shows some possible ways for the university to enter the regional development scene.∗ 
 
Keywords:  cluster-mapping, cluster policy, peripheral regions, regional concentration  
1. Introduction 
Several countries’ and regions’ economies answer global challenges with the spatial 
concentration of economic activity. It has been proved that spatial proximity 
provides such advantages (positive local externalities) to the regional economic 
actors, which enhance their competitiveness and chance for success in international 
competition (Lengyel–Deák 2002). 
In recent years, the Hungarian economic literature has turned towards clusters 
and cluster-based economic development (Buzás 2000, Deák 2002, Gecse–
Nikodémus 2003, Lengyel 2001, Lengyel–Deák 2002, Lengy l–Rechnitzer 2002). 
This study deals with only one segment of building and implementing a cluster-
policy aiming at developing clusters and therefore competitiveness. This segment is 
                                                   
∗ Many thanks to Alice Chapman-Hatchett (International P rtnerships Officer, International Affairs 
Group – Strategy Division, Kent County Council, UK) for the language review of this study. 
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cluster-mapping. The focus of the study introduces th  methodology from a practical 
point of view: adaptability of the mapping toolkit1 n Hungary, experience drawn 
from the statistical data based empirical study of Szeged and Csongrád County. 
2. Focus and methodology 
Demonstrating the commitment of international organiz tions towards clusters, a 
series of cluster-studies has targeted the region. The 2002 studies of the LEED 
program, however, stated that Hungary had no real custers  
(Ionescu–Möhring 2002). In 2005 a more sophisticated view was formed  
(OECD 2005): between 2002 and 2005 clusters emerged in several industries 
(automotive, logistics, construction and tourism). 
2.1. The region in focus 
Csongrád County is part of the South-Great-Plain Region at the South-Eastern 
border of the EU. This region has the third biggest population amongst the 
Hungarian regions (after the Central Region and the North-Great-Plain Region), 
according to its territory it is ranked fourth2. The county fits well the row of the 
neofordist, peripheral counties in the South-Eastern crescent of Hungary  
(Lengyel 2003). Despite or besides the opinion cited n the previous paragraph, in 
2000 several cluster(-like) initiatives existed in the region (Buzás 2000): 
1.  „DÉL-THERM” Union including three heat- and thermic technology firms; 
2. a textile-industry reintegration program with the participation of science 
institutions, led by HUNGARN Fonó Ltd.; 
3. the textile industry subcontractors’ coordination ce tre at Eurotex Ltd.; 
4. co-operations in IT, the agrarian sector („onion-association”, organic farming) 
and biotechnology. 
 
The 2-digit SIC-code (division-level) analysis of employment data of the 
Hungarian regions and counties (Gecse–Nikodémus 2003) shows an over-
represented presence of food-processing and textile industries here. The food-
                                                   
1 For a general review of the toolkit please see Patik (2005), for the detailed methodological description 
of the present study please see Patik–Deák (2005). 
2 Based on www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/egyeb/hnk2005/tablak/load1_2.html. Download: 27th February 
2006 (Population data refer to 1st January 2004, territorial data to 1st January 2005.) 
The South-Great-Plain Region itself (18.338 km2) is a bit bigger than the Walloon Region of Belgium, 
and a bit smaller, than Niederösterreich in Austria. As for the population (appr. 1.3 million inhabitan s), 
it almost equals the Champagne-Ardenne region in France, or Estonia as a whole. Csongrád county 
with its territory of 4.262 km2 could be compared to Luxembourg or the Danish Viborg county, its 
population of approximately 425 thousand people suggests the Belgian Leuven or the Italian Parma 
regions. The county has around 73 thousand employees and registers 34 thousand enterprises. 
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processing concentration is probably due to the canning factory of Szeged, the grain 
mill industry, meat processing (in Szeged, Csongrád an  Szentes) and winemaking 
(in Csongrád, Mórahalom). Textile-industry is present in almost every bigger town 
(Hódmezővásárhely, Szeged). 
Significant employment concentrations of Csongrád County have been 
revealed in the chemical industry (plastics, pesticides, paints, varnishes and rubber 
products) and china-production (Hódmezővásárhely). 
Spatial concentrations do exist in Hungary; clusters are being formed with the 
adaptation of foreign best practice. The private sector has built several clusters, 
which are promoted and supported by the government. The South-Great-Plain 
clusters with governmental subsidy (these might be present in the region in focus) 
(Gecse–Nikodémus 2003): 
1. Textile Cluster; 
2. Public Works and Road Construction Cluster; 
3. Tourism Cluster; 
4. Handicraft Cluster. 
 
The present study is unique in a way, as it uses 4-digit SIC-code (class-level) 
analysis on subregional and county level, working with a complex system of indices 
and criteria. More detailed and accurate results are awaited accordingly. 
2.2. Methodology 
All empirical studies should start with an operative definition of the phenomena to 
be measured. The literature documents dozens of cluster-definitions, based on 
different theoretical background etc. (Gordon–McCann 2000, Martin–Sunley 2003). 
Two basic approaches are agreed to set the theoretical background: economics and 
business studies (Phelps 2004). 
Taking these two cornerstones into consideration, this study is guided by the 
second one. But choosing cluster-definition does not solely define the theoretical 
background and the terminology to be used: it is the definition which selects the 
applicable tools from the cluster-mapping methodology. A definition, which serves 
well the aims of the mapping process, is decisive for the measures describing the 
concentration of economic activity (i.e. employment, turnover, number of 
enterprises) and also for the spatial approach, whether geographical, social, 
economic, cultural etc. These are the critical milestones of the mapping procedure 
(DeBresson–Hu 1999). Accordingly, the alternative way of cluster-development is 
chosen in this study (Bergman–Feser 1999). 
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3. Defining the methodological framework 
Before getting deeper into the facilities provided by the toolkit of cluster-mapping, 
several decisions have to be made, as seen above (Bergman–Feser 1999). Taking the 
cited train of thought into consideration, the following pages deal with the aim of the 
research, the cluster-definition used, the indices and methods used, and finally the 
consequences drawn. 
3.1. Aims and cluster-definitions 
As a first step, we have to investigate the region to be developed, we have to set an 
aim for development, which is delivered by the programs and strategies of the region 
finalised in the late 90s (MTA RKK ATI 1998, DARFT 1999). These documents 
unitedly stress that there is a need to adjust higher education to the economic 
structure. As a combination of the objectives of the region and the university the 
baseline of the current research is the following: to launch the knowledge-based 
economy of Szeged and Csongrád County, to enhance the innovativeness of the 
region, with the active participation of the University of Szeged. 
Quite agreeably, the university can have an influence on the economy of 
Szeged and its region with the knowledge produced and used inside its walls, with 
its research capacity and infrastructure, with the new technologies created by or with 
the help of the university. Enright’s definition (1998) describes these initiatives the 
best, however, the definition of Lengyel and Deák (2002) is also remarkable for the 
stress on the role of the drivers of local economy. Let our cluster-definition be the 
following according to these: a local/regional driver of the economy, where the 
enterprises operate with shared infrastructure, labour pool and knowledge-base, 
using division of labour. 
This definition ensures geographical proximity along with features, which 
implicitly assume the existence of co-operating and supporting institutions 
(university, technology-transfer organisations etc.). As a consequence we can expect 
that it will guide the mapping activity and will help in choosing the adequate tools 
from the methodology. 
3.2. Methodology options 
Before going deeper into the introduction of the toolkit, it is important to emphasize 
that we are going to deal with the mapping of potential clusters – no matter which 
index or method we use. A real cluster can be identfi d as a result of a multi-step 
analytical process. Using the chosen method on the data at hand potential clusters 
are identified which need to undergo further analysis. Using one single method will 
not result in a reliable output. Based on this we are going to see how the keywords 
of the definition can be investigated with the different methods. 
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Finding the drivers of the economy leads us to the problem of measuring the 
concentration of economic activity. An economic activity presumeably drives the 
regional economy, if it has a dominant role in the economy and shows considerable 
growth. It should also be a traded industry. The first two aspects can be derived from 
added value, the share of employment and the number of nterprises. The share of 
export can feature the traded characteristics3. 
As mentioned before, the definition implicitly contains spatial proximity, 
geographic concentration. During the research this feature is assisted by the source 
of the data-set: all data refer to Szeged, the Szeged subregion and Csongrád County. 
In the following pages the keywords of the cluster-d finition are “translated” into 
indices and analytical methods (a-g), thus forming the methodological frame of the 
mapping. 
a) Share of added value, growth of added value. Added value is hard to 
investigate along 4-digit SIC-codes or on subregional level. The data-collection of 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) represents the county level and the 
2-digit SIC-code depth. No more detailed data are avail ble, that is why the drive of 
the economy cannot be analysed well enough through added value4. 
b) Employment data. Employment data are expected to reveal the economic 
structure of the county and subregion through the employment share of the different 
economic activities, showing the size of the common labour-pool. The most often 
used index in this case is the location quotient, the LQ-index, exhibiting economic 
specialization. The LQ-index based on employment daa is referred to as 
“employment-LQ” in the future, to distinguish it from other LQ-indices. 
Despite the constraints of the usage of the employment-LQ (see Brenner 2004 
for more details), this index was the central tool f the British cluster-mapping 
project (Miller et al. 2001). In Hungary a similar methodology assisted Gecse and 
Nikodémus (2003). These two projects had quite different value limits when setting 
the evaluation criteria, when deciding an economic activity’s being a high-point or 
part of a cluster. Differences exist moreover in the depth of the dataset, the territorial 
level in focus – both studies serve as a guideline for this mapping, though. 
Beside employment-LQ another important index is the change of 
employment. This latter has its own problems, too: it is easily influenced by the 
number of enterprises, productivity, capital adequacy, technological level of the 
economic activity investigated. However, the growing number of employees might 
mean the growth of the critical mass. 
c) Number of enterprises, change in the number of enterpris s. An attractive 
option for the comparison of the number of enterprises in different regions might be 
                                                   
3 Certain economic activities are able to attract income into the region, although their output is not 
tradeable, so it won’t add to the export data: tourism, higher education, R&D. These activities ought to 
be investigated more thoroughly. 
4 Based on consultations with the experts of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Summer and 
Autumn 2004. 
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the use of the general LQ-index filled with enterprise data – the “enterprise-LQ”. An 
enterprise-LQ above 1 shows relatively more enterprises in an industry than the 
national average. However, the number of enterprises in different regions may vary 
according to the regions’ economic structure. The enterprise-LQ – the relative 
number of enterprises as a mapping tool – could be misleading: caution is required. 
It is important to conclude that the enterprise-LQ will definitely not show the 
specialization of the region, but it gives a good hint on the size-structure of the 
economic organisations (more precisely: of the averg  relative size of the economic 
organisations). That is why it is going to be used as a secondary index, to elaborate 
the view of the economy given by other, “more reliable” tools. 
More information on an economic activity is given by the number of 
enterprises, and the change in the number of enterpris s. Here also it is not so much 
the size of the industry, but the structure, which counts. In Hungary these indices 
can be perfectly used, data are fully available from the HCSO. 
d) Export. The RCA-index (revealed comparative advantages; used mainly in 
world economy) can be considered as an LQ-index, too. I  has the same structure, 
filled with the appropriate export-data, and it shows the specialization of a region 
illustrated by the export activity. The “export-LQ” is not often used on a regional 
level, but as the output-side reflection of the employment-LQ it was worth 
introducing it. 
Its usage in Hungary is difficult; a rather limited series of data is available on 
the 4-digit SIC-code level. As a consequence, the export-LQ is only used as a 
complementary tool. 
e) Qualitative case-studies. Qualitative case-studies might reveal several of 
the keywords in our cluster-definition: shared infrast ucture, knowledge-base, 
division of labour (appearing as transactions among regional actors, input-output 
relationships). They make hardly measurable characteristics less elusive. 
As several foreign case-studies are available today, there is an opportunity for 
benchmarking, one might collect the distinguishing features of an industry’s 
clusters. It is also possible to recognize those infrastructural and institutional 
ingredients which make the clusters function and flourish, or the presence of which 
might indicate the existence of a similar cluster in Hungary. Porter’s diamond is 
often used when this method is chosen (Roelandt–den Hertog 1999, Lengyel 2000). 
f) Number of patents. The birth of shared technology could be traced via the 
number of patents. Together with the patent citations in the USA this indicator is 
appropriate for following the spreading of technologies and for finding the shared 
technology base (Jaffe et al 1993). Hungarian adapttion is influenced and hindered 
by the discrepancy of the Hungarian patenting system as compared to the American. 
The patents of the Csongrád County organisations might reveal the innovative 
activities of the region, though. 
g) Transactions and relationships among the regional actors. Analysing 
division of labour and the value chains equals the mapping of both spatial and 
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economic proximity, provided that the data investigated refer to the appropriate 
territorial level. This comfortably leads us to meeting the expectations recorded in 
the cluster-definition. Two elements of the mapping tool-kit are widely used here: 
input-output analysis and graph-analysis, but qualitative case-studies have the 
potential of revealing transactions and relationship , too. All three are part of the 
OECD-recommended methodological range (Roelandt–den Hertog 1999). 
The input-output analysis is well known in Hungary (Lengyel–Rechnitzer 2004). 
Unfortunately, for the region in our focus no input-o tput matrix is available, and 
creating our own matrix would require additional resources. 
Graph analysis (usually based on input-output matrices) would give a nice 
illustration of the region’s economy (see i.e. Luukkainen 2001, p. 284.). The 
difficulties of its usage lie in the matrix itself, as explained earlier. That is why these 
methods are not easy to use in Hungary. 
4. Adapting the methods in Hungary – data and methodological setbacks 
The previous paragraphs have proved that the potential clusters of Szeged and 
Csongrád County can be analysed mainly from two sides: employment and the 
number of enterprises. These are completed by the export data to sophisticate the 
results. The identified potential clusters could be tested by qualitative case-studies in 
the future. 
After the overview of the Hungarian statistical databases with regard to the 
territorial level and “depth” (number of SIC-code digits) of the data, the following 
indices can be used to map Szeged and Csongrád County on merits: 
1. employment-LQ, 
2. share of regional employment, 
3. enterprise-LQ, 
4. number of enterprises and its change, 
5. export-LQ. 
4.1. Data imperfection 
The different employment patterns of certain industrie  and economic activities  
(i.e. outsourcing) might distort the value of the employment-LQ. Thus the real size 
of an industry is certainly bigger than shown by the data. A similar problem is – as 
pointed out by Gecse and Nikodémus (2003) – that the HCSO does not collect 
employment data from the organisations with less than 4 people. The number of 
employees in organisations with 4-49 people is estimated, as a result there is a 
possibility of imperfection. 
The use of the export-LQ is made more difficult by the fact that the HCSO 
collects export data exclusively from the processing industry firms with more than 
“Analyse this” – cluster-mapping in Szeged and Csongrád County 
 
61 
50 people. Moreover the act on data protection prohibits the declaration of data in 
economic activities with 3 or less actors. It narrows our data set5. 
When interpreting the export-LQ it should be noted hat the HCSO takes 
export as transporting goods outside the border of Hungary. As a result, export data 
are incapable of showing trade among the regions or counties, and traded industries. 
Further data imperfection derives from the deficieny of the industrial 
classification system: not every economic activity is replaceable with one or more 
SIC-codes, mainly the activities of the “new economy”, creative industries etc6. 
Some data are collected according to the location, others according to the 
premise of an enterprise; some refer to Szeged, others o the Szeged subregion. 
4.2. Methodological shortcomings 
Methodological shortcomings derive mainly from aggregation, the decision on the 
value limits and the choice of the benchmark or the point of reference. 
Aggregation influences mostly the LQ-indices and the s are of the economic 
activities. The minimum size of the different activities on different territorial levels 
must be defined carefully. This is also true for the different levels of industrial 
classification aggregations. 
Choosing the value limit means giving the value of an LQ-index, from which 
the given economic activity is considered relevant or concentrated. Theoretically, 
this limit is 17, but in practise caution is required (Brenner 2004). The limit for the 
employment-LQ should be above 1. 
The differences in the employment patterns are not to be ignored in the 
empirical analysis, though, mainly when analysing parts of Hungary.  
The employment ratio of the Hungarian regions varies greatly, which distorts the 
employment-LQ, when having the whole of the economy as a benchmark. In a more 
developed region non-traded community-services are ov r-estimated, traded 
activities are under-estimated. In the peripheral regions the effect is quite the 
opposite. This effect can be eliminated if the traded industries serve as a benchmark. 
                                                   
5 Although the mere existence of publishable data in itself shows the significance of an economic 
activity – it means that there are at least three regional actors with traded products and export activity 
and with more than 50 people each. 
6 The literature often doubts the ability of the NACE (SIC-code based analysis) to answer the questions 
about a regions economic structure. A basic problem is that the classification systems seemingly do not 
follow the evolution of the economy: the activities of the new economy, creative industries and 
biotechnology are not classified. It is true for the NACE Rev.1.1. of the EU, ISIC REV.1.1 of the UN 
and the harmonised Hungarian TEÁOR’03, too (KSH 2002). 
North-America (Mexico, the USA and Canada) has remedied these problems recently. NAICS (North 
American Industrial Classification System) has been created, renewing the traditional classification and
enhancing the depth of the data (6-digit codes) (Tűű 2003). 
7 At Gecse–Nikodémus (2003) the regional and county-level value limit for the employment-LQ is 1, at 
Miller at al (2001) the regional limit is 1,25, the local is 5. 
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To sum up, in the analysis of the data it is worth having LQ-index limits 
above 1, and having traded industries as benchmark. But selecting traded industries 
is not an easy task. The literature documents several methods to do that (Stimson–
Stough–Roberts 2002, Porter 2003), these cannot be used in Csongrád County or 
Szeged. 
5. Mapping Szeged and Csongrád County 
Cluster-mapping in practise puts several problems and setbacks into the limelight. 
The analysis of Szeged and Csongrád County illustrates most of them impressively – 
that’s why this mapping project might serve as a guideline for other Hungarian 
mapping approaches. 
To return to the train of thought cited and used earlier, the tools and indices 
are defined now, this should be followed by setting the system of criteria, value 
limits, the sequence of the tools and indices. 
After these decisions are made, the investigation runs this way: the first step is 
the employment-LQ and the share of regional employment, using the economy as a 
whole as a benchmark (owing to the problems of dividing traded and non-traded 
industries). The deficiencies deriving from this benchmark are expected to be set off 
by the combination of several indices and tools. The mapping runs parallel for 
Szeged and Csongrád County. 
Both employment-LQ and the share of employment are c lculated with 4-digit 
SIC-code data for the year 2003 for Szeged and Csongrád County. In case both meet 
the expected value limits, the second step is analysing the number of enterprises. 
The data regarding the number of enterprises are for the year 2004, and these are 
also 4-digit SIC-code “deep”. Those classes/activities which do not match the 
employment criteria, are removed from the research. Those having deficiency with 
respect to only one employment indicator are to be analysed further if they show 
enough enterprises. In this case two of three data prove the critical mass. 
Classes with few enterprises but with good employment indicators might 
“suffer” from the unique features of the economic activity itself. In this case the 
enterprise-LQ can answer the question, whether the low number of enterprises is a 
general national phenomena or a regional characteristic. 
Another specification for clusters was expected growth. A potential driver of 
the regional economy should show growing number of actors – indicated by the 
annual average growth of the number of enterprises egarding the 1999-2004 period. 
“Analyse this” – cluster-mapping in Szeged and Csongrád County 
 
63 
Figure 1. The process of the cluster-mapping 
AIM
To launch the knowledge-based development of Szeged
and Csongrád county, to enhance the innovativeness of the region,
with the active participation of the University of Szeged.
CLUSTER-DEFINITION
A local/regional driver of the economy, where the enterprises
operate with shared infrastructure, technology, labour pool
and knowledge base, using division of labour.
KEY WORDS OF THE DEFINITION
Driver of the economy;
shared infrastructure; shared technology; labour pool; knowledge base;
division of labour
Facilities provided by the





Employment-LQ; share of employment,




Limits of indicator-values; sequence of different tools and indicators
CLASSES (SIC CODES)
Csongrád county:
0123, 0124, 2852, 2924, 4100, 4511,
4521, 4531, 4533, 4544, 5010, 5131,
5147, 5153, 7012, 7310, 7411, 7470,
7481, 7485, 7487, 8010, 8042, 8512,
8513, 8514, 9262,
1512, 1533, 1740, 1752, 1772, 1822,
1930, 2010, 2513, 2521, 2621, 2811,
2923, 2953, 3310, 3430, 3614
Town of Szeged / Szeged
subregion:
4521, 4531, 5147, 7012,
8010,
1740, 2521, 2811, 2852,
2924, 3430
POTENTIAL CLUSTERS
Groups of economic activities (SIC classes) fitting he criteria
QUALITATIVE STUDY
Testing the potential clusters
 
Source: own construction 
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The limits of the indicator-values as a set of criteria have been defined 
according to the foreign and Hungarian mapping practise. More combinations of 
value limits were tested to result in an acceptable number of activities, regional 
“high-points”. It was also expected that the set of economic activities resulted from 
this research should include industries with export-capacity. 
The set of industries left at the end of the process should be further analysed 
by qualitative case-studies, so as to group them into potential clusters, to reveal 
connections, co-operations among them etc. 
After testing different sets of limits of indicator-value, Csongrád County 
showed 27, Szeged (and its subregion) showed 5 SIC classes which correspond to 
the criteria. (More than in the case the British or the Hungarian Gecse–Nikodémus 
values were used.) These classes are to be supplemented by the activities with export 
data as a second row. Grouping into clusters has been done with the analysis of the 
content of the SIC-codes, lacking a qualitative case-study (Figure 1). 
6. Results 
Results and experiences appear in two fields: the usage of the methodology and the 
development of Szeged and Csongrád County. 
Methodologically the most conspicious difficulty was the quality of the data, 
which slowed down the whole mapping process. The Hungarian system of SIC 
codes was altered in 2002, and the modification was not consequently applied to the 
data (comparing those from 1999 with the more recent ones for example). Another 
disadvantageous factor was the lack of data. In some cases no employment data 
were published in spite of the fact that the number of enterprises was much higher 
than the limit for data-protection (it is three as mentioned earlier). Altogether 192 
activities were analysable on the county level, 55 on the town or subregional level – 
all of the different data were available only in these cases from among the 518  
4-digit SIC-code activities. Of course using the indices separately was possible for 
more than 55 or 192 activities. 
We have now come to the point where the activities f tting the system of 
criteria are to be investigated further (Table 1 and 2). On the whole in Szeged and 
the Szeged subregion five potential clusters are ident fied: the Construction Cluster, 
The Human Resource Cluster (including activities contributing to the development 
and “maintenance” of the human resource of the region), the Metal and Machinery 
Cluster, the Textile and Footwear Cluster, and the Plastic Cluster. 
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4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works 
4531 Installation of electrical wiring and fittings 




8010 Primary education 3,82 0,30 
Metal and 
machinery 
2811 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of 
structures 
2852 General mechanical engineering 
2924 Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery n.e.c. 
3430 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor 








2521 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and 
profiles 
0,00 0,03 
 5147 Wholesale of other household goods 0,40 0,32 
Source: own construction 
 
Meanwhile the county has a more wide-ranging processing industry character. 
The activities named at Szeged are present with much more 4-digit SIC-code 
classes. On the county level the clusters of Szeged ar  to be completed with the 
Meat Cluster, the Business Services Cluster, and the Fruits and Vegetables Cluster8. 
(There are some SIC classes, which couldn’t have been grouped into any of the 
clusters, although they met all the criteria.) These clusters are obviously only 
hypothetical, regarding the cluster-definition at the beginning of this study. As long 
as an appropriate qualitative case-study confirms their existence, the living co-
operations, division of labour and transactions inside a cluster, it is a mere 
assumption. 
Critical mass (in employment and number of enterprises) is performed on 
county level by the Construction and the Human Resource Cluster. A critical mass 
in employment is perceived in Metal and Machinery, Meat, Textile and Footwear 
(Table 2). 
                                                   
8 The region has unique features, too. For example the employment-LQ of the manufacture of cordage, 
rope, twine and netting is extremely high, but the number of enterprises is very low, just like the 
number of employees. The foreign cases take this activity as part of the textile cluster – following this 
practise it becomes a strong point of the region’s economy, making it special among the others. 
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7310 Research and experimental development on 
natural sciences and engineering 
8010 Primary education 
8042 Adult and other education n.e.c. 
8512 Medical practice activities 
8513 Dental practice activities 
8514 Other human health activities 
9262 Other sporting activities 
12,69 6,48 
Construction 
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood; 
impregnation of wood 
3614 Manufacture of other furniture 
4511 Demolition and wrecking of buildings; earth 
moving 
4521 General construction of buildings and civil 
engineering works 
4531 Installation of electrical wiring and fittings 
4533 Plumbing 
4544 Painting and glazing 
5153 Wholesale of wood, construction materials 
and sanitary equipment 




1740 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, 
except apparel 
1752 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and 
netting 
1772 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted 
pullovers, cardigans and similar articles 
1822 Manufacture of other outwear 
1930 Manufacture of footwear 
5,27 0,62 
Meat 
0123 Farming of swine 
0124 Farming of poultry 




2811 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of 
structures 
2852 General mechanical engineering 
2923 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and 
ventilation equipment 
2924 Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery n.e.c. 
2953 Manufacture of machinery for food, 
beverage and tobacco processing 
3430 Manufacture of parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles and their engines 
5010 Sale of motor vehicles 
4,27 2,19 






7411 Legal activities 
7470 Industrial cleaning 
7485 Secretarial and translation activities 
7487 Other business activities n.e.c. 
2,41 6,34 
Plastic 
2513 Manufacture of other rubbed products 





1533 Processing and preserving of fruit and 
vegetables n.e.c. 
5131 Wholesale of fruit and vegetables 
0,73 0,61 
 




2621 Manufacture of ceramic household and 
ornamental articles 
0,92 0,05 
 5147 Wholesale of other household goods 0,44 0,26 
 
3310 Manufacture of medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopaedic appliances 
0,31 0,30 
 7481 Photographic activities 0,04 0,21 
Source: own construction 
 
Szeged has much less of a critical mass in any of its potential clusters. Most 
considerable concentrations are the Construction and the Human Resource Clusters 
(Table 1). Assumably, on a subregional or municipal level it is not really worth 
searching for clusters, it is at least the county level, where clusters with a critical 
mass are identifiable. 
An interesting feature appears in connection with Szeged: the centre of the 
county shows concentration only in those activities, n which the county does so, 
too. Szeged might be outstanding in activities hardly measureable with the 
traditional SIC-code based data. 
Although the aim of the mapping included the promotion of innovation, too, 
real innovative clusters have not been recognised. It is true however, that the 
methodology itself was not favourable enough for innovative clusters. Traditional 
industries were identified, dominantly in the processing industry (Figure 2). On one 
hand, it gives the university a clear view about the structure and nature of the 
region’s economy and educational needs, on the other hand the university might find 
innovative partners and demand in the innovative segments of the clusters identified. 
With knowledge of the economic structure and development of the  
South-Great-Plain Region and Csongrád County, it is supposed to be a region with 
(potential or latent) traditional, processing industry clusters and drivers of the 
economy. The university cannot ignore the innovative factor, but realistically one 
should not expect to find extensive innovative relationships embedded in the region. 
Although Szeged considers biotechnology and different high-tech activities as a 
breakout, these are not statistically measureable and are not dominant segments of 
the economy at present. 
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Source: own construction 
 
Education and research are important parts of the regional employment. 
Consequently, the university promotes the county and the town with its input-
effects, as a passive regional role-player. With a future active university strategy the 
institute will be able to promote the other potential clusters, too. 
7. Summary 
All regions desire clusters. These economic structues are ideally created 
spontaneously, however, their development is sought to be supported in direct and 
indirect ways from various levels. This is a sort of pressure on the regions, any form 
of clusters or high-tech activities is a value-added f ature in the competition for 
relocating big companies and development resources9. Cluster-mapping is a 
methodology, a tool-kit and process to support presenting a realistic image on the 
regions. Via the adaptable part of this tool-kit, a detailed but not too surprising 
picture has been received of the region. It is worth mentioning that the processing 
industries are dominant as usually in the neofordist or (half-)peripheral regions 
(Enyedi 1999, Lengyel 2003), but we have to list the activities supporting the 
                                                   
9 Referring to the motion picture “Analyse this” mentio ed in the title of this study, one might as well 
think that “the Robert de Niro of regions” gets a nervous breakdown because of the pressure and 
necessity of becoming a high-tech region, regardless of its talents and desires. 
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development and maintenance of the human resource alongside with the 
construction industry. 
To summarize, the selected industries show a certain concentration / 
specialization (LQ-indices and the number of enterprises were used to show it), and 
also growth (through the number of enterprises). It means that the features ascribed 
to the drivers of the economy, moreover the critical m ss behind the shared labour 
pool and infrastructure is proven in case of the potential clusters. Export contributes 
to the driver image, and is an atribute when identifyi g the traded activities, 
therefore to the range of activities derived from the other indices has been completed 
by the exporting industries. 
This method did not indicate on the 4-digit SIC-code level the following 
activities appearing in earlier researches and initiatives: heating and thermo-
technical activities, the plant breeding part of the agricultural sector (except 
processing and distribution), a large number of segments of the food processing 
industry, some areas of the chemical industry, and handicraft (the latter cannot be 
measured statistically anyway). 
Regarding the clusters of the region it is worth considering that the local 
involvement and embeddedness of the enterprises located in the South-Great-Plain is 
extremely low (Buzás 2000). Based on this we have to be aware that the dominance 
in the economic structure of the region does not necessarily mean that a given 
activity will be the core of a cluster built on spontaneous co-operation and deeply 
embedded in the local and regional economy. Nevertheless, this should be the way 
of progress, even through the economy developing activity of the university. 
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Quo Vadis Hungarian Spatial and Settlement Policy?  
Miklós Lukovics – Tamás Besze 
 
The sum of the possible financial resources at Hungary’s disposal supported by the 
European Union between 2007 and 2013, indicates a historical chance in connection with 
the fulfillment of the development objectives, especially the spatial objectives in Hungary. 
The optimal utilization of the financial resources requires a continued decentralization 
process – started in 1996 but refracted in 1999 – and  strengthening of the regional 
institutional system. The efficient utilization of the financial resources also requires such a 
planning mechanism, which considers both the nationl specialities as well as the 
international spatial development experiences, and is based on a wide professional and 
political consensus. 
The present paper aims to survey the most important milestones of  the Hungarian 
spatial policy formation, especially the ones of the spatial- and settlement development. Also 
the evolution process of the Hungarian self governme t system is going to be explored, 
principally in regards of the relationship between the municipality development and EU 
grants. Finally the most important projects of the Municipality of Szeged will be 
demonstrated.  
 
Keywords:  regional policy, spatial development, municipality development 
1. Introduction 
Since Hungary's accession  to the European Union, spatial planning has come more 
and more into the limelight, because  financial aide of the European Union is based 
on  accomplished spatial documents (Rechnitzer–Lados 2004). Ten years ago, the 
Hungarian Parliament accepted the Act XXI. of 1996. on  regional development and 
physical planning. This was a supreme and complex rgulation of spatial 
development in Hungary (Horváth 1998). Its further importance is, that Hungary 
was the first among the candidate countries to adopt  the legal conditions of the 
regional institutions relating to the principles and requirements of the European 
regional policy. According to the act, spatial development in Hungary is based on 
national and regional planning documents, concepts, programs, and physical plans 
(Rechnitzer 1998a). 
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2. Some issues of the Hungarian spatial policy until 1996 
Concerning the analysis of the Trianon Treaty, Pál Teleki was the first Hungarian 
who examined the economic effects of  spatial processes (Hajdú 2001). According 
to him, breaking-up the solid, poly-centric city network of the Hungarian Kingdom 
would trigger severe issues for the rest of the Hungarian territory. The truth of his 
statement is confirmed by the fact that nobody could resolve the problem of a 
Budapest centered, mono-centric Hungary so far.. 
The first legislative provision in connection with e spatial- and settlement 
development was the Act VI. of 1937. on physical plnning of cities, housing and 
construction. The law obliged  cities to complete city development plans (Sipos 
1993), furthermore compelled  cities with high level of exactitude to prepare land 
usage plans and general settlement plans. After World War II, the Institute of 
Physical Planning (the so called TERINT) was been established in 1949. The 
general aim of the TERINT was to coordinate  socialist c industrialization and  
town-planning. Additionally, its task was to register all spatial and settlement 
changes, and to prepare several plans. Its significa ce might be the completion of 
the first regional planning works, like the one of Zagyva-valley, Borsodi area, 
Baranyai area.  
As for local legislation, in 1949 and in 1950 the Constitution, and later the 
first council law introduced a council system that was completely alien to the 
Hungarian conditions, by copying the soviet model (MKOGY 1950). From the 
beginning, the major function of this system was to accomplish the central decisions 
of the white trash dictatorship that aimed to change society and economy mainly 
with means of  polity, leaving little local independence. Similarly to the first one, the 
Second Council Law in 1954 also rejected the idea of local municipality (MKOGY 
1954). There was a decrease in the councils’ duties in administration and authority 
but the councils’ spatial and settlement development tasks slightly increased. The 
councils were regarded as the lengthened arm of the central state organization 
delegated by the monolithic party-centre. In the so-called dual subservience the 
centre managed the county by primacy means, the county managed the townships 
and most of the towns and the township councils managed the villages. This local 
dependence attached serious lack of local democratism, nominal votings and 
elections preceding the real free elections. Council boards were politically 
insignificant, as council leaders, closed council meetings and closed executive board 
meetings decided on important issues beforehand, and  council meetings mostly just 
accepted these decisions. From the aspect of city development, we cannot disregard 
that the panel program that started in the second half of the 1960s wasn’t based on 
local decisions, either. 
The decree with legal force of 1955. XXXVI. on the regulation of town- and 
village settlement determined the system of town- and village settlement, and dealt 
with the notion of regionalism more thoughtfully than ever before. Due to this 
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legislative provision,  the number of regional plans i creased significantly from the 
end of the fifties. In 1965, the National Settlement Development Plan was  
completed, which surveyed  Hungarian settlements and  development trends. In 
1970, the National Settlement Development Concept was  worked out, which was  
adopted by the Hungarian government after a wide dialog with the local and 
departmental authorities in 1971. According to the concept, all the settlements were 
classified into development categories. The financil resources provided for each 
settlement were  dependent on the category of the concrete settlement.  
This dual subservience remained in force during the lat r “reforms” of the 
council system, the laws did not provide much more local independence. The 
council system was only the executor of central programmes. But these programmes 
did not involve local needs that could have given a special image to settlement 
development and that could have implemented developments in a way that would 
have fulfilled local needs the most. As local regulation did not have any latitude in 
other developments either, settlements got poorer and poorer, regardless of their 
size.  
On the whole, the Hungarian spatial policy before 1985 can be characterized 
with a settlement view instead of a spatial view. This policy was city-centric, which 
underplayed the role and importance of territorial units. In this period, the spatial 
policy was strongly centralized in Hungary.  
From 1985 until 1996, Hungarian spatial policy can be characterized as a 
transitional one. The resolution of the Parliament Nr. 12/1980-85. aimed to develop 
the lagging behind territorial units, so this legislative provision was the first, which 
declared the spatial view instead of settlement view. In the middle of the eighties, it 
has been realized, that the development of separated settlements is not efficient, 
complex territorial units has to be taken into consideration and developed. In the 
decentralization process of the Hungarian regional policy, the Act LXV. of 1990.  on 
the local governments counts as a substantial mileston , which pronounced the local 
demand on decentralization.  
From 1991 until 1995, spatial development efforts were supported by a 
separated money fund in Hungary. The Spatial Development Fund had a broadly 
varied function: to support employment level expansio  and economic restructuring 
in lagging behind regions, to support the creation of crisis management programs on 
the level of regions and sub-regions etc. It was also emphasized, that during this 
transitional period the regional policy of the European Union was introduced to 
Hungary, which started to receive its core principles (Lados 2001), but its effects 
became perceptible only in the next period.  
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3. Milestone in Hungarian spatial policy 
The adoption of the Act XXI of 1996 on regional development and physical 
planning meant a turning point in regional planning, institutions, financial and 
economic regulation and EU-integration. 1996, the year, when the act came into 
force is the beginning of the third stage of the Hungarian spatial policy. This 
legislative provision set its regional developments goals, overall objectives – 
therefore the partition of competences between the Parliament and the government – 
in compliance with the regional policy of the European Union. This act forms the 
basis of the Hungarian spatial policy (Rechnitzer 1998a).  
The Country Report of the European Union in 1998 gave  very positive 
evaluation on the Hungarian regional policy, because the adopted act was unique 
amongst the candidate countries. One of the most important significances of the act 
was to define and to clear the most important notios f the theme, like region, sub-
region, spatial unit, regional development etc. Furthermore the act defined the tools, 
financial resources and the institutions of regional development. The notion of 
regional planning was given a high priority also in the preparation for drawing 
Structural Funds and the evaluation of the country alike.  
The act set up the possibility of applying the regional policy of the European 
Union by containing the most important core principles of the EU’s regional policy, 
like concentration, partnership, additionality, regional applications etc. Furthermore 
the act fulfills the requirements of justice, equity and solidarity, and the general 
cohesion objectives of the European Union (Horváth 1998). Dissociation of the 
institutions into national, regional, and sub-regional level also can be evaluated as a 
big step in the efforts of decentralization. The act ordered to complete spatial 
development documents first of all on the level of regions and counties1. This is a 
very important issue from economical view, because for ign direct investment and 
enterprise development need a well documented background, since spatial 
documents contain significant information to support investment decisions  
(for example about externalities).  
The progress of the Hungarian spatial policy came to a sudden standstill in 
1999. The act XCII. of 1999. on the modification of the act XXI. of 1996. on 
regional development and physical planning can be evaluated as a withdrawal in the 
decentralization efforts in spatial policy. Significant changes in the membership 
                                                   
1
 In connection with this point of the act, the following legislative provisions should be mentioned: 
- 184/1996. (XII. 11.) Statutory order on the adoption process of spatial development concepts, 
programs and physical plans. 
- 112/1997. (VI. 27.) Statutory order on the information system about spatial development and 
physical planning.  
- 18/1998. (VI. 25.) Departmental order on the contents of spatial development concepts, 
programs and physical plans.  
- 23/2001. (II. 14.) Statutory order on the modificaton of the 184/1996. (XII. 11.) Statutory order 
on the adoption process of spatial development concepts, programs and physical plans.  
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pattern of the Regional Development Councils are on the way back to centralization: 
the preponderance of ministries, its right of veto, the exclusion of the local economic 
actors (chambers, Council of Labour), the membership of deconcentrated 
organizations (Office of Agriculture) are steps towards centralization. The European 
Union passed strictures on this issue, just as on the inadequate utilization of the 
financial resources: spatial resources have been usd a  resource replenishment by 
municipalities and their institutions so they did not catch their originally intended 
target group, the enterprises. 
The European Union also crabbed Hungary in connection with the NUTS-2 
level regions: the defined seven regions did not satisfy the criteria of normative 
regions defined by the EU: there are not elected, only delegated representatives on 
regional level, and the Regional Development Councils do not have own financial 
resources at their disposal.  
In 1998, the first National Spatial Development Concept (OTK) was approved 
by the Hungarian Parliament (Decree 35/1998 III.20. of the Hungarian Parliament). 
This Concept was the first complex and strategic development document in 
Hungary, which was the principal document of Hungarian spatial development 
policy, regional development. It gave orientation for different instruments of 
regional policy, and formulated guidelines in order to educe regional disparities. As 
a framework document it contains the development perspectives of the country and 
its regions, outlines the long-term regional development objectives and declares the 
guidelines for the elaboration of  various development programs. In addition, the 
document provided regional planners and stakeholders with the necessary 
information (OTK 1998). 
4. New trends in  Hungarian spatial policy 
According to the act XXI of 1996.2, the National Spatial Development Concept 
should be analyzed every six year. As a result of three comprehensive evaluations on 
the emergence of the Hungarian spatial development policy and the regional 
processes of the country, a new concept was elaborated nd approved by the 
Hungarian Parliament at the end of 2005 (Decree 97/2005 XII. 25 of the Hungarian 
Parliament). The new concept sets up the principles of a more complex spatial 
development policy, which must be integrated into all other policies. At the same 
time these policies also should be integrated through the development of regions by 
the process of decentralization.  
                                                   
2 The act LXXV. of 2004.  on the modification of the act XXI. of 1996.  on regional development and 
physical planning and other related acts went back to the way of decentralization, because it abandone 
the preponderance of ministries in the membership pattern of Regional Development Councils. 
Furthermore this act also established development councils  on the level of sub-regions. 
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The new OTK lays down the spatial perspectives of the country, and the long 
term objectives in harmony with them. Furthermore it draws up medium-term 
objectives and spatial priorities, tools, institutional conditions, and contains the 
targets of the regions.  
The new National Spatial Development Concept contains the following 
innovations in comparison with the National Development Concept of 1998 
(Salamin et al 2005, OTK 2005): 
- it is strong committed to accelerate and strengthen d centralization and 
regionalism in Hungary, 
- it defines a more complex spatial policy, than ever b fore: a spatial policy 
with widespread functions, integrated into the general development policy, 
- nearby the objective of decreasing regional disparities also the objective of 
spatial efficiency (competitiveness) and sustainability comes into the 
limelight, 
- it is founded on cross-border thinking. 
 
In harmony with one of the most important core principle of the EU regional 
policy, the idea of subsidiarity, the National Spatial Development Concept of 2005 
puts down only such spatial objectives and tasks, which are valid for the country in 
general. These objectives of the OTK are results of a widespread consultancy 
process with  regional development agencies. The concept provides  wide elbow-
room in spatial planning for the regions on several aggregation levels, especially for  
NUTS-2 regions. These territorial units are defined as the primary aggregation level 
in the decentralized development policy. During the spatial planning process of the 
NUTS-2 regions the general objectives written in the OTK should be considered 
compulsory (Salamin et al 2005, OTK 2005). 
5. Development poles in the new spatial policy  
The National Development Concept (OFK), as an overarching development concept 
fulfills the role of a country strategy was elaborated in 2005, parallel to the National 
Spatial Development Concept. Because of this fact, their main findings are the same: 
both of them define development poles in Hungary. “… in order to ensure that 
development is not limited to the area of the capital, he monocentric spatial 
structure should be resolved. […] The whole country requires development poles to 
catalyze competitiveness, and which are organic elem nts of a harmonious, 
polycentric, cooperative town network system. […] Hungary’s development poles 
are: Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, Pécs, Győr, and Budapest.” (OTK 2005). 
According to the concept, the most important task of the development poles are to 
facilitate innovation activity and help spreading inovation in the region. They also 
should contribute to the decrease of regional disparities in Hungary.  
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The Decree 96/2005 (XII. 25) of the Hungarian Parliament on the National 
Development Concept and the Decree 97/2005 (XII. 25) of the Hungarian 
Parliament on the National Spatial Development Concept defined Szeged as a 
development pole also on the level of legislative provisions with other 4 cities listed 
in the decrees (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Regional development poles and axes in Hungary 
 
Source: own construction on the basis of OTK (2005, p. 39.) 
 
Consequently, Szeged, as a defined development pole, with some other 
preferential cities together plays an accentuated role in the new spatial policy of 
Hungary. From the point of view of our research it also has to be emphasized, that 
both OTK and OFK highlight the increase of capacity for specialized research and 
development of the departments that are competent to instigate defined and 
significant development (OTK 2005). The core competence of the development pole 
program in Szeged is the biotechnology.  
Based on this, in the following part of this paper we are going to concentrate 
on the city of Szeged. In the next few chapters we will enhance the most important 
milestones from the history of the Municipality of Szeged, then some of its 
relationships with the most important institution of the development pole 
competence, the University of Szeged will be surveyed.  
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6. Regime change and the evolution of settlement development’s local self-
governmental legal background 
The regime change  challenged people not only on a national but also on a local 
level: in Szeged, just like in all other communities of the country, the first general 
municipal elections were held in autumn 1990 as a significant step towards 
developing democracy. It put an end to the council system and new type of local 
self-governments replaced them, which, contrary to common councils, could be 
founded in each settlement.  
The political necessity of founding local self-governments, which have their 
own rights, wealth and income sources, met the natio l and international economic 
and professional efforts started on this issue several years before. The new 
legislation overthrew the whole council system, building on municipal traditions and 
historical values instead. Dr. Balázs Horváth, Secretary of the Homeland of the 
Antall-government initiated that the Act LXV. of 1990 should include those basic 
requirements that are contained in the 1985 municipal Charta of the Council of 
Europe, and that József Eötvös, the Cult and Educational Minister of the 
revolutionary government of 1848-49 drew up as follows (ETS 1985): „ We demand 
the personal independence to be maintained; we demand the decisions that are of 
interest only for certain segments of citizens, for example a town or the inhabitants 
of a county, to be made only by those whom these isues concern!”  
(MKOGY 1990a) 
The major basic requirement and the quintessence of the new local self-
government system is municipal independence, changing the local self-governments 
into owners and economic organizations, which could proceed to settlement 
development based on local interests. 
7. The economic grounds of local self-governments’ devlopment sources in 
the 1990s 
The economic background of local self-governments that became legitimate by the 
democratic elections radically changed in comparison to the council system. At the 
change of the regime, the Act LXV of 1990 significantly changed the conditions of 
settlement management and placed it on a new basis. 
From this point, local self-governments had their own properties, and could 
manage their own budgetary incomes and expenses indpe ently. In addition, they 
could alienate  items that had been taken away fromthe state property and had been 
given to the municipalities (such as roads, institutions, buildings, barracks etc).  
It was a milestone for settlement development because settlements suffering from 
lack of financial sources could use their properties as a collateral when asking for 
development aids or applying for tenders, or they could even sell, privatize these 
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properties. Possessing own financial resources, local self-governments were able to 
decide on their own settlement’s actuation and the dir ction of their development 
quite independently.  
But this kind of independence did not always mean complete independence in 
terms of development tasks in the first half of the 1990s. The reason for this is that 
the municipalities’ financial operations and their use of sources is strongly 
controlled: firstly because the budget of local self-governments is part of the public 
finance, they get most of their financial funds from the state3; secondly because in 
case of other supports financed by the public, the state determines the conditions 
how these supports can be used, for example earmarked subsidies and allocations4 
based only on national sources, that were significat in this period and that realized 
several important investments in Szeged in the last few years.  
8. The new financial sources of the regime change: privatization incomes, 
earmarked subsidies, real estate barters  
In the years following the regime change, Szeged couldn’t see bigger developments 
due to a lack of equity. Similarly to other local se f-governments, the  Municipality 
of Szeged, the county capital of Csongrád County, could experience not only the 
bright side of wealth growth, but also took on a lot of charges after its own 
ownership developed. Firstly the establishment costs f municipal institutions was 
almost an impossible burden for the local  authorities. Secondly, the only significant 
source of income, privatization, which started due to the possibility to alienate the 
local self-government’s properties, meant not only i come but also expenses. These 
properties were often rather devastated buildings and building sites without public 
utilities, which had to be upgraded before sale. In most cases it meant restoring 
building and providing building sites with public utilities.  
But in terms of town development and town rehabilitat on, the undoubted 
merit of privatization is that the incomes of selling those properties that had been 
given by the state meant almost the only sources that could finance more significant 
projects in the beginning of the 1990s. Due to such incomes several building 
reconstructions were started in the city (e.g. the restoration of Dóm square). 
In the following years the local self-governments’ independence in decision-
making was damaged by the lack of other development sources independent of the 
                                                   
3 The bigger part of the incomes of the local self governments consist of state assigned taxes, normative 
contributions of the state budget, local taxes, incomings of its own economic activities and fees 
(MKOGY 1990b). 
4 According to the Act 1992. évi LXXXIX. the Hungarin Parliament supports some of law defined 
local investments in order to stabilize the actions of the local self-governments. If a local self-
governments fits to the state specialized criteria system it gets the earmarked subsidies automatically. 
Beyond this adequate the ermarked allocations were available just in competition: in order to get state 
subsidies local governments have to create competitive project ideas for a ranking list. 
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budget. According to the Act LXV of 1990.  on local self-governments could 
manage local developments in their own jurisdiction, but without proper financial 
background they could only implement  developments which enjoyed central state 
support. This statement is confirmed by how the incomes of the privatization of 
municipal properties (building sites, buildings, etc.) were used, as according to 
central legislation these incomes could be used only to restore buildings (mainly 
residential properties), which were almost the only re iable financial background for 
building restorations besides earmarked subsidies and allocations in the beginning of 
the 1990s (MKOGY 1990b). It includes the restoration of Szeged’s historical centre, 
which, after the small renovations of the 1980s, appe red only point wise in the 
beginning of the 1990s, and was limited to certain institutional and residential 
buildings. From the end of the decade bigger and bigger projects were started with 
conscious town rehabilitation planning, such as the on  billion-forint restoration of 
Kárász street – Klauzál square, the restoration of so-called 2nd block within Kárász, 
Somogyi, Kelemen and Kölcsey streets, and the 800 million-forint rebuilding of the 
dual roundabout at Dugonics square and the transformation of Tisza Lajos 
boulevard, which were remarkable improvements of the  city centre’s traffic 
conditions.  
For the sake of using the available sources independently, the local self-
government has often tried to find other ways of utilizing its properties to gain 
alternative economic benefits. After the regime change, the acquired buildings were 
taken into account not only as properties that could be sold, but they also gave the 
possibility for different organizations to join economically. The “Universitas 
property barter programme” that was started in the middle if the 1990s  by the local 
self-government and the university as their first development programme in the 
middle of the 1990s serves as a good example for that. It meant that the university, 
which covers the whole of the city’s area, and the municipality swaps properties on 
the grounds of mutual benefits with the approbation of Szeged’s General Assembly. 
József Attila University and Juhász Gyula Teacher Training College, the legal 
predecessors of Szeged University possessed a notable number of properties 
SZMJVÖ (2000). 
9. Sources appearing with the pre-accession to the European Union (Phare, 
ISPA) 
The city of Szeged started to work out investment co cepts based on new sources in 
the second half of the 1990s. The reason for this wa  that the basis of Pre-accession 
to the European Union became available such as PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD. 
From these, mainly the pre-accession programmes of PHARE and ISPA were 
significant from the point of settlement development. Since these programmes – 
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mainly ISPA – supported mostly cohesive investments, the main direction of 
developments was also limited to remedial projects. 
 Due to the shift in the direction of the targets of PHARE programmes in 
1997, the programme’s funds could also be used directly for institutional 
developments and supporting investment (Flamm Benedek 2003). In autumn 2003, 
approaching the deadline of using the pre-accession’  fu ds, an application was 
handed in to restore a square that belonged to the historical part of the city centre of 
Szeged. Competitive factors started to arise as part of the project as the application 
included not only rehabilitation, but also creation of workplaces. The reason for this 
was the establishment of a biomonitoring system at the square, that monitors the 
pollution level of the air, and to operate this system, experts had to be trained and 
employed, and other new employees were also hired through cooperation with civil 
services and the employment centre, who had to look after the renovated park. Thus 
the idea of partnership, that is a keystone of the grants of the European Union, 
concretely appears in this 1.1 billion-forint project.  
Another important investment of Szeged, which aimed to establish the city’s 
entire sewerage system, was also launched in this period. Hungary’s biggest 
investment of this kind was implemented from a total gross budget of more than  
23 billion forints, using sources from Brussels, ISPA funds, and it meant that  
253 kilometres of drainage was built altogether in the city and in the neighbouring 
villages that joined to the programme.  
The main aim of ISPA was to prepare the counties awaiting the accession to 
welcome the Cohesive Fund’s supports, and to solve the concrete problems of traffic 
and environmental infrastructure, that were hindering the accession. So the 
supporting programme had remedial aims firstly, and not to improve economic 
competitiveness. We mustn’t forget though, that as an indirect effect of this 
investment, the number of people employed in local onstruction increased 
significantly – even if temporarily -, because 80% of the contractors working on this 
project were local entrepreneurs, this way local employers and employees could also 
benefit from the rehabilitation, and it also enlarged the budget of the municipality 
because of the entrepreneurs’ local taxes (mainly trade and communal taxes). 
Besides the restored roads and completed drainage syst m, a further benefit of the 
project was the strengthened local entrepreneurs, who could use this work as a 
reference and who, this way could apply for similar projects in other parts of the 
country with great chances. 
10. Increase in development funds between 2004 and 2006  
With Hungary’s accession to the European Union on the 1st of May 2004, 
unprecedented financial sources became available for national and local 
developments. Between 2004 and 2006 675 billion fori ts were available for certain 
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development priorities in the frame of the National Development Concept (NFT). 
According to the basic aims5 drawn up in the NFT, there were calls for tenders in 
five operational programmes (OP): Economic Competitiv ness OP, Environment 
and Infrastructure OP, Agricultural and Rural Development OP, Human Resource 
Development OP, and Regional OP. From these Operational Programmes mostly 
GVOP, KIOP, and ROP provided possibility to implement bigger investments. The 
support rates were around 50-80%, but in many cases raising the 10-15% own 
funding was also a difficulty. Despite the extended funds, this problem could have 
discouraged a lot of local self-governments from potential development possibilities, 
but the Hungarian government established a tender possibility based only on 
national sources to help the local self-governments. The ministry of Home Affairs 
has called a tender every year since 2004 “to support local self-governments’ own 
sources for the development tenders of the European Union” and it has supported a 
lot of local self-governments’ development ideas, that gave fund for the own source 
of a successful application for an operative programme6.  
In 2005 the Association of National Municipalities’ Union’s standpoint on the 
T/17700. bill of the 2006 Budget of the Hungarian government also drew attention 
to the problems of  local self –governments’ development sources. According to this 
bill, the extensive reform of local self-governments, that could make the operation of 
each settlement economical (OÖÉSZ 2005), does not come true again in 2006. 
According to the starting point and the accepted bill, which was mainly unchanged 
compared to the original one, there wasn’t a change i  the duties and jurisdiction, 
the conditions of management regulations remained basically unchanged, the 
financial conditions were damaged7, so for the next budgetary period of the 
European Union between 2007 and 2013, the ability to finance bigger municipal 
investments remained a key question of development policy.  
11. New dimension: the development period of 2007 -2013 
Certain chapters of the presently effective national development document, “The 
New Hungary Development Plan” (hereafter UMFT) enhanced the development 
possibilities of local self-governments. The 675 billion-forint fund available in the 
                                                   
5 The National development Plan (2004-2006) drafts three general goals (competitive ecomomy, more 
effective human resource and well-balanced spatial development) in order to improve the living 
standard sin Hungary (NFT 2004).  
6 In the year 2005 a municipality managed project with the name of „Integrated Development of the  
E-government in Szeged” was granted by the EU. The total project budget was 670 million HUF  
(appr. 2,3 million EUR). Beyond the 540 million HUF EU grant the municipality got other 78 million 
HUF as an own source subsidy from the Hungarian Government (SZMJVÖ 2005).  
7 According to the Act of the annual Hungarian Budget in 2005 the local self-governments got  
1349,8 billion HUF (approximately 4,49 billon EUR) as state financial source which was half billion 
HUF less than in the previous year (MKOGY 2005). 
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frame of NTF got ten times larger in the period of 2007-2013 and it provides a 
possibility for more specific aims (Table 1).  
According to the Decree 96/2005 (XII. 25) of the Hungarian Parliament on 
the National Development Concept and the Decree 97/2005 (XII. 25) of the 
Hungarian Parliament on the National Spatial Development Concept defined Szeged 
as a development pole also on the level of legislative provisions with other 4 cities 
listed in the decrees. The long term aims of UMTF is broadening employment and 
ensuring permanent growth. As for the latter one, according to the UMFT Integrated 
Settlement Development Strategy, the support for the economic growth of the 
settlements that are development centres predominates mostly in polycentric, 
cooperative settlement network system (UMFT 2007). To ensure a long term, 
balanced spatial development, there is a need to compensate the capital’s economic 
dominance and to change the monocentric structure of the country, which they want 
to establish with functionally assigned settlements and emphasized developments 
based on technological innovation. This idea was rathe  weakened later, in the phase 
of planning and social discussions, but because of the central role of 5 “pole cities” 
the possibility of some key investments (based mainly o  equity) didn’t disappear. 
As a matter of fact, cities that are assigned as competitive poles do play a key role in 
determining their area’s competitiveness with their innovation potential.  
Table 1. Operational Programmes of The New Hungary Development Plan (UMFT) 




1. Economic development Economic Development OP (GOP) 690,0 
2. Transport development Transport OP (KÖZOP) 1703,2 
3. Social renewal Social Renewal OP (TÁMOP) 966,0 
 Social Infrastructure OP (TIOP 538,9 
4. Environment and energy 
developments 
Environment and Energy (KEOP) 1140,0 
5. Regional Development OPs of the 7 regions of Hungary: 
West Pannon OP 
Central Transdanubia OP 
South Transdanubia OP 
South Great Plain OP 
North Great Plain OP 
North Hungary OP 
Central Hungary OP 
1609,4 
6. State reform State reform OP 
Electronic Public Administration OP 
(ÁROP) 
140,7 
Co-ordination and communication of the 
New Hungary Development Plan 
Implementation OP (VOP) 87,2 
TOTAL (billion HUF)  6875,4 
Source: own construction on the basis of UMFT (2007, p. 132.)  
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Although UMFT also underlines the importance of settlements and the 
settlement system from the point of competitiveness in this case, it is probable that 
these settlements have also come to the front in case of other kinds of project 
concepts’ central and EU funds – usually developing basic settlement functions.  
12. Summary 
The reform of the institutional system in the Hungarian spatial development takes 
place very slowly. The institutional system set up for the access was not 
consequently built on institutions of regional development, which disappointed the 
regions (Szaló 2006). The effective establishment of the seven NUTS-2 regions has 
not been achieved yet, though some encouraging efforts happened.  §6 of the act 
XCII of 1999. on the modification of the act XXI of1996. ordered to set up regional 
development councils, hereby the regional framework has been defined by legal 
means. Some competences and tasks have been delegated to regional level, but the 
regions possess neither elected representatives nor own financial resources, although 
those later two are very important from the point of view the European Unions 
definition on regions.  
The correct usage of some core principles (decentralization, subsidiarity, 
partnership) requires the reconsideration of decision-making competencies, to 
decentralize the power, to strengthen the autonomy f the local communities 
(Rechnitzer 1998b). The institutional framework of the spatial policy in Hungary is 
strongly attached to  public administration, especially to the counties. Economic 
development is unfortunately only second priority in the distribution of financial 
resources, entrepreneurs are not able to enforce their interests. The counties hesitate 
to be partners of each other, although an efficient spa ial policy requires a successful 
concentration of forces on each territorial level.  
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Public Goods, Private Interest and Altruism 
Ferenc Mozsár 
 
This study shows through an example of a public good-like commodity, that the market might 
possibly provide the commodity even when there is no rivalry in its consumption and the 
exclusion of non-payers is costly. The actions of the market actors motivated by private 
interest both on the demand and supply side may render public (eg. government) decision 
unnecessary, and thus the necessary welfare losses a sociated therewith (like taxation, 
public choice, allocation of resources, particular interests) can be avoided. I will also show, 
that altruistic behaviour – which is, in a way quite distant from the logic of the market – does 
not necessarily enhance efficiency. 
 
Keywords: public goods, altruism 
1. Introduction 
Economic theory and practical evidences show, that private demand for public 
goods, which is, the individuals’ willingness to pay, nd the supply of these goods 
frequently results in socially suboptimal quantity of these goods. Economic theory, 
however, clearly suggests possible solution most of the time as well. This solution is 
typically not a kind of centralised decision mechanism, that appears a plausible 
solution, but there are generally methods that can be activated, devised by the 
entrepreneur on the supply side. It is always advisble to consider these methods, as 
in this case we do not have to calculate with the transaction costs and other 
efficiency losses linked to the public provision of these goods (costs of taxation, 
allocative losses in connection with realisation of partial interests). In this short 
paper I would like to illustrate my above view through an example of an arbitrarily 
chosen public good-like commodity. As a by-product of this simple model it can 
also be shown how, under certain circumstances, it does not matter whether self-
interested market behaviour is accompanied by altruistic behaviour. 
Well-known definitions for a public good mention non-rivalrous consumption 
(Samuelson 1955, Mansfield 1975), non-excludability (Fisher 2000, Pearce 1993), 
extern effects (Buchanan – Stubblebine 1962, Cornes–Sandler 1996), indivisibility 
(Stiglitz 2000) of the good and possibly governmental provision (Rodda 2001) as 
differentiating characteristic.1 I will now take non-rivalry as a sole important 
                                                   
1 On the notion of public goods in detail see Mozsár (2003). 
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characteristic of a public good, which also means that congestion will not happen in 
spite of a growth in the number of consumers. Non-excludability as a frequently 
mentioned attribute of a pure public good will be handled as a second condition, 
which might go together with the first, but it result  in different kinds of problems. It 
can also characterise private goods, and should be handled differently. A third 
dimension of the public good problem is whether the good in question is discrete or 
continuously divisible. In the first case, we only have to make a „yes-no” decision, 
or more of this kind consecutively, in the other case decision have to be made about 
the quantity too. In this paper I will investigate a perfectly discrete good, the 
consumption of which is non-rivalrous, there is no congestion and non-payers can 
only be excluded at prohibitively high cost. 
In this sentence most of the papers that I am aware of would have said that 
non-payers are non-excludable, but the main problem is the high cost of exclusion, 
not the technical impossibility of exclusion. Thus „non-excludability” in reality 
means, that taking on the cost of exclusion leads to a socially not efficient outcome, 
since the costs associated with exclusion would mean a greater burden on society 
than the potential loss associated with solutions allowing free riding (where loss 
results form suboptimal allocation of resources or form supply provided by the 
government) or with the altogether failure of supply. „Too costly” exclusion 
techniques may hinder the market altogether from producing the good. In this case 
the entrepreneur has to discover or invent less costly excluding techniques. But if 
exclusion is currently indeed „too costly”, the possibility of free riding has to be 
considered and one should investigate, whether private solutions could possibly lead 
to efficient outcome under the circumstances. 
2. The case of a single potential buyer 
In the most simple case there exist one and only one consumer whose reservation 
price exceeds the production cost of the good in question. In such cases it is 
possible, that this person alone provides the public good by herself. The only 
condition for this to happen is, that her disutility (envy) resulting from others’ free 
riding should not decrease her net welfare from consuming the public good below 
the production cost of it, and that she should be sur  that without her contribution 
the public good would not be produced at all. In other words, she has to have p rfect 
information over the others’ willingness to pay. The only rational thing to do for her 
is to produce the public good, access to which is now the same as it would be with a 
private good. The positive value others attach to this good now does not play any 
role, since the good is assumed to be discrete and co gestion effects are ruled out. 
This kind of solution is does in fact happen frequently in the reality, 
especially in the case of public goods of smaller value.2 The probability of this kind 
                                                   
2 Someone or other from the block will eventually salt the frozen sidewalk. 
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of solution is higher as the intensity of preferencs in the group become more 
differentiated. Intensity of preferences is often dtermined by the status, for example 
by the wealth of the individual, and the more it is differentiated, the more probable it 
is, that there exist someone in the relevant group whose valuation exceeds the public 
good’s cost of production. It is clear, that the more real estates one has, the higher 
she values a prospective decrease in real estate tax (as a public good), and the more 
she is willing to sacrifice to win the decision makers (legislators) to this case. 
„Small” actors are thus fairly able to exploit the „big” actor or actors, as we shall see 
later (Olson 1971). 
3. More than one potential buyers 
The situation is more difficult if there are more than one actors in the relevant group, 
whose valuation exceeds acquisition costs of the public good, because this opens up 
for them a way to free ride. In this case, it is not totally certain, that the good will be 
acquired at all (Hindriks–Pancs 2001). Let b indicate the utility of the public good to 
any consumer, and C the cost of acquisition. Let us assume, that b > C for every 
member of the group! If a member of the group is sure, that no other member will 
provide the public good, it is rational to her to acquire it herself. Her net utility than 
is b – C. If she succeeds in free riding, however, her net utili y will be b. The course 
of action she will take is dependent on the relation between the certain b – C and the 
expected b when free riding. Precondition for a successful free ide is the existence 
of at least one actor in the group, let us call her altruist – as opposed to the egoist 
free rider – who is willing to finance the public good unconditionally whenever  
b > C holds. Let us suppose, that the relevant group is a random subset of a 
population where the ratio of egoists is e[e ∈ (0,1)]3.The likelihood that in a group 
of n ≥ 2 there is no altruist is than en and thus obviously the likelihood of there being 
at least one altruist is 1 – en. If we look at the situation from the point of view of an 
egoist, than the likelihood of there being at least one altruist among the others is 1 – 
en-1. It is rational for her to abstain from acquiring the public good if 
b – C ≤ (1 – en–1)b     (1) 
For n = 2 this is true if4  
e
b
C ≥        (2) 
In this case, the likelihood [π(n, e)], that the public good will be produced 
equals to the likelihood of there being at least one altruist in the group. 
                                                   
3 See (Goeree et al 2002) on the relationship between alturism and group size. 
4 And if it holds for n = 2, than it also holds for any group larger than that. 
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π(n, e) = 1 – en.      (3) 
According to this, the likelihood of actually producing the public good 
proportional to the size of the group and inversely proportional to the ratio of egoists 
in the population. The former relationship seems to contradict the results of Olson 
whose opinion is, that small groups are more successful in providing public goods 
than bigger ones (Olson 1997), but notice, that in this model the utilities b derived 
from using the good by the members of the group is independent of the size of the 
group (as I assumed there be no congestion), whereas in Olson’s model the sum of 
the member’s utilities Σbi(n) is constant. 
What happens, if the original population is more egoistic, or the cost-benefit 
ratio more favourable? With suitably chosen parameter values the ratio of eg ists in 
the population will exceed C/b, that is 
e
b
C < .       (4) 
In this case b – C > (1 – en–1), and since e < 1 and C > 0, there exist a critical 
group size n* so, that 
b – C > (1 – en–1)b  for every n < n* and 
b – C ≤ (1 – en–1)b  for every n ≥ n*. 







n      (5) 
Critical group size is thus bigger the less favourable the cost-utility ratio is, 
and the smaller the ratio of egoists in the basis-population. There are two 
possibilities: 
1. if n ≥ n*, then the existence of at least one altruist in the group is very likely, 
so the dominant strategy for the egoists is not to pay, that is, to free ride.  
The probability of the production of the public good is the same (1 – en) as in 
the previous case. 
2. if n < n*, then one egoist is going to pay, the others are not. Symmetric 
behaviour is not a possible equilibrium, since we assumed b > C, so payment 
of one single person is enough for the public good to be produced. It is also 
not a possible equilibrium that no one pays, since b – C > (1 – en–1)b. Let us 
denote with p the probability that a given (egoistic) person will not pay!  
Who does pay will earn a net utility of b – C. Who does not pay will earn net 
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b utility if someone else does pay, and 0 otherwise. The likelihood that one 
member of the n – 1 size group („the others”) will pay is 1 – (ep)n–1, which is 
the sum of the likelihood of „there is at least one altruist” (1 – en–1) and 
„although there are no altruists, at least one of the egoists will eventually pay” 
[en–1(1 – pn–1)]. 
 
If b – C > [1 – (ep)n–1]b than the probability of one egoist paying will 
increase, otherwise it will decrease. In equilibrium 
b – C = [1 – (ep)n–1]b, 













ep for every n < n*.    (6) 
The decrease (increase) of altruists is, in this case (when n < n* and e > C/b) 
offset by the increase (decrease) in the egoists’ willingness to pay, thus the right 
hand side of the equation is constant.5 The likelihood of the public good actually 
being produced will be then independent of the level of altruism:  
π(e, n) = 1 – (ep)n,     (7) 














.       (8) 
The probability of the public good actually being produced is inversely 
proportional to the size of the group.6 
In the former 1) case the smaller the ratio of egoists in the population and the 
larger the size of the group, the more likely it is, that the public good will be 
produced. The precondition of a certain production of the public good is the total 
absence of egoists or an infinitely large group. These results signify what an 
entrepreneur should do: she should lower the ratio of egoists within the group or 
raise the size of the group concerned. In my opinion, the “magnitude” of egoism is 
directly proportional to C/b whereas the “feeling” of belonging to the concerned 
group is inversely proportional to it. Lowering the costs of providing the public 
good, which is a typical task for an entrepreneur, will lower the probability of 
                                                   
5 As a reminder, e is the ratio of egoists within the population, p is the egoists’ likelihood of not paying. 
A rise in the ratio of egoists means an increase in e a d their higher propensity to pay means a decrease 
in p. 
6 Assuming C/b = 0,5 the probability of the public good actually being produced is π(e, n) = 0,75 when 
n = 2 and π(e, n) → 0,5 when n → ∞.  
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egoistic behaviour, and higher private advantages associated with the existence of 
the public good (b) can raise the size of the group. The private advantages associated 
with the existence of the public good can be supplemented with various “selective 
incentives” Olson mentions (Olson 1997). These selectiv  incentives are non 
collective goods, the individual usage of which is conditional on taking part in 
financing a public good, and thus can be an effectiv  ool in organising latent 
groups. In my opinion such private goods that can be used by members of a group 
can, in addition to their functions mentioned by Olson, induce people to be part of 
the group, which in turn make them interested in providing the public good that 
enhances welfare of the group. I do not therefore tak  the relevant group as given, 
this is why we can speak here of the “feeling of belonging to a group”. It is one of 
the tasks of the entrepreneur to generate and strengthen this kind of feeling in 
prospective consumers through informing them, providing complementary goods or 
in other ways. 
In case 2) the more probable the actual production of the public good the 
smaller the C/b ratio, and the smaller the concerned group. In this case the perquisite 
for the certain production is C = 0.7 
In the above model we cannot reach the reassuring co clusion that under 
realistic circumstances voluntary contributions canassure the provision of the public 
good whenever the sum of private valuations is higher t an the cost of providing the 
good. This (ex post) efficiency condition is maybe a too strict one too according to 
Menezes et al. (Menezes et al 2001). It is in fact not very appropriate to evaluate the 
“goodness” of an allocation mechanism on a binary (either good or bad) scale.  
An alternative evaluative method can be, as the aforementioned authors also suggest 
is to measure the probability of actually providing the public good, once provision is 
otherwise effective8. 
4. No potential consumer 
The situation gets even more difficult, if no member of the group has a high enough 
willingness to pay as to finance the public good, even though its existence would be 
Pareto-efficient, that is 
bi < C,  for every i, and:  n⋅b > C. 
The contribution of any single player is insufficient in this situation to 
guarantee for her the availability of the public good. Her contribution is than useless 
                                                   
7 Lower costs will modify the reaction of the players under some circumstances. It can happen, that it 
lowers willingness to pay, and thus it will not change the likelihood of the public good’s production 
(Menezes et al 2001). 
8 It would be good to use this kind of evaluation in general, whenever the efficiency of allocative 
systems, market structures are considered. 
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if not enough other players other than her contribue and meaningless if the public 
good is financed without her contribution anyway. The real question here is the 
probability of hers being the pivotal contribution. How probable is it, that the public 
good will not be produced without her contribution, but it will with it? Let us 
investigate first the case when n = 2, bi = 1 (i = 1,2) and 1 < C < 2. Denoting ci the 
contribution of the i-th person to the costs, the public good can be financed if  
Σci ≥ C. 
If the players have perfect information regarding the valuation of the others, 
than any contribution so that C–1 < ci < b1 = 1 can lead to the efficient outcome, to 
the procurement of the public good. The symmetric outc me is naturally the  
c1 = c2 = C/2. 
Considering now the case of less than perfect information, let us assume, that 
any player values the public good at bi = 1 with a probability of 0,5 and bi = 0 with 
the same probability. While everyone is perfectly aware of her own valuation, as to 
the others everyone knows only this probability distribution. Depending on what 
happens with the contributions paid if the public good is not produced due to the 
behaviour of the other, two cases can be distinguished (Menezes et al 2001). 
a) In the first „game” if Σci ≥ C the public good will be purchased, but the 
potentially positive sum Σci – C will not be refunded (but will remain the 
profit of the producer). In the case of Σci < C, however, the contributions are 
paid back. This variation is called subscription game. The symmetric Nash-
equilibrium in this game is, that everyone contributes ci = 0 if the good is 
invaluable, and ci = C/2 whenever the good is valued at 1.
9 The outcome will 
always be Pareto-optimal. 
b) In the other game, Σci < C is a sufficient condition to prevent the purchase of 
the good, but the money paid in already will not be refunded. This kind is 
called contribution game10. The contribution of player 1. is obviously zero if 
b1 = 0. How much is she willing to pay, if she values the good at 1? In case of 
a contribution of C/2 the public good will be purchased with a probability of 
50%, which means an expected value of ½, thus the exp cted net utility is  
½ – C/2 < 0. Maximal contribution from each player is ½,which is not 
sufficient to finance the public good, as we assumed C > 1. The resulting 
outcome will not be efficient11. 
 
This simple, two-player model with binary valuations can be generalised to  
N > 2 players or to cases in which the valuation of the players is characterised by 
continuous probabilistic variables of known distribut on (Menezes et al 2001).  
                                                   
9 Nash (or Nash-Cournot) equilibrium means, that everyone’s choice is optimal, given everyone else’s 
choice. This means, that no one wants to alter her strategy ex post. 
10 Typical examples of this are when the contribution is an unconditional donation or physical work. 
11 Further models that assume non constant contributions in (Menezes et al 2001). 
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More complicated models bring up many new issues and make lots of new insights, 
but in our case they all mark pretty much the same path as our above compact 
model. More general analysis also supports the superiority of the subscription game 
over the contribution game just as it is confirmed in laboratory experiments. Perhaps 
our opinion is not fictitious, that in contribution game situations secondary 
(„selective”, if you like) incentives like self-esteem or prestige play a greater role 
than potential benefits from the public good itself. This is suggested by the 
significant national differences in donation habits. In subscription games, however, 
the contrary can be assumed. 
Let us now assume, that from a group of n at least 1 ≤ w ≤ n members have to 
contribute to the production of the public good. For the sake of simplicity let us 
again fix the amount of contribution at c per person. Denoting with mn the number of 
contributors in the group of n, the probability that there is exactly mn–1 = w – 1 
contributors in any group of n – 1 (the „others”), that is, the player in question s a 



















wmprob ,  (9) 
where e denotes again the ratio of egoists within the population, and p the 
probability that an egoist will not pay. The indifference condition for a given group-
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Subtracting the right hand probability from both sides and rearranging we get: 
cbwmprob
n
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.     (12) 
The probability also, that in a group of n only m < w members contribute, and 
therefore the public good will not be produced is the sum of probabilities m = s,  
s < w  





















ne .    (13) 
The probability of the public good being produced is than obviously: 

























nene .  (14) 
Because of (6), ep is constant, the altruist/egoist ratio again does not affect the 
probability of producing the public good. This probability will decrease as the group 
size increases until n* (Hindriks–Pancs 2001), above that this probability ncreases. 
Increase in the number of necessary contributors also decreases the probability of 
the production of the public good. 
5. Conclusion 
The task of the par excellence entrepreneur is to discover opportunities by which she 
is able to enhance net social welfare, and collect reward for her doing so from those 
who enjoy this enhanced welfare. Every situation comm nly discussed under the 
topic of „market failure” is thus an opportunity to market players. An environment 
should be created, where the entrepreneur can reachher goal, and at the same time 
also fullfills her social function („invisible hand”). 
In this paper we investigated a public good, which is an eclatant example of 
market failure, and three possible relevant groups. We assumed a public good in the 
consumption of which – in our terminology: naturally – there is no rivalry, no 
congestion effect, and excluding non-payers would be socially inefficient due to 
exclusion costs. We analised a (relevant) group, in which at least one member’s 
willingness to pay exceeds the production cost of the public good, then one in which 
this holds for more members and lastly one in which the provision of the public 
good is conditional on common financing. 
In the more complicated cases (2. and 3.) we pointed out those factors  
– cost/benefit ratio, group size, selective incentives – which an entrepreneur could 
modulate, thus making the opportunity to enhance welfare also an opportunity to 
earn money. We also pointed out, that in the analised situations the not so market-
conform altruistic behaviour do not necessarily enhance the efficiency of the 
allocation. 
Of course most of the public goods that are generally viewed as such can have 
many other specific characteristics (congestion, excludability of non-payers) that 
bring up newer problems and call for new solutions. The objective of this paper was 
solely to show, that these (private) opportunities can in fact exist.  
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Measuring the Innovation Performance of Hungarian 
Subregions 
Zoltán Bajmócy – Izabella Szakálné Kanó  
 
Today’s spatial economic processes are heavily influe ced by the conditions of the learning-
based economy. In this peculiar framework one of the main drivers of regional change is 
technological change occurring through the sequence of innovations. Therefore, the 
interpretation and measurement of territorial innovation capacity has become one of the 
main fields of interest in regional economics; however, the analyses conducted in lower 
levels of territorial aggregation raise several methodological problems. 
Present paper aims to analyse and evaluate the innovation capacity of the Hungarian 
LAU-1 subregions on the theoretical basis of the regional systems of innovation. We rank the 
innovation capacity of the subregions along distinct dimensions and also complexly, then we 
carry out the classification of the subregions, and we also analyse the spatial regularities of 
the innovation capacity. In the last chapter we attempt to shed light on the limitations of the 
applied approach in order to discuss the problems of the usual methods of innovation-
measurement and thus to provide possible future resarch directions. 
 
Keywords: regional systems of innovation, measuring in ovation capacity, subregion 
1. Introduction 
In today’s “knowledge-based” or “learning-based” economy there exists a close 
correlation between innovation capacity and the desired economic processes of the 
different regions. Through learning and innovation capacity, regions acquire unique 
resources that are hard to reproduce and help them to perform well in the territorial 
competition (Storper 1997, Lengyel 2003). Therefore, grasping the innovation 
capacity (potential) of the different territorial units has become a field of intense 
research. 
Although innovation research is primarily not rooted in regional science 
(Solow 1957, Nelson–Winter 1982, Inzelt 1998, Marinova–Phillimore 2003, 
Fagerberg 2005), spatiality has still been closely associated to the study of the 
innovation process and innovation capacity right from the beginning (Hägerstrand 
1952, Moulaert–Sekia 2003, Dőry 2005, Lagendijk 2006). 
On the one hand, regional science has drawn attention to the fact that 
innovation is a spatial phenomenon which largely depends on region-specific 
resources impossible to reproduce elsewhere (Ács et al 2000, Asheim–Gertler 2005, 
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Storper 1997). Consequently, the spatial situation and proximity of players 
represents an important determining factor of innovati n (Varga 2009). 
On the other hand, it also explored that analysis on the subnational level 
assumes essential importance when exploring the innovation capacity (Doloreux 
2002, Tödtling–Trippl 2005, Hollanders 2006, Lengyel–Rechnitzer 2004), since the 
innovation potential of a given country may assume some characteristic spatial 
structure and display significant territorial disparities. 
The present paper deals with this latter subject area by analysing the structure 
of national innovation capacity on the level of subregions. The first part of our paper 
reviews the interpretation possibilities of regional i novation capacity together with 
the measurement approaches deriving from them. This is followed by introducing 
the methodology of our subregional analysis and demonstrating the results emerging 
from the survey. 
Our survey focused on various aspects. On the one ha d, it aimed to utilize 
the experience of the most significant Hungarian and international studies that focus 
on the measurement of the innovation capacity of territorial units. On the other hand, 
we intended to gain an overall ranking also covering the different subareas that, 
beyond comparing the performance of the different trritorial units, can also be used 
to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of a given subregion. Furthermore, 
we intend to offer a categorization of Hungarian subregions based on innovation 
capacity. Beyond all that, we analyse the regularities of the spatial structure of 
subregional innovation capacity, the potential (spillover) effects of neighbouring 
subregions. 
The final chapter of the paper examines the limitations of the applied 
approach, by which we also attempt to draw attention o some crucial points that 
represent general problems of the measurement approaches of territorial innovation 
capacity. This also offers potential future research directions. Finally, we summarize 
our most important findings. 
2. Interpreting and measuring the innovation capacity of regions 
The innovation process is closely linked to spatiality. Storper’s (1997) concept of 
the “regional worlds of innovation” alludes to this, while the different territorial 
innovation models (TIM) unfold the same idea (Dőry, 2005, Moulaert–Sekia 2003, 
Lagendijk 2006). Therefore, innovation does not merely have a spatial aspect, but 
the spatial situation (distribution) of the players and the given regional environment 
exercise an endogenous influence on its outcome (Varga 2009). 
Regional science has constructed various concepts (TIM) that aimed to 
explain the excelling innovation performance of certain regions (and consequently 
their competitiveness and success). These theories basically provide a description of 
the peculiar characteristics of successful regions compared to others. 
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The concept of regional innovation systems (RIS), that has assumed special 
significance among TIM models in relation to explaining innovation capacity, partly 
follows this tradition. Besides emphasising spatiality, this approach obviously 
carries the attributes of the system models of innovati n as well. Compared to other 
TIM models, the RIS concept carries one considerabl dvantage in terms of the 
interpretation possibility of territorial innovation capacity. The concept of regional 
innovation systems (similarly to national innovation systems) derives the innovation 
performance of regions from elements that are more or l ss present in all regions and 
differ only in terms of their performance and the fr quency of interactions among 
the elements. This way, by reviewing system elements a d their relations we may 
gain a picture about the innovation performance (potential) of the region1. 
Tödtling and Trippl (2005) describe regional innovation systems as an open 
formation, the major elements of which are the subsystems of “knowledge-
generation and diffusion”, that of “knowledge applicat on and exploitation”, their 
system of relations and the policies influencing all these. Similarly to Cooke’s 
(2004) interpretation, they emphasise the social embeddedness of RIS. The RIS 
concept does have strong institutional and evolutionist economic roots, thus, 
amongst factors influencing innovation activity, they review the historically 
emerged local institutional and infrastructural environment, system of rules and 
relations and mechanisms of interest representation. 
Doloreux (2002) also defines regional innovation systems as the total of 
elements and relations. He classifies the players of the system into four basic 
categories: companies, institutions, knowledge infrastructure and regional 
innovation policy. He emphasises interactive learning, knowledge creation, 
proximity and social embeddedness as most important system mechanisms.  
In the course of defining the elements of the regional innovation system  
(and potential at the same time), Dőry (2005) highlights six categories: R&D 
activities of enterprises, relations of enterprises, innovation-related services, 
technology supply, policies and regional environment. Consequently, this approach 
in fact includes factors similar to those formerly mentioned as well: the system of 
knowledge creation and exploitation as well as the background conditions and 
policies facilitating this. 
Although it does not always occur in the systematization of RIS elements in 
an explicit way, yet, recognizing the role of the background factors that enable the 
learning capacity of players and therefore the continual adaptation capacity of the 
region constitute an inherent part of the approach. The concept of the so-called 
“smart” infrastructure (Malecki 1997, Stimson et al 2006) represents a pattern 
widely used for systematizing these background factors. The “smart” infrastructure 
                                                   
1 At the same time, we must note that certain authors (similarly to other TIM models) interpret RIS as 
the collection of attributes that distinguishes certain regions in the course of territorial competition.  
So according to them, the mere existence of the syst m elements is not enough to construct a RIS, since 
it also requires the presence of actual regional (local) among the subsystems (Asheim–Coenen 2005). 
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embraces physical and “soft” elements as well as (knowledge-intensive) business 
services, which essentially encourages the learning capacity of the companies in the 
region. 
Consequently, the interpretation of RIS and therefore regional innovation 
capacity means grasping certain relevant elements ad the system of relations 
existing among them. Available approaches practically emphasize the importance of 
knowledge creation, knowledge exploitation, the background conditions enabling or 
encouraging these (“smart” infrastructure) and the complex system of relations 
existing among them. So essentially, when grasping the innovation capacity of 
regions, reviewing these categories seems effective. Consequently, grasping 
innovation capacity requires a complex measurement approach. 
The majority of practical attempts aiming at the measurement of innovation 
reflect on this. In the literature we can see two significantly different approaches 
concerning the area of measuring the innovation performance of territorial units. 
One of the schools (that seems more dominant in Europe) concentrates on 
quantifying the elements of the innovation system and the relations existing among 
them. The surveys carried out in the frameworks of the “European Trend Chart of 
Innovation” belong here: the different Scoreboard reports and the methodological 
background studies of these (EIS 2007, Arundel–Hollanders 2005, Hollanders 2006, 
Kanerva et al 2006). Most Hungarian attempts may also be classified to fall in this 
group: Csizmadia and Rechnitzer’s (2005) survey concentrating on Hungarian cities, 
Kocziszky’s (2004) study focusing on subregions in Northern Hungary or the 
regularly published reports entitled “Innovation in Western Transdanubia” 
(Csizmadia et al 2008). The strength of these attempts definitely lies in the complex 
interpretation of innovation – going beyond research and development and its 
outputs – and the application of the results of innovation system theories, while the 
problem of the selection and potential weighting of indicators represents their 
weakness. 
At the same time, there exists a substantially different approach in measuring 
innovation capacity, where innovation capacity is reduced to an indicator considered 
relevant (while the rest of indicators are taken into consideration only indirectly, in 
the light of the relation to this dependent variable). Porter and Stern’s (2003) 
“National Innovation Capacity” index may represent the best known example of 
innovation surveys falling in this family. When ranki g the innovation capacity of 
countries, they consider the number of patents regist red at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office to be the dependent variable. Other indicators are entered in 
the National Innovation Capacity index based on what type of relation they have 
with the dependent variable above (in a regression m del). 
The strength of the approach lies in the relative objectivity of selecting the 
indicators (based on their explanatory power) and weighting them (weight is 
provided by the regression coefficient) within the model. The explanatory potential 
of the indicator and the value of the regression coefficient clearly justify its 
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inclusion in the survey. However, the weakness of the approach derives from the 
same aspect, since the selection of a single highlighted dependent variable poses 
considerable problems; in fact, it equates innovatin o invention. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to find a dependent variable that could apply almost equally well to a wide 
range of countries (territorial units). This is why the work of Porter and Stern, for 
example, is subject to a lot of criticism (despite th fact that it is frequently cited). 
On the whole, in our opinion the approaches based on system models can 
draw a much more diversified picture about the innovati n capacity of territorial 
units together with its structure despite their certain weaknesses. Moreover, they 
reflect the nature of the innovation process much more, and can leave the linear 
approach of innovation behind. Therefore, our analysis carried out in the present 
paper is committed to this approach. 
3. Methodology 
Our analysis provides the comparison (ranking) of the innovation capacity of the 
Hungarian subregions, their classification and we also examine the regularities in the 
spatial distribution of innovation capacity. The 168 Hungarian subregions defined 
by Government Decree 244/2003 constituted the basic un ts of the analysis. 
Although the presently valid classification defines 174 subregions, the statistical 
data used by us could not be aggregated according to the new territorial 
classification in all cases. 
The first step of the analysis was the selection and grouping of the set of 
applicable indicators. In creating the groups of indicators, we strived to provide the 
building elements of a “typical” regional innovation system in line with the 
measurement approaches based on the literature of innovation systems. We 
established three categories, each of which constitutes the basis of a subindex. These 
are: knowledge creation, knowledge exploitation and the “smart” infrastructure 
(Table 1). 
The indicators of the subindex of knowledge creation measure the capacity of 
creating scientific and technological knowledge. These indicators are widely used; 
they constitute the elements of most innovation analyses. We must note that several 
approaches narrowly interpreting innovation do not g  beyond this range of 
indicators; and draw conclusions by equalizing research and development (R&D) 
with innovation. Since R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation, and innovation 
does not necessarily presume R&D (OECD 2005), it is essential to develop further 
categories. 
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Table 1. Indicator set for measuring subregional innovation capacity 
Category  Indicator  
1 Number of R&D performing units per 100000 inhabitants 1 
2 Total staff of R&D units per 1000 inhabitants 2 
3 Number of scientists with PhD per 10000 inhabitants 3 
4 Number of teaching staff of higher education institutions per 1000 
inhabitants 
4 
5 Investments of R&D units per 1000 inhabitants 5 
6 R&D costs per 1000 inhabitants 6 
7 Expenditures of R&D places per 1000 inhabitants 7 
Knowledge 
creation 
8 Number of patents in a 5 year period per 10000 inhabitants 8 
1 Export sales as a percent of total sales 9 
2 Export sales per inhabitant 10 
3 Number of foreign owned companies per 1000 inhabitants 11 
4 Share capital of foreign owned companies as a % of total share capital 12 
5 Incomes from intellectual properties per inhabitant 13 
6 
Percent of companies in NACE 24 and 29-34 divisions within all 
companies (high and medium tech manufacturing) 
14 
7 
Percent of companies in NACE 64 and 72-73 divisions within all 
companies (high-tech services) 
15 
8 







Number of knowledge-intensive firms with more than 50 employees per 
100000 inhabitants 
17 
1 Per cent of employees with university or college degre  18 
2 Percent of white collar workers in leading positions within all employees 19 
3 
Number of full-time students in higher education institutions per 1000 
inhabitants 
20 
4 Number of ISDN lines per 1000 inhabitants 21 
5 Broad band internet access per 1000 inhabitants 22 
6 Registered members of public libraries per 1000 inhabitants 23 
7 Cinema visits per 1000 inhabitants 24 





Tourist arrivals in public accommodation establishments per 1000 
inhabitants 
26 
Note: At indicators 14-16 the sector codes refer to TEÁOR’03. The source of data: TEIR – Hungarian 
Spatial Development Information System (indicators 4, 9-13, 20-26, reference year: 2007), Hungarian 
Statistics Office (HSO) Central and Territorial Database (indicators 14-17, reference year: 2005), HSO 
R&D Database (indicators 1-2. 5-7, reference year: 2007), HSO Census Database (indicators 18-19, 
reference year: 2001), Hungarian Patent Office Pipacsweb Database (indicator 8, reference year: 2000-
2004) and Hungarian Academy of Sciences General Assembly Database (indicator 3, reference year: 
2004). 
Source: own construction 
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The indicators included in the subindex of knowledge exploitation 
substantially aim at grasping the characteristics of the private sector capable of 
exploiting innovations, so on the one hand, it uses indicators like export share or the 
presence of foreign direct investment, on the other hand, it indicates the share of the 
knowledge intensive sectors. 
The subindex of the “smart” infrastructure systematizes the factors that are 
required for the operation of the performances measured by the two other 
subindexes. This, on the one hand, means the presence of “talent” and the conditions 
necessary for its maintenance (e.g. cultural activities, entertainment), the “openness” 
of the region in a non-economic sense (e.g. the number of visitors) and the 
utilization of information and communication technologies. 
In the course of selecting actual indicators associated with the different 
subindexes, the sets of indicators included in various former measurement attempts 
were reviewed2, taking into consideration the subregional availabil ty of the different 
indicators. Based on all this, the survey was started with 26 indicators, eight of 
which were classified in the subindex of knowledge cr ation, nine fell in the 
subindex of knowledge exploitation and another nine were included in that of the 
“smart” infrastructure. 
Since the analysis aims at grasping innovation capacity, we tried to avoid 
including elements – present in various reviewed analyses (Csizmadia–Rechnitzer 
2005, Kocziszky 2004) – that indicate the general income producing capacity of the 
economy, since this results in confusion in grasping capacities for innovating and 
capacities emerging from innovation. 
Furthermore, it is also important to highlight that all of our indicators measure 
relativized values; we mostly used indexes that represent the size of the region as the 
base of projection. The advantage of this lies in the fact that the values of the 
different subregions become comparable, while its drawback is that it does not 
measure the absolute concentration of activities, although in certain cases there is a 
presumable relation between the volume and efficiency of innovation-related 
activities (Varga 2009). 
The second step of the analysis involved the comparation of the innovation 
capacity of subregions and their ranking. In calculating the different indexes (and 
providing the rankings this way), we relied on the m thodology used in the surveys 
of the “European Innovation Scoreboard” (EIS) – both the Summary Innovation 
Index (SII) and the Service Sector Innovation Index (SSII) is constructed in a similar 
                                                   
2 The Summary Innovation Index (EIS 2007) of the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), the Service 
Sector Innovation Index (Kanerva et al 2006) of the European Trend Chart on Innovation, the EXIS 
Summary Index (Arundel–Hollanders 2005), the Euro-Creativity Index of Florida–Tingali (2004), the 
set of indicators of the European Regional Innovation Scoreboard Summary Index (Hollanders 2006), 
the indicators applied in Csizmadia and Rechnitzer’s (2005) analysis of the innovation potential of 
Hungarian cities and the set of indicators used in Kocziszky’s (2004) analysis of the innovation 
potential of the subregions in the Northern Hungarian egion. 
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way. Our “Subregional Summary Innovation Index” (SRSI) was created through the 
following steps: 
- Defining the minimum and maximum values of the different indicators. It was 
true for almost all the indicators that the data of one or two subregions 
excelled (usually in the positive direction) compared to the Hungarian average 
value. Data were considered as outlier if their deviation from the national 
average was above three times the standard deviation. Outlier data were not 
taken into account in the course of defining minimum and maximum values 
(this was needed to prevent the subsequently emerging scale from being too 
concentrated). 
- Rescaling data. We deducted the minimum value emerging in relation o the 
given indicator from each figure, and divided by the difference of the 
maximum and minimum value. This way each rescaled value falls between 0 
and 1. Outlier data received the value of 0 or 1 (depending on the direction of 
the deviation). 
- Establishing subindexes. The different subindexes emerge as the arithmetical 
average of the values of the indicators associated to them. The potential 
weighting of the indicators may represent a possible step; however, in the 
course of the analysis – in harmony with the methodology of EIS – emphasis 
fell on clarity. 
- Developing the SRSI and establishing ranking. The SRSI is the arithmetical 
average of the three subindexes. The ranking of the Subregional Innovation 
Capacity derives from ranking SRSI values in a decreasing order. Index (and 
subindex) values are values measured on a ratio scale; therefore, they are 
suitable for grasping the distance from other regions, and comparison with the 
national average. 
 
Consequently, the SRSI index of the different subregions characterises the 
region’s innovation capacity in a complex way based on a complex set of indicators. 
The approach goes beyond frequently used analyses focu ing on R&D: besides the 
capacity of knowledge creation, it also characterises the subsystem of knowledge 
exploitation and the quality of the “smart” infrastructure necessary for operating all 
these. Therefore, the innovation capacity of regions that have good performance 
based on the SRSI is generally the result of a complex erformance with multiple 
foundations. At the same time, it might happen thata region assumes a relatively 
advanced position in the ranking based on the SRSI due to the outstanding value of a 
given area; therefore, the analysis of performance a cording to the different 
subindexes is also required. 
The third phase of the analysis consists of providing the potential 
classification of subregions based on their innovati n capacity. This occurred 
similarly to the method of Csizmadia and Rechnitzer (2005) in their analysis of the 
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innovation potential of Hungarian cities. Classificat on took place on the basis of the 
three subindex values. 
We carried out K-means cluster analysis using the sandardized values of the 
three subindexes. The analysis was completed with three, four and five clusters. 
Classification seemed relatively stable, the increase in the number of clusters led to 
the further division of certain groups, but no significant change occurred in the 
members of the different groups. Based on the dispersion of distance measured from 
the cluster centre, the establishment of five groups resulted in the emergence of most 
homogeneous (and most easily interpretable) clusters; herefore, this seemed the 
most supported solution. 
In the fourth step of the analysis, we examined the spatial regularities of 
subregional innovation capacity, that is, whether t data of adjacent territorial units 
are similar. In fact, we measured spatial autocorrelation with the help of the Moran 
index on the national level, and the “Local Moran Index” on the subregional level. 
The index number proposed by Moran in 1948 called the Moran index 
measures spatial autocorrelation similarly to the autocorrelation of time series data 





























- M: the number of territorial units, in our case this means 168 subregions, 
- xj: the value of the examined data values associated to territorial unit j, in our 
case, the value of the different subindexes and the SRSI associated to 
subregion j. 
- wij: item j of line i of the neighbourhood matrix, itsvalue is 1 if subregions i 
and j are neighbours, otherwise it is 0. 
 
Since the neighbourhood of territorial units can be int rpreted in multiple 
ways, therefore, various neighbourhood matrixes can be created. In the followings, 
we used bastion neighbourhood as the basis, which means that wij  received the 
value 1 if subregions i and j have a shared border ar a, otherwise the value of  
wij is 0. 
The size of the pseudo-significance level calculated by the Monte Carlo 
method and the algebraic sign of the value I define the size of autocorrelation and its 
direction indicated by the actual Moran I value (Table 2). 
 
 Zoltán Bajmócy – Izabella Szakálné Kanó  
 
108
Table 2. The interpretation of the Moran Index 
Significance Index value Interpretation 
p < 0,05 és I < – 0,00598 Strong negative autocorrelation  
0,05 ≤ p < 0,1 and I < – 0,00598 Weak negative autocorrelation  
0,1 ≤ p  Autocorrelation is not significant 
0,05 ≤ p < 0,1 and I > – 0,00598 Weak positive autocorrelation 
p < 0,05 and I > – 0,00598 Strong positive autocorrelation 
Note: „p” represents pseudo-significance. Index value must be compared to -1/(M-1), which, in our 
subregional database, has a value of -0,00598 
Source: own construction on the basis of Cliff and Ord (1981) 
 
The other index number – closely related to the Moran Index – calculated by 
us is the Local Moran Index that can be interpreted as the local index number of 
spatial autocorrelation. These values can be calculated separately for each subregion. 
In our case, the actual subregional standardized value of the examined innovation 
index is multiplied by the joint average standardize  value of the neighbours of the 
subregion. If the Local Moran Index value calculated his way is positive, then the 
given subregion is similar to its neighbours; if, on the other hand, the value is 
negative, then it is different from them. This way subregions can be divided in five 
categories based on their comparison to the original st ndardized index value  
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The interpretation of the Local Moran Index 
 Interpretation Condition 
High – 
High 
Both the given subregion and its neighbours have and 
index values significantly above the average. 
Local Moran I > 0 
Standardized indicator value > 0 
p < 0,05 
High – 
Low 
The given subregion has significantly above the 
average, while its neighbours below the average indx 
values. 
Local Moran I > 0 
Standardized indicator value < 0  
p < 0,05 
-  No significant correspondence. 
 
p > 0,05 
Low – 
High 
The given subregion has significantly below the 
average, while its neighbours above the average index 
values. 
Local Moran I < 0 
Standardized indicator value > 0  
p < 0,05 
Low – 
Low 
Both the given subregion and its neighbours have and 
index values significantly below the average. 
Local Moran I < 0 
Standardized indicator value < 0  
p < 0,05 
Note: „p” represents pseudo-significance. 
Source: own construction 
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4. The innovation capacity of Hungarian subregions 
The innovation capacity of Hungarian subregions is comprehensively introduced 
with the help of the SRSI and its subindexes, which is followed by the classification 
of subregions based on innovation capacity and the analysis of spatial regularities. 
One of the most general statements that can be madebased on the SRSI is that 
in terms of innovation capacity, Hungary is characterised by enormous disparities 
(Figure 1). There are only 11 subregions with performance above the Hungarian 
average (0,51 SRSI value). The performance of the or 157 subregions ranges 
below the average. All this implies that innovation capacity is unbelievably 
concentrated spatially in Hungary. 




































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
Out of the first 30 subregions, 18 have cities with county rights; however, the 
rank is not completely in line with expectations. Although Budapest’s first place and 
the notable position of the Debrecen, Szeged and Pécs subregions meet expectations, 
the good ranks of the Veszprém, Gödöllő and Eger subregions are rather surprising. 
Among regional centres, the Miskolc subregion only assumed the 13th position. Out 
of subregions without cities with county rights the Gödöllő subregion is among the 
first 10 (ranked 6th), while further five subregions were among the first twenty: the 
Pilisvörösvár, Balatonfüred, Szentendre, Esztergom and the Szarvas subregions. It is 
important to underline, that six subregions that have cities with county rights could 
not make it to the first 30. These are the Zalaegerszeg (31), Békéscsaba (34), 
Hódmezővásárhely (38), Nagykanizsa (43), Szekszárd (44) and the Salgótarján (51) 
subregions. 
Budapest’s SRSI value (0,84) excels compared to the o r subregions – 
although not overtly. It must also be mentioned that Budapest produced outlier 
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values for 17 of the 26 indicators. Since in this ca e it automatically received the 
value 1 (although its performance is higher in reality), the index value carries a 
downward distortion. Although a relatively large number of subregions showed 
outlier data related to certain indicators, there were only three further subregions 
with more than four outlier data: the Debrecen (8),Pécs (6) and the Szeged (9) 
subregions. 
The summarized results are further shaded by the ranks based on the different 
subindexes. Based on this it becomes apparent that the capacity of subregions is 
“one-sided” or has “multiple foundations”. Budapest has the first position in the 
rank according to the subindex of knowledge creation. The subindex-based ranking 
reflects well the territorial distribution of major Hungarian universities and the 
research institute network of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This is obviously 
the consequence of the fact that a significant partof research and development 
activities is tied to these institutes in our country (In Hungary, the proportion of 
public financing compared to company financing in R&D is much higher than the 
European average, although this is far from true compared to the GDP). 
The territorial concentration of knowledge creation s even higher than it was 
in the case of the SRSI. Only 10 subregions exceed th  national average value 
(0.56). The value of the subregion ranking 30th is already below 0.25. In accordance 
with this, the favourable ranking of various subregions with small city centres is not 
necessarily accompanied by good performance in terms of absolute value. A 
favourable relative position may go hand in hand with an unfavourable absolute one. 



































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
17 subregions exceed the national average value (0.52) of the knowledge 
exploitation subindex (Figure 2). The ranking based on this element of innovation 
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capacity is completely different from what would emerge in the case of knowledge 
creation. The Szeged, Pécs and Debrecen subregions reputed to be innovation 
centres assumed only positions 18, 21 and 22. 
Interestingly, various subregions that excel in attrac ing foreign direct 
investment and (partly due to this) in export, also perform well according to the 
other indicators of the category (e.g. proportion of knowledge-intensive services). 
The capacities of knowledge creation and knowledge exploitation (the 
capacity to manufacture products with high added value that can even be marketed 
internationally) are spatially divided in Hungary. Knowledge exploitation often does 
not utilize locally produced knowledge, while the results of R&D are poorly utilized 
in economic terms. Only few regions showed stable and strong positions in both 
areas: besides Budapest, the Gödöllő and maybe the Győr subregions may be 
mentioned. 
The ranking deriving from the “smart” infrastructure subindex reflects the 
hierarchy of the national urban network, although with smaller differences. Beyond 
subregions with large city centres, some subregions with less population that 
function as significant (cultural) touristic targets could reach a notable position (the 
Keszthely-Hévíz and Szentendre subregions). At the same time, in order to reach a 
good position in the rank it was not enough to perform well in terms of one or two 
indicators. The performance of the above subregions is beyond average in terms of 
five or six indicators of the category. 21 subregions exceeded the national average 
value (0.44). It is worth noting that while in relation to knowledge creation, the 
value of the subregion ranking 30th already goes below 0.25, here only the 
subregion ranking 58th has the same result. 
Differences in ranking are perfectly reflected in measuring the joint 
movement of subindex values as well. The relation existing between knowledge 
creation and knowledge exploitation is much looser than that of knowledge creation 
and “smart” infrastructure values (Table 4). 
It is highly important to examine whether innovation capacity is reflected in 
the differences apparent in economic performance. This also serves to control the 
results of the survey. Both in terms of the SRSI and the different subindexes, 
medium or strong positive correlation manifest with the Gross Value Added per 
capita (GVA) and the income serving as the basis of Personal Income Tax. The 
connection is a bit looser with the “GVA per employee” and the “profit before tax 
per employee”, that can be interpreted as productivity indicators, although in terms 
of knowledge exploitation and the SRSI, this also means a relatively strong 
connection. 
In harmony with expectations, the subindex of knowledge exploitation shows 
the closest connection with income and productivity indicators, while the connection 
of knowledge creation is the loosest to them. This also proves the relevance that the 
category of the “smart” infrastructure assumes. The correlation matrix obviously 
proves that connection of innovation capacity and economic performance, however, 
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the intensity of the connection implies that the two do not derive from each other in 
a deterministic way. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of certain income indicators and the subregional 
summary index 







KCR 1,000        
KEI 0,592 1,000       
Smart 0,778 0,631 1,000      
SRSI 0,919 0,823 0,900 1,000     
GVA p. c. 0,476 0,731 0,521 0,641 1,000    
PBT 0,312 0,556 0,297 0,433 0,773 1,000   
GVA p. e. 0,446 0,704 0,498 0,610 0,992 0,773 1,000  
Tax 0,557 0,878 0,644 0,769 0,671 0,451 0,628 1,000 
Note: Pearson’s correlation. For all values in the matrix: p<0,01. KCR: knowledge creation subindex, 
KEI: knowledge exploitataion subindex, Smart – Smart infrastructure subindex, SRSI: subregional 
summary innovation index, GVA p.c: gross value added per capita, PBT: profit before tax per 
employee, GVA p.e: gross value added per employee, Tax: Personal tax base per inhabitant. 
Source: own calculations 
 
Furthermore, another question lies in why innovation capacity shows a more 
intense connection with the basic values of personal income tax per citizen than it 
does with work productivity indexes (since as a result of innovations, we would 
expect improvement in productivity more than increase in incomes). The reason of 
this – in our opinion – is that it is difficult to separate the maintenance of innovation 
capacity from the presence of highly qualified “talents” working in positions that are 
paid better than the average. 



















 N=99 N=3 N=38 N=18 N=10 
Knowledge creation (Zscore) -0,4523 2,1776 -0,2007 0,8183 3,1144 
Knowledge exploitation (Zscore) -0,6415 -0,0988 0,7520 0,8990 1,9050 
Smart infrastructure (Zscore) -0,4984 -0,4025 -0,0824 1,5666 2,5479 
Source: own calculations 
 
The analysis completed so far already implies clearly that the innovation 
capacity of Hungarian subregions strongly differ. Some subregions may be 
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characterised by relatively strong innovation capacity, while the innovation 
performance of the majority of subregions proves rather poor. Moreover, the 
different rankings of the different subindexes imply that relatively strong innovation 
performance can be achieved in various ways, and subregions form groups in this 
respect too. 
The K-means cluster analysis carried out on the basis of the standardized 
values of the three subindexes confirmed that subregions can be classified based on 
their innovation capacity. The five groups emerging based on the relation to the 
criteria defining the cluster can be interpreted relatively easily (Table 5 and  
Figure 3): 
- Subregions with strong innovation capacity (10) that, in terms of all three 
subindexes, perform significantly above the average. Th  cluster is relatively 
homogeneous, the standard deviation of the (Euclidean) distances from the 
centre is 0.38 (without Budapest this value is only 0.33). Although cluster 
members show good performance in all three categoris, their value is the 
strongest in terms of knowledge creation. The vast majority of cluster 
members are university towns. 
- Subregions with medium innovation capacity (18) that have a relative 
performance in all three areas, but especially in terms of the “smart” 
infrastructure. Mostly subregions with larger city centres as well as certain 
subregions of the Budapest agglomeration belong here. This cluster is less 
homogeneous; the standard deviation of distances from the centre is 0.43. 
- “One-sided” knowledge exploiting subregions (38) are the ones that show a 
relatively good performance in terms of knowledge exploitation while they 
prove rather weak in the other two areas. We must note at the same time that 
in certain cases this relatively good performance is xplained by small size. 
On the other hand, certain values show such territorial concentration that the 
good position assumed in the subregional ranking may also cover a weak 
absolute performance (lagging behind the national average). The cluster is 
homogeneous; the standard deviation of distances is 0.28. 
- “One-sided” knowledge creating regions (3) are the ones whose knowledge 
creating activity is outstanding, while their performance in terms of the other 
two subindexes is weak. All three subregions belonging in this group have 
relatively small population; therefore, the relatively strong knowledge 
creating capability may not assume such significance. Also due to the small 
number of items, the cluster is highly homogeneous; the standard deviation of 
distances is 0.10. 
- Subregions with weak innovation capacity (99) include the majority of the 
country’s subregions. The performance of these is rathe  weak in terms of all 
three subindexes. Despite the great number of items, the cluster is 
homogeneous; the standard deviation of the distances from the cluster centre 
is 0.23. 




The clusters are clearly distinct; classification is obvious in almost all the 
cases. Compared to the classification deriving from three and four clusters, the 
cluster of “mediums” was further divided, and the two “one-sided” clusters emerged 
from it. Furthermore, some formerly strong regions migrated to the cluster of 
medium strength, and some other formerly weak ones fell into the category of one-
sided knowledge creating subregions. 
Accordingly, there are only two areas in which the borders among groups are 
slightly blurred. The best performers among the subregions with medium innovation 
capacity stand really close to the cluster of strong ones. Consequently, the 
classification of the subregions of Pilisvörösvár, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza is not 
perfectly clear. The other similar area involves the weaker members in the cluster of 
one-sided knowledge exploiting subregions that, based on their performance, are not 
far from the subregions with weak innovation capacity. 






































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
We also examined what regularities does the spatiality of subregional 
innovation capacity show, and whether the data of neighbouring territorial units are 
similar, since in certain cases, real economic territorial relations may cross 
subregional boundaries, therefore, the innovation performance of the different 
subregions may derive from the “spillover” effects of the neighbouring region. The 
significance of this is particularly obvious in sight of the ring of subregions 
surrounding Budapest that have a relatively good innovation capacity. Such analysis 
Measuring the Innovation Performance of Hungarian Subregions 
 
115
may bring us closer to what the “ideal spatial distribution” of a national analysis of 
regional innovation would be. 
Out of the SRSI and its three subindexes only one subindex involves a 
strongly significant (positive) autocorrelation among its territorial values, and that is 
the subindex of knowledge exploitation (Table 6). This means that the effect of 
factors strengthening the extent of knowledge exploitati n goes beyond subregional 
boundaries. 
In the case of the rest of subindexes and the SRSI, the presence of such factors 
surpassing subregional boundaries is not significant o cerning the whole country. 
Still, in the area of Budapest, we can find a coherent system of subregions (Budapest 
and the Szentendre, Dunakeszi, Pilisvörösvár, Budaörs nd Ráckeve subregions) 
where both subregions and their neighbours have high SRSI values, that is, they fall 
in the “high – high” class. 
Table 6. Results of the global Moran I test 
Index Moran I 
value 
P value Interpretation 
Knowledge creation -0,0330 0,30 No significant autocorrelation* 
Knowledge exploitation 0,3442 0,00 Strong positive autocorrelation* 
„Smart” infrastructure -0,0150 0,44  No significant autocorrelation* 
SRSI 0,0622 0,11 No significant autocorrelation* 
Note: * Significance level of 5%. Calculation were carried out by Geoda095i. 
Source: own calculations 
 
This implies that in terms of innovation capacity, the capital and the 
surrounding subregions constitute an organic unit, real territorial connections go 
beyond subregional boundaries significantly here. Rsults suggest that except for 
Budapest, there is no other significant innovation ce tre in the country that would 
have an innovation “radiation” transcending subregional boundaries (Figure 4). 
Two phenomena cause the positive spatial autocorrelation of the capacity of 
knowledge exploitation: the spatial condensation of positive subindex values on one 
hand, and that of negative (standardized) subindex values, on the other hand. An 
intense territorial concentration of subregions with a high local Moran index value 
may be noticed in the area of Budapest (“high – high” class). 
On the other hand, two further coherent areas are visible on the map: in the 
central part of the Trans-Tisza Region, and in North-Eastern Hungary, where both 
the subregion and its surrounding have low knowledge exploitation subindex value 
(“low – low” class). 
So the spatiality of the knowledge exploitation capacity displays characteristic 
regularities. The possibility of the presence of a re l regional system surpassing 
subregional boundaries may arise in Central Hungary (at least in terms of knowledge 
exploitation). At the same time, another important result lies in the fact that in the 
case of the other two subindexes no significant autocorrelation exists. This is less 
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surprising in connection with “smart” infrastructure, since the values of this 
subindex correspond to the city-hierarchy relatively well (and consequently to its 
territorial appearance too). However, in terms of the subindex of knowledge 
creation, this definitely implies that the effect of research and development activities 
(and institutions dealing with research and development) does not go beyond their 
own subregion. 






































































































































































































Note: The figure represents the Local Moran I-Test values at a 5% level of pseudo-significance, by 
using bastion neighbourhodd matrix. In case of high-high relation, both the given subregion and its 
neighbours have high “Knowledge-exploitation” Subindex value. Calculations were carried out by 
Geoda095i. 
Source: own calculations 
5. Limitations and future research directions 
The method applied in our analysis has various limitations – besides others – that are 
rooted in the general methodology of innovation measurement. Consequently, from 
the aspect of measuring the innovation capacity of territorial units and the scientific 
debates related to this, we consider the exploration of such limitations and the 
provision of potential future research direction to be of vital importance. 
A part of the limitations inherent in the applied approach derive from 
subnational level analysis. This more or less characterises all similar measurement 
attempts, but it does not question the relevance of the method substantially. The 
difficulties of accessing territorial data generally require giving up complexity to a 
certain extent. Surveys conducted on a lower territorial agglomeration level are 
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suitable for the utilization of company level innovation data much less than 
necessary, or, in the case of using company level data, they limit the scope of the 
survey to one or two regions (Hollanders 2006, Csizmadia et al 2008). Moreover, in 
this case, a fundamental result of the theory on inovation systems, namely, 
grasping the relations amongst the players of the system is excluded from the focus 
of the studies (or assumes less importance). 
Approaches avoid another basic achievement of the li erature on regional 
innovation systems, when they measure and compare the innovation capacity of 
regions that in certain cases have radically different characteristics based on the 
same criteria. The different types of the regional i novation system do not infer 
different measurement approaches. However, for example in a spatially embedded 
regional innovation system, the analysis of knowledge flows within an industrial 
branch and among the different branches says much more than, let us say, R&D 
activity would. 
The further limitations of the approach are much more f paradigmatic 
nature. Related to measuring the innovation capacity of territorial units, an articulate 
uncertainty is apparent concerning what to measure and what do we really measure. 
On the company level, grasping innovation activity is relatively obvious  
(for example, in regularly conducted Community Innovation Surveys the criterion of 
an innovative company is clear). At the same time, th  macro effect of micro level 
innovations may be anything (innovation, sales turnover or market share are not in 
direct connection). Maybe exactly because of this, it  not the innovation activity of 
regions, but the capacity of innovation to contribute GDP per capita growth that is 
measured. This approach, however, doubtlessly carries preconceptions: it connects 
the concepts of economic growth (competitiveness) and innovation capacity ex ante. 
In the light of this it is not surprising if innovation capacity and economic 
performance show close connection. 
This may also explain low receptiveness to the different measurement of 
different regional innovation systems, since the capa ity to contribute to economic 
growth as a “global objective function” creates a common denomination for the 
different regions in terms of measuring innovation capacity. 
The general attribute of works aiming at comparing the performance of 
regions is that they examine innovation capacity in a relative way (compared to 
others). Annually published rankings (like, for example, “Scoreboard” reports) are 
based on reviewing performance compared to the average. Therefore, improvement 
in performance corresponding to the average is interpreted as stagnation (any 
fallback smaller than the average would be displayed as improvement). In our 
opinion, this approach is basically rooted in the fact that studies (as already 
discussed) measure the capacity of innovation activity to contribute to economic 
growth (competitiveness). Competitiveness is in fact a relative category. Based on 
its approach, it practically does not matter what our performance is, if compared to 
others or our formal self it is good or undergoes improvement (Bajmócy 2007). This 
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approach derives from the general view of mainstream conomics and economic 
policy, according to which greater growth (competitiveness) is better than smaller 
(practically under all circumstances). In fact, this approach also penetrates the 
Lisbon strategy that created “Scoreboard” reports. Here, the main question became 
how much (and in what sense) the member states lag behind one another and 
especially behind the USA and Japan. 
However, all this has another root (maybe going even d eper), and it is the 
negligence (in a certain sense) of the Schumpeter tradition in innovation 
measurement. Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” cotinually deconstructs the old 
economic structure and replaces it with a new one (Schumpeter 1950). Furthermore, 
it is not only economic structure that changes, but in “co-evolution” with it, also the 
infrastructural environment, social relations, interest representation mechanisms and 
the relation of economy and the natural environment (Polányi 1944, Witt 2003, 
Kemp et al 1998). One consequence deriving from this process of creative 
destruction lies in the fact that innovation inevitably has its losers – at least in the 
short run. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that winners and losers also have 
different positions in terms of space. 
The other fundamental criterion is that the innovation process – since it causes 
changes in the economy, society and the natural environment simultaneously – 
requires a great level of continual adaptation from the involved parties. In this case, 
however, the pace of change is not at all marginal, th t is, in a given case, too fast 
change (outstanding innovation performance) can even result in catastrophic 
economic and environmental effects. 
All this means that in measuring the innovation capacity of territorial units, 
the application of an approach much more complex than earlier ones seems efficient: 
integrating social and environmental effects into the measurement and grasping the 
“manageable” pace of change. 
6. Summary 
The present paper describes a complex analysis of the innovation capacity of 
national subregions based on multiple indicators, in the course of which we regarded 
the concept of regional innovation systems as a point of departure. Based on the 
complex system of indicators classified in three categories, the analysis goes beyond 
the approaches that emphasise solely research and development. Beyond knowledge 
creation, we also reviewed the performance of knowledge exploitation and the 
“smart” infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of all these. 
Based on the results, it becomes apparent that the territorial distribution of 
innovation capacity carries enormous disproportions in Hungary. Innovation 
capacity is concentrated in few subregions. Besides th  few subregions with strong 
innovation capacity, the group of those with medium nnovation capacity is not wide 
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either. This latter one characteristically embraces subregions with centres that have 
more population, although there are some exceptions o this. 
It is highly important that knowledge production and knowledge exploitation 
are spatially differentiated in Hungary. The number of subregions that excel in both 
categories is rather small. The effect of knowledge creation typically does not go 
beyond subregional boundaries, and is only rarely accompanied by local knowledge 
exploitation. At the same time, knowledge exploitation capacity shows characteristic 
spatial patterns. In this respect, various subregions are interconnected organically in 
the surroundings of Budapest. 
In the final chapter, we pointed out that the approaches aiming to measure the 
innovation capacity of territorial units have several limitations that suggest the 
necessity of reconsidering generally used schemes. B yond economic indicators, 
grasping social and environmental changes induced by innovation at the same time 
seems efficient, since only the joint analysis of the hree dimensions could provide a 
real basis for (the practice of) linking innovation capacity and the desired direction 
of change in subregions. 
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An Analysis of the Spatial Distribution of Knowledge 
Intensive Services in Hungary 
Izabella Szakálné Kanó 
 
In today’s developed countries we see an increasing headway of the services sector, while 
the European Union’s regional policy for the period f 2007-2013 places special emphasis 
on the support of knowledge intensive activities. Therefore, it is important to survey the 
situation of services with high knowledge intensity in Hungary as well. 
Economic activities, and consequently the spatial distribution of knowledge intensive 
services are influenced by a great deal of factors including disproportions within the given 
country and externalities like knowledge spillover or market size. The various trends of 
spatial econometrics and economic geography have dev loped a series of indicators and 
index numbers, all of which grasp this phenomenon fr m different aspects. 
My paper aims at applying some of these indicators in Hungary for the analysis of the 
spatial distribution of knowledge intensive service sectors and their potential clustering.  
 
Keywords:  knowledge intensive services, cluster, Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index, Moran index 
1. Introduction 
Today enterprises operating in developed countries usually outsource routine and 
controllable production in order to reduce labour costs and due to the more 
environment conscious regulation system of these countries, while strategic, 
financial and marketing activities requiring knowledg  and creativity stay in the 
headquarters of the enterprise. This is partly the reason why the proportion of 
services is prominently high compared to the economic activities of developed 
countries, and especially the range of knowledge intensive services demanding 
prepared workforce and able to adapt to market changes flexibly undergoes dynamic 
development.  
Since the economic driving force of sectors with high knowledge intensity is 
especially great, the European Union’s regional policy for the period of 2007-2013 
also places great emphasis on supporting innovation clusters (CEC 2005). However, 
it is important to underline that the majority of innovations are not closely linked to 
R&D activity even in the case of sectors, in which these are most intensely applied 
(Bajmócy 2007); consequently, it is not enough to use only the intensity of R&D 
activity to measure knowledge intensity.  
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Since Hungarian knowledge intensive sectors are abl to achieve continuous 
increase in the area of work productivity even with constant growth in the number of 
employees (Bajmócy 2007), an important task lies in defining their spatial 
distribution, where they cluster and what intensity level of factors concentrate them 
in a given territorial unit. 
In the course of analysing economic activity and the spatial situation of active 
enterprises in different sectors the gathering of enterprises at certain geographical 
spots is markable. Talking about uneven spatial distribution, we need to distinguish 
the concepts of concentration and agglomeration. While the first concept 
(concentration) only covers the difference of values in economic activities measured 
within a given territorial unit, the second term (agglomeration) also considers the 
spatial relations of these values, the analysis of which must also involve the relations 
of the different territorial units in terms of adjacency and distance (Lafourcade–
Mion 2007). Both concepts may be interpreted on any division level of the examined 
geographical area (in Hungary, for example, on regional, county, subregional 
(kistérség) and local levels as well).  
After the differentiation of concepts, the indicators developed for their 
analysis can also be systematized accordingly. In the course of analysis, I used the 
following indicators and index-numbers: 
- Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index and the location quotient (LQ) for measuring spatial 
concentration,  
- and the Moran index for characterizing spatial auto-correlation, i.e. 
agglomeration. 
 
The present paper aims at analysing the spatiality of national knowledge 
intensive sectors. The spatial distribution of knowledge intensive services is 
examined with the use of statistical methodology, i.e. providing the statistical 
analysis of the spatial dispersion of these sectors. The second section elaborates on 
some important considerations of the knowledge based economy. In the following, 
section three reviews the basic concepts of spatial differentiation and the theoretical 
background of the survey, then introduces the Hungarian data applied for measuring 
the spatial distribution of economic activities. Section four discusses the results of 
the survey comparing the different models built on different assumptions for the 
total of the 13 analysed knowledge intensive servic sectors as well as mentioning 
the different sectors one by one. Finally, section five describes the summarising 
observations of the survey. 
2. Knowledge based economy 
Different sectors are likely to represent different technological standards. In order to 
display technological differences, OECD and Eurostat urveys usually regard high-
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tech and medium-tech industrial sectors as well as knowledge intensive services to be 
the economic sectors that realize knowledge based economy (OECD 2001). 
According to this principle, the technological stand rd of enterprises can be assessed 
by the two-digit code of their primary activity (Pavitt 1984). Owing to standardized 
European data collection, Hungary’s Standard Industry Code’03 numbers can be 
adapted for this goal1 (In the case of services, see Table 1). 
Table 1. Knowledge intensive service sectors 
Knowledge intensive services 
61 Water transport 71 Renting 
62 Air transport 72 Computer and related activities 
64 Post, telecommunications 73 Research and developmnt 
65 Financial intermediation 74 Other business activities 
66 Insurance and pension funding 80 Education 
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 85 Health and social work 
70 Real estate activities 92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
Note: Sectors 64, 72 and 73 are qualified as high-tech knowledge intensive services. 
Source: Laafia (2002, p. 7.) 
 
OECD assessed first the knowledge intensity of sectors only in the case of 
processing industry branches. It defined knowledge intensity based on the R&D data 
of the sector by comparing the amount of R&D expenditures to the added value of 
the sector. Later, this method was expanded to also consider purchased technologies 
that were applied through mediator or capital. This way, assessing the knowledge 
intensity of the service providing sector also becomes possible, since these sectors 
are more technology utilizing than technology producing ones.  
3. Basic methodological concepts 
The geographical and spatial concentration of economic activities derive from 
various reasons, with special local characteristics, natural, social and economic 
factors lying in their background. The concept of cluster tries to describe this 
phenomenon: “… a geographically bounded concentration of interdependent firms” 
(based on Rosenfeld 1997 p. 10., CEC 2002, p. 9.), or in a different way: the 
geographically proximate group of enterprises, suppliers, service providers and 
associated institutions active, competing or interconnected in the same industry 
sector linked by different types of externalities (Porter 2003, p. 562.). 
The externalities in Porter’s definition include increasing returns to size, raw 
material concentration, transportation costs, knowledge spillover and the effects of 
market size. Since the reach of these external effects may be significantly different 
                                                   
1 These data are taken from a database compiled in 2007, therefore, I do not deal with the changes of 
the Standard Industry Code that entered into force in 2008. 
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from one another, it is important to map out what extension the spatial clustering of 
the different economic activities has, or in other words, on what level of spatial 
division it becomes measurable. 
The concept of clusters has rich literature with a wide variety of different 
approaches; consequently, the scale of indices and indicators defining the degree of 
clustering is also rather wide. 
3.1. Concentration or agglomeration 
All of the concepts aiming to grasp the core of the un ven spatial distribution of 
economic activities and the local concentration of enterprises – concentration, 
agglomeration and specialization – examine this phenomenon from a slightly 
different point of view. Accordingly, the indicators and index numbers serving their 
measurement also characterize spatial distribution in a different way.  
Agglomeration and concentration – the literature of clusters tends to use these 
two concepts as synonyms, although according to Lafourcade–Mion’s (2007) 
approach, it is recommended to differentiate between th se two terms, since the size 
of enterprises may be closely linked to which form of gathering is realized. 
We use the concept of concentration when enterprises are clustered in a given 
region, while these regions can be adjacent or isolated as well. In this case, the only 
important aspect is whether two enterprises settle in the same territorial unit or not. 
In such cases the adjacency relations of the territorial units are disregarded.  
In the case of agglomeration, the spatial bunching of enterprises occur in 
adjacent territorial units, therefore, in the case of agglomeration, territorial units are 
not separate and discrete elements of spatial division any more, but interrelated 
units, where connection is determined by spatial adjacency/distance. In this case, the 
concept and measurement of spatial auto-correlation emerge. 
Figure 1. Concentration and/or agglomeration 
 
Source: Lafourcade–Mion (2007, p. 49.) 
 
The difference between the two concepts is easy to understand. Figure 1 
shows two types of position assumed by 12 companies i  9 territorial units. Both 
territorial divisions may be called equally concentrated, since in the case of 
concentration, it is not relevant how the nodes of densifying are situated in space 
compared to one another. However, while in the first case (on the left), companies 
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agglomerate in space, the second case (on the right) is specifically  
not agglomerated, since the data of the adjacent territorial units are systematically 
different from one another.  
From the aspect of clustering, it is obviously important whether the areas 
where the economic activity in question is concentrated tend to be adjacent or are 
situated sporadically in space. 
This also means that comparing the degree of agglomeration and 
concentration in a sector, the level of spatial division enabling the measurement of 
the range of factors attracting the different companies of the sector together may be 
defined. 
If spatial distribution corresponds to the figure on the left, then we can 
conclude that he range of factors erving as the reasons of clustering is larger than 
the range of the units in the chosen level of spatial division. If spatial distribution 
follows the figure on the right, then the range mentioned above is smaller than or 
equal to the size of territorial units. 
Thus, at least one level above the level of spatial division serving as the basis 
of measurement, agglomeration may already be grasped as concentration. 
3.2. The index numbers of concentration and agglomeration 
Based on the above mentioned conceptual distinction, I would like to review the 
underlying content of calculated index numbers.  
In the case of surveys and studies conducted with the goal of economic 
development and job creation, the degree of clustering is mostly measured with the 
help of index numbers based on employment data: 
The LQ index or Location Quotient is an indicator often used in the case of 
employment data. This is the statistical indicator of the under- or overrepresentation 
of a certain economic activity in the economy of a given region compared to the 












LQ == , where 
- eij   is the number of employees in service sector i in territorial unit j, 
- ej   is the number of employees in services in territorial unit j, 
- Ei  is the number of employees in service sector I, on the national level, while 
- E   is the number of national employees in the services. 
 
So 
- sij shows what proportion of the employees of service sector i work in 
territorial unit j, 
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- while xj indicates what proportion of the employees of servic s (or the total 
number of employees) work in territorial unit j. 
 
The index number serving for measuring the distribuion in the number of 
enterprises operating in the same field of activity, that is, sectoral (not spatial) 








2  , where 
- Ni : is the number of enterprises operating in sector i, 
- zik : is the proportion of employees per enterprise k in sector i. 
 
Ellison-Glaeser’s concentration index (Gi) is the index similar to the well-
known Gini coefficient, which measures disparity. It compares the spatial 
distribution of employment in sector i to the original spatial distribution of 

























- M : is the number of territorial units within the examined territorial unit, 
- xj and sij are values defined together with the LQ index. 
 
If the value of Ellison-Glaeser’s concentration index (Gi) is low (around 0), 
the spatial distribution of sectoral employment is s milar to the original spatial 
distribution of employment, while a value close to 1 indicates a high degree of 
concentration in the sector.  
It is recommended to modify the Gi index with the help of the Hi index value, 
since why a sector is concentrated in one territorial unit may prove a significant 
question: either because it consists of a single large enterprise or the sector includes 
many smaller companies that settled in the same territorial unit. 
The modified indicator published in the 1990s (Ellison–Glaeser 1997) is 
called Ellison-Glaeser’s γi index, and is the estimation of the value of correlation 
between the choice of plant location by two companies operating in any service 
sector i. For its calculation, two important index numbers, the Herfindahl index (Hi) 
and the Ellison–Glaeser concentration index (Gi) are used. Ellison-Glaeser’s γi index 
(EG γ) 
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The Moran index, the index number proposed by Moran in 1948, indicates 
whether the spatial distribution of the currently analysed data values show any kind 
of regularity, i.e. whether the data of adjacent territorial units are similar. (Moran 
1950. Dusek 2004, Lafourcade–Mion 2007) If our data are the territorial values of 











LQ  or some other numerical value indicating 
concentration like ii xs − , that results in the territorial auto-correlation coefficient 
































- M : is the number of territorial units within the analyzed territorial unit, 
- wij: is element j of row i of the adjacency matrix, its value is 1 if territorial 
units i and j are adjacent, otherwise it is 0. 
3.3. Data 
Subregional employment data are taken from the 2006 edition of the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office’s (KSH) Regional Statistical Yearbook and from the data 
on the population census of 2001 published on the KSH’s website, while the data of 
the different companies derive from the 2007/2 publication of KSH’s company 
informational data register (The Company Code Regist r – Cég–Kód–Tár)  
(KSH 2007).  
I calculated the data of the different corporate enterprises on staff number, 
plant location and sector (Hungarian NACE) by association to the relevant 
subregion. I collected subregional level employment data by sectors (TEÁOR’03,  
2 digits) and staff categories.  
Exact company data on staff number would have been necessary for 
computing each index number, however, these were not available, so they had to be 
estimated. For this sake, I presumed that company staff numbers are distributed 
evenly within the staff categories (Ellison–Glaeser 1997), therefore, when 
computing the Herfindahl index (when the sum of squares is computed), I 
substituted each staff figure with e square average of the values within its own 
staff category, while in the case of calculating potential total staff number, I 
substituted each staff figure with the arithmetic mean of the values within its own 
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staff category. Since within staff categories, distribution is usually not even, this 
simplification may result in a distortion, however, the degree and direction of this is 
difficult to estimate. 
Subregional level employment data derive from the data on the population 
census of 2001, which data series correlate with the subregional data series of 2006 
on the number of personal income tax payers to the extent of 0.999, therefore, I used 
the former one as the basis of my calculations. I etimated the subregional number 
of employees in the industrial, construction industry and service providing sectors 
based on these data as well.  
I compiled the data of the subregional adjacency matrix necessary for 
computing the Moran index based on the spatial situation of the 168 subregions  
(kistérség) using ’rook’ adjacency as the basis, which means that element j of row i 
in the matrix received the value (wij) 1 if subregions i and j have a shared border 
area, otherwise the value is 0 (Anselin 1988). 
In the empirical analysis, I classified service sectors based on OECD’s above 
mentioned division (Table 1). I took the number of c mpanies belonging here based 
on their primary activity and the number of their employees as a basis. I used the 
168 subregions as territorial units. 
4. Results 
With one exception, (70 Real estate activities2), I defined the index numbers 
of spatial concentration (EG γ) and agglomeration (Moran index) for two different 
cases for each knowledge intensive service sector listed in table 1: taking data on 
Budapest into consideration and without Budapest, due to two important reasons. On 
one hand, the determining social and economic power of the capital is obvious, 
nevertheless, in statistical terms, the fact that the majority of institutions 
concentrated in Budapest (for example, institutions f national importance) occur 
only in Budapest’s statistical data in spite of also serving the rest of the country may 
be defined as a distortion (Lukovics 2007). On the other hand, Budapest is included 
in all territorial divisions – whether local, subregional (kistérség) or county level – 
as one unit, although the approximately 1.7 million nhabitants represent 17% of 
Hungary’s population, therefore, this can also be rega ded as a distorting factor. 
4.1. Concentration 
The value of Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index can take its value in the interval [-1,1].  
Its negative value shows the sparseness of the sector (in this case, ompanies’ choice 
of plant location is not random, what is more, they try to settle as far from one 
                                                   
2 I left out service sector 70 of real estate activities from the survey because in the absence of capacity, 
the analysis of the sector was not possible with my methods. 
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another as possible), while in the case of p sitive values: values between 0 and 0.02 
indicate weak concentration, between 0.02 and 0.05 they show moderate 
concentration, while values over 0.05 suggest strong concentration. Based on the 
value of Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index, I classified sectors in the following categories. If 
- γ < 0   , then the sector is spatially sparse; 
- 0 ≤ γ < 0.02  , then the sector is weakly concentrated; 
- 0.02 ≤ γ < 0.05  , then the sector is moderately concentrated; 
- 0.05 ≤ γ   , then the sector is strongly concentrated. 
Table 2. Ranking of knowledge intensive services compared to the spatial 
distribution of employees based on Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index (concentration, 2007) 
Including Budapest Excluding Budapest 
Sectors EG γ 
Classifi-
cation 
Sectors EG γ 
Classifi-
cation 
62 Air transport -0.0115 66 Insurance and 
pension funding 
-0.0337 
61 Water transport -0.0015 
sparse 
61 Water transport -0.0066 
sparse 
85 Health and social work 0.0022 74 Other business 
activities 
0.0013 
74 Other business activities 0.0071 
weakly 
concen-
trated 85 Health and social 
work 
0.0017 
80 Education 0.0351 71 Renting  0.0027 









92 Recreational, cultural 
and sporting activities 
0.1361 92 Recreational, 
cultural and sporting 
activities 
0.0034 
73 Research and 
development 
0.1787 65 Financial 
intermediation 
0.0046 
72 Computer and related 
activities 
0.1944 80 Education 0.0057 
67 Activities auxiliary to 
financial intermediation 











65 Financial intermediation 0.2685 64 Post, 
telecommunications 
0.1037 










Source: own calculations 
 
Table 2 includes the ranking of the 13 examined knowledge intensive service 
sectors in terms of concentration determined on the basis of the Ellison-Glaeser’s γ 
indices. 
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On the basis of spatial concentration, it can be stated that the majority of 
knowledge intensive service sectors, namely, 9 out of 13 may be called at least 
moderately concentrated, and this great degree of concentration is mainly due to 
Budapest, since upon omitting its figures, only two sectors remain strongly 
concentrated (61 Air transport and 64 Post, telecommunications), while the rest only 
qualifies as moderately concentrated at the most. 
Table 3. Ranking of knowledge intensive services compared to the spatial 
distribution of employees based on Moran index (concentration, 2007) 




















66 Insurance and pension 
funding 
-0.0288 
74 Other business 
activities 
-0.0108 





66 Insurance and 
pension funding 
-0.0062 
80 Education -0.0156 negative 71 Renting  0.0006 






73 Research and 
development 
-0.0012 




92 Recreational, cultural 
and sporting activities 
-0.0002 
none 
61 Water transport 0.0044 
61 Water transport 0.0031 positive 
73 Research and 
development 
0.0322 
72 Computer and related 
activities 
0.0093 





62 Air transport 0.0109 62 Air transport 0.0181 
71 Renting  0.0262 
92 Recreational, 













Source: own calculations 
4.2. Agglomeration 
In the case of the Moran index, it is impossible to determine the auto-correlation 
level of the sector’s spatial distribution based on values only. For determining this, 
the (estimated) distribution defined using actual concentration values, with the help 
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of the Monte Carlo method is also necessary. The Geoda 0.9.5-i software3 developed 
by Luc Anselin is suitable for completing these calculations, therefore, with its help 
it is possible to determine the spatial distribution of the given service sector with a 
preliminary defined significance level: 
- with strongly negative auto-correlation; 
- with negative auto-correlation; 
- with no auto-correlation; 
- with positive auto-correlation; 
- with strongly positive auto-correlation. 
 
Table 3 includes the ranking of sectors in terms of agglomeration provided on 
the basis of the Moran index. Based on the index number of agglomeration, sectors 
are divided, positive auto-correlation occurs in 5 out of 13 sectors, while this index 
number is distorted (in the direction of positive auto-correlation) in the event if there 
are a lot of adjacent areas “empty” in sectoral terms, that is, having low employment 
level. This result is not surprising, since concentration measures the effect of forces 
having narrower range, while agglomeration also assesses the effect of forces going 
beyond area borders. Therefore, it would be worth conducting the survey on the 
local level as well. 
4.3. The different sectors4 
According to the results displayed by the tables, knowledge intensive service sectors 
show a rather mixed picture in terms of concentration and agglomeration. Figures 2 
and 3 indicate how sectors can be classified along these two dimensions. 
In order to make the typization of examined service sectors possible,  
I selected some of the 13 sectors that I will introduce in more detail now. 
In the case of sectors 61 Water transport and 62 Air transport, based on the 
values of the γ index number, we find that the choice of plant location by enterprises 
operating in these sectors does not or only slightly depend on other enterprises’ 
choice of plant location, and if it does depend on it, instead of attractions it is rather 
repelling forces that lie in the background. On theother hand, the values of the 
Moran index indicate very strong spatial auto-correlation, which in this case is not 
the consequence of an attracting force going beyond subregional borders, but rather 
the relatively low number of enterprises operating in the sectors (104 and 110), since 
this way, many subregions have low si - xi value similar to their neighbours.  
If data on Budapest are excluded from our calculations, the two sectors 
behave in different ways; the index values of sector 61 Water transport display a 
similar picture to the case when Budapest was included in the calculation, while 
sector 62 Air transport shows strong spatial concentration. The reason for this may 
                                                   
3 The software can be downloaded free of charge fromhttp://geodacenter.asu.edu/software/downloads. 
4 Only some sectors are discussed in more detail here.
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be that the very few smaller enterprises of the Air transport sector operating in the 
countryside are concentrated in some subregions; while enterprises located in 
Budapest take up the majority of the whole sector (2102 of 2369 people are 
employed by companies with plant location in Budapest). 
Figure 2. Results including data on Budapest 
strong  65; 66; 67  73; 92  64; 72 
medium   80   71 
weak  85  74   















  Spatial auto-correlation 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 3. Results excluding data on Budapest 
strong    64  62 
medium      
weak 80 65 71; 74; 85 67; 73 72; 92 















  Spatial auto-correlation 
Source: own calculations 
 
In the following, I will introduce the results of three knowledge intensive 
service sectors different both in terms of index number values and from Budapest’s 
aspect. 
 
4.3.1. Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation (67) 
Every service provided in close relation to financil intermediation falls in this 
service sector (KSH 2003).  
In the case of considering data on Budapest, enterpris s’ choice of plant 
location in the sector is 
- strongly concentrated in space γ = 0.2087,  
- with strongly negative auto-correlation I = – 0.0224,  
- the sector is scattered H = 0.0908. 




If, on the other hand, we disregard data on Budapest, then enterprises’ choice 
of plant location is 
- weakly concentrated in space γ = 0.0033; 
- with positive auto-correlation I = 0.0362; 
- the sector is strongly scattered H = 0.0014. 
 
The comparison of index values and the analysis of different subregional LQ 
values lead us to the following conclusions.  
Budapest’s influence is especially great, since according to the result of the 
calculation including its data, only the capital has an LQ value higher than 1.5, the 
same value of all the other subregions is smaller than 1. Consequently, enterprises’ 
choice of plant location is concentrated mainly in Budapest that can be interpreted as 
a single island5.  
Figure 4. Distribution of LQ values in sector 67 Activities auxiliary to financial 





































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
If calculations are completed without the data on Budapest, he picture 
becomes much more differentiated (Figure 4). Distribu ion of LQ values in sector 67 
of activities auxiliary to financial intermediation according to subregions, excluding 
                                                   
5 That of Budapest is the only black subregion in the LQ map computed with data on Budapest, the rest 
of subregions are white. 
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data on Budapest). Relatively many enterprises operate in the sector – 5531, out of 
which 1970 are situated in Budapest.  
In the country, we can find enterprises with fewer employees that are 
concentrated, although weakly. Concentration mainly occurs in adjacent areas; 
consequently, there is also evidence of agglomeration, so factors go beyond 
subregional borders. 
This activity is mainly concentrated in the subregions of Győr – Sopron – 
Mosonmagyaróvár, the one surrounding Budapest and those of Pécs, Debrecen and 
Miskolc. The two biggest differences in concentration can be observed between the 
Békéscsaba subregion and its environment (high – low), and the Szeged subregion 
and its surroundings (high – low). 
 
4.3.2. Renting (71) 
Longer term Renting of machinery and equipment withou  operator and of personal 
and household goods (KSH 2003). 
In the case of considering data on Budapest, companies’ choice of plant 
location is 
- moderately concentrated in space  γ = 0.0453; 
- with strongly positive auto-correlation  I = 0.0262; 
- the sector is strongly scattered  H = 0.005. 
 
If, on the other hand, we disregard data on Budapest, then enterprises’ choice 
of plant location in the sector is 
- weakly concentrated in space  γ = 0.0027; 
- with no auto-correlation I = 0.0006; 
- the sector is strongly scattered  H = 0.0079. 
 
The analysis of the LQ values of the different subregions demonstrates that 
the picture including data on Budapest is similar to the results calculated without 
these values. The only major change is that while in the former case, Budapest and 
the surrounding subregions similarly have high concentration, which also occurs in 
auto-correlation values, so this activity is agglomerated around Budapest, without 
data on Budapest, with a significance level of 5% there is no auto-correlation any 
more – so the Renting sector does not have agglomeration in the rest of the country.  
Disregarding data on Budapest does not bring any great change in the map 
displaying LQ values either, only gives a slightly more complex view (Figure 5 and 
Figure 6). 
There are 2267 enterprises in this sector, 844 of them are situated in Budapest. 
Here, Budapest is followed by the subregions below that may be emphasized due to 
a greater degree of concentration: Veresegyház, Budaörs, Székesfehérvár, 
Dunaújváros, Gyál, Siófok, Baja, Szentendre, Szekszárd and Pilisvörösvár. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of LQ values in sector 71 Renting according to subregions, 

































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of LQ values in sector 71 Renting according to subregions, 

































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
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It is important to underline the existence of areas that prove especially 
“empty” from this sector’s aspect: these mainly include the surroundings of the 
Pécs, Debrecen and Nyíregyháza subregions. 
 
4.3.3. Research and development (73) 
This sector includes three types of scientific research and development: basic 
research, applied research and experimental developm nt (KSH 2003). 
In the case of considering data on Budapest, companies’ choice of plant location in 
the sector is 
- strongly concentrated in space  γ = 0.1787; 
- with no auto-correlation  I = – 0.0012; 
- however, the sector is strongly scattered  H = 0.0054. 
 
If, on the other hand, we disregard data on Budapest, then enterprises’ choice 
of plant location in the sector is 
- weakly concentrated in space  γ = 0.0153; 
- with positive auto-correlation  I = 0.0322; 
- however, the sector is scattered  H = 0.0106. 
 
In the case of the research and development sector, various changes are 
apparent in index values if data on Budapest are excluded; auto-correlation grows, 
while the γ  value decreases. 
This means that in the choice of plant location made by enterprises operating 
in the research and development sector, an attractive factor going beyond 
subregional borders can clearly be detected. The dev lopment of some nodes is the 
result of this: such agglomeration points include Budapest and its surroundings like 
the Szentendre, Budaörs, Pilisvörösvár, Vác and Gödöllő subregions as well as the 
subregions of Mosonmagyaróvár and Győr. 
Disregarding data on Budapest brings some change in the map displaying LQ 
values, the number of subregions having an LQ value higher than 1.5 increases 
considerably (Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
Furthermore, the value of the Moran index is signifcantly increased by the 
fact that no enterprise with the main activity of R&D operates in 69 subregions, 
many of which are adjacent. 
2547 enterprises are present in this sector, out of which 1402 are located in 
Budapest. Moreover, the subregions of Pécs, Debrecen, Szeged, Miskolc, Kecs-
kemét, Székesfehérvár and Veszprém may also be mention d. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of LQ values in sector 73 of research and development 

































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of LQ values in sector 73 of research and development 

































































































































































































Source: own calculations 
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4.4. The boundaries of the survey 
The above applied index numbers and indicators repres nt useful help in analyses 
aiming at the measurement of agglomeration and concentration, however, it is 
important to underline that final conclusions cannot be drawn based on only these 
values. In the following, I would like to introduce the limitations of my survey: 
1. Spatial division: Since I completed this research on the subregional level, my 
results can only show the presence and range of fact rs that occur on this level 
of spatial division, therefore, it would be useful to conduct the survey on the 
county level as well. 
2. Absolute or relative concentration: LQ values mean the quotient of si/xi, while 
both the Moran index and Ellison-Glaeser’s γ index can be calculated on the 
basis of si – xi values. The former one measures concentration along the 
subregion’s own employment level, therefore, it is relative, while the latter 
one measures the absolute flow (to or from) of natio l employment. This is 
why the use of both is recommended in the survey, and results must be 
interpreted accordingly. 
3. Distortion of index numbers: Since no exact data on employment were 
available, only the classification of companies in terms of staff number 
categories, I had to assess these. This may represent a significant degree of 
distortion in the value of index numbers.  
4. Agglomeration – is it? Behind the high value of theMoran index there may 
not surely lie real agglomeration; it is possible that the value increased due to 
the concentration of the sector in adjacent subregions with high population, or 
the existence of adjacent subregions that, however, have especially low 
employment in the sector and are “empty”. 
5. Summary 
Based on the frequency distribution of index numbers and values included in the 
tables, surveying the concentration of knowledge int nsive sectors suggests that 
knowledge intensive service sectors display a rathe mixed picture in terms of 
concentration and agglomeration. 
Based on the index number of spatial concentration (Ellison-Glaeser’s  
γ index), it can be stated that the majority of knowledge intensive service sectors  
(9 out of 13) may be called at least moderately concentrated, and this high degree of 
concentration is due to Budapest, consequently, Budapest is the subregion where 
these knowledge intensive service sectors are present in higher concentration 
compared to the rest of service sectors. 
However, based on the index number of agglomeration (Moran index), sectors 
prove more divided, positive auto-correlation can be found in 5 of the 13 sectors. 
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This result is not surprising, since concentration measures the effect of forces having 
narrower range, while agglomeration also assesses the effect of forces going beyond 
area borders. Therefore, it would be worth conducting the survey on the county level 
as well.  
The so-called Budapest-effect is very high both in the measurement of 
agglomeration and of concentration. 
Based on the LQ indices of knowledge intensive sectors and the values of the 
Moran index also examining the effects of adjacency, it can be concluded that these 
sectors are less clustered in Hungary. The value of 51LQ ,>  represents an 
internationally accepted low limit that justifies the statement that a sector undergoes 
clustering. In each of these sectors there exist subregions where a certain spatial 
concentration may be detected, but these sectors are less agglomerated in space, and 
we can find only three sectors that demonstrate high spatial auto-correlation, 
however, this is often due to the “empty” adjacent areas.  
Based on the survey, it can be concluded that the clustering of knowledge 
intensive service sectors cannot be proved in Hungary, so there are no substantially 
innovative clusters in these sectors. This is not surprising, since in moderately 
developed countries like Hungary the economy has not yet been driven by 
innovation.  
The survey also demonstrated that Hungarian regions, counties and subregions 
are in very different phases of development and are link d to the global economy 
very differently. Consequently, their competitiveness can only be improved by very 
different strategies of economic development. 
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Subregional Economic and Innovation Contribution of 
Hungarian Universities 
Zoltán Bajmócy – Miklós Lukovics 
 
Several success stories prove that universities are abl  to significantly influence regional 
development. Partially due to this fact a number of regions have created development 
strategies to strengthen the regional effects of universities and to motivate the academic 
sphere for a more intense involvement in regional economic development also in the post-
socialist transition economies. In spite of this, it is not obvious whether the significant 
regional contribution of universities is a rule or rather an exception. On the top of this the 
validity of the relevant results of the literature can not be unambiguously extended to 
transition economies. 
Present paper aims to measure the contribution of Hungarian higher education 
institutions to regional economic and innovation performance. On the one hand, it attempts 
to adapt the methodology of a former US study of Goldstein and Renault to a transition 
economy, and instead of regional to sub-regional (LAU-1) level. One the other hand it 
expands the focus of their method, and connects the role of universities to complex territorial 
innovation performance, and especially to knowledge exploitation ability. It concludes that 
universities have significant contribution to overall local innovation performance, but very 
limited contribution to the knowledge exploitation ability. This contribution is too forceless 
to result in the dynamic improvement of the local economic performance or in the rise of the 
local incomes. 
 
Keywords: universities’ regional contribution, innovation performance, transition 
economy, Hungary. 
1. Introduction 
The role of universities in systems of innovation and their contribution to economic 
development are widely approached research issues. Th  increasing importance of 
the academic sphere in the innovation systems is usually explained by the growing 
importance of knowledge compared to the conventional factors of production 
(Etzkowitz et al 2000). 
Nowadays “the growth in technological knowledge relies increasingly on 
science” (Rosenberg 1994, p. 9.). This “ties industrie  to universities, which provide 
both people trained in the relevant fields, and research findings which enable the 
technology to advance further” (Nelson 1995, p. 77.). On the top of this, it is often 
argued that nowadays the conventional teaching and research functions of the 
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universities are able to evolve and generate economic effects only in synergy with 
the new function of the “economic utilization” (Etzkowitz et al 2000). 
The contribution of universities to innovation performance and economic 
growth may significantly differ regarding the peculiarities of the given region or 
university. In certain cases the contribution of the academic sphere is apparent and 
vital. These success stories (Silicon valley, Route 128, Cambridge) served as a basis 
for numerous economic development actions all over th  world (technology-transfer 
programmes, science parks, technology business incubators, etc.), but the success of 
these programmes are in may cases questioned (Cooke, 2001, Asheim–Coenen 
2005, Löfsten–Lindelöf 2005). 
Therefore, it remains a basic question whether univers ties’ economic 
contribution is a rule or rather an exception. This seems to be particularly important 
in the post-socialist transition economies, where the success stories are absent, but 
still a number of central and local development strategies are based on the hoped 
economic development effects of universities.  
In present paper we focus on the question whether universities’ contribution 
to regional innovation and economic performance canbe proved in a transition 
economy, namely in Hungary. In chapter 2 we synthesize the main finding of the 
literature dealing with the (regional) economic contribution of universities.  
We outline the importance of the regional-level analysis, and touch upon the 
peculiarities of transition economies in this respect. In chapter 3 we present the 
hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 4 provides an overview on the methodology of our 
analysis, which is based on Hungarian sub-regional (LAU-1) data. In chapter 5 we 
show the results of the analysis and we draw our conclusions in chapter 6. 
2. Regional economic contribution of universities 
In today’s knowledge- or learning-based economy the innovation potential depends 
to a great extent on extra-organizational factors and relations, in other words the 
innovation system (Lundval 1992, Nelson 1993). In almost all innovation systems 
have higher education institutions (HEIs) a significant role, especially research 
universities as essential knowledge-producers (Inzelt 2004, Tödtling–Trippl 2005). 
The literature of innovation systems has uncovered that not solely the 
presence of the universities are important, but the c aracter and intensity of the 
relations between universities and other participants of the system. A large body of 
literature deals with the mechanisms through which the academic knowledge 
production affects the corporate innovation performance (Etzkowitz–Leydesdorff 
2000, Inzelt 2004, Bercovitz–Feldman 2006), with the spatiality of these 
mechanisms (Feldman 1994, Morgan 2002, Goldstein–Reault 2004, Varga 2009) 
and with the transformation within the academic sphere that enables the operation of 
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these mechanisms (Etzkowitz et al 2000, Goldfarb–Henrekson 2003,  
Clarysse et al 2005, Antonelli 2008). 
As we can see only a part of the studies dealing with the economic role of 
universities puts the problem of spatiality into the focus. One could easily argue that 
universities are rather national and not regional “resources”. Students do not gain 
scholarships solely from the host region of the university, nor do they remain there 
necessarily after graduation. Furthermore research ties make universities become 
parts of global networks. 
Nevertheless certain universities contribute signifcantly to their local 
(regional) environment and catalyze local economic processes. As a consequence 
regions are increasingly looking at universities as exploitable local “resources”.  
This raises the need for analyzing the spatial characte istics of the university-
business relations. 
Although the external relations of the universities are to a great extent 
globally tied, a certain part of university-industry relations have local characteristics. 
This is due to the fact that the technology-transfer process is embedded into the 
contexts of local routines and local / regional systems of innovation  
(Bercovitz–Feldman 2006). Hence personal relations and local embeddedness gains 
and important role, which sheds light on the importance of the analysis of the local 
and regional innovation systems (Asheim–Coenen 2005). On the top of this, 
externalities (spillovers) that play a vital role in the innovation process have spatial 
characteristics, they are mostly local, thus the spatial distribution of the participants 
matters (whether they are spatially concentrated or evenly distributed) (Varga 2009). 
A number of innovation models emphasize that innovati n is a spatial phenomenon, 
depending to a great extent on resources that are region-specific and can not be 
reproduced elsewhere (Ács et al 2000, Asheim–Gertler 2005, Storper 1997). 
Although the literature of territorial innovation models is heterogeneous (Moulaert–
Sekia 2003, Lagendijk 2006), the given approaches usually emphasize the 
importance of the local scpecifities (participants and relations), the learning ability, 
which naturally sheds light on the essential role of knowledge-producing 
organizations. 
Therefore the spatiality of the effects of universities has an abundant literature. 
The (spatially restricted) economic effects of the academic sphere are manifold: they 
range from the increase of local demand through the direct technological effects to 
the contribution of regional “milieu” (Goldstein–Renault 2004). 
These potential effects can be divided into two main groups: the input-side or 
income effects, and the output-side or knowledge-eff cts, which latter covers the 
scientific, technical and economic knowledge streaming from the academic to the 
business sphere (Armstrong–Taylor 2000, Morgan 2002, Varga 2004). Income 
effects basically derive from the local spending of the university, its students and 
staff. Although they may have a significant role in certain areas, they are not able to 
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catalyze the local economy1, they are static in nature. Conversely, knowledge-eff cts 
are able to induce dynamic local development: they can serve as a basis of the local 
innovation potential, and thus eventually the improvement of economic performance 
and the rise of local incomes. 
In connection with the knowledge-effects the most intensely researched issue 
is probably the analysis of the local spillovers deriving from the spatial 
concentration of R&D activities. A number of empirical studies proved a significant 
and positive relation between university R&D and the number of company-owned 
patents2 in case of spatial proximity (Audretsch–Feldman 1996, Anselin et al 1997, 
Varga 1998, Autant-Bernard 2001). With the increase of the distance the relation 
becomes insignificant. These econometric analyses, which are based on the 
knowledge-production function, provided important proofs of the existence of the 
academic knowledge spillovers and their local nature. 
However, beside the knowledge externalities connected to the formalized 
R&D results, there are numerous other channels of universities’ potential regional 
effects. Therefore it is still a pivotal question that, to what extent are the effects of 
universities general. Do they also affect (beside th  patent or product-innovation 
effectiveness of the business sphere), the overall loca economic performance or the 
rise of local incomes. In this respect the analysis of Goldstein and Renault (2004) 
based on American time series provides essential resu ts. They generally proved that 
in the USA the presence of research universities significantly affects the rise of 
regional incomes, but only after 19863, when – as a consequence of the Bayh-Dole 
Act – universities started to make serious efforts to strengthen their industrial 
relations. They proved furthermore, that the channels of the R&D related effects are 
way broader than the transfer of formalized achievements (patents); overall 
university R&D expenditures are more significant indicators than the number of 
university patents. 
While the econometric analyses based on the knowledge production function 
suggest that the critical concentration of R&D capacity and local industrial activities 
is required for the spillovers to become significant factors, Goldstein and Renault 
(2004) found that the general economic effects of universities are more intense in 
the smaller regions. It seems that universities are abl  to serve as a substitute for 
agglomeration economies to a certain extent. 
                                                   
1 The ways of strengthening the income effects are on the one hand the increase of the number of 
students and the staff, on the other hand the rise of the proportion of local spending. These face 
objective hinders (e.g. public procurement rules do not allow the university to prioritize local buying). 
Therefore the strengthening of the income effects is not an objective of local economic development. 
2 These studies usually use the number of patents as a measure of innovation performance, which can 
be seriously criticized. Nevertheless Ács et al (2002) proved that using the number of newly introduced 
high-tech products leads to the same results as using the number of patents. 
3 Although the Bay-Dole Act was adopted in 1980, its effects became measurable only a few years 
later. 
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However, the above results can not be unambiguously exteriorized to 
transition economies, it is not at all obvious, that these effects could be proved there 
as well. In the transition countries the performance of the regional innovation 
systems is weak (Hollanders 2006), so are the university-industry relations  
(Inzelt 2004, Papanek 2006), and the political actions aiming at the encouragement 
of university-related technology-transfer have just begun being amplified. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of university-related local economic development 
programmes can be questioned in many cases (Barta 2002, Buzás 2003, Bajmócy 
2006). 
The literature of Hungarian universities’ economic contribution is quite 
scarce. Inzelt (2004) provides a general overview on the transformation of 
university-industry relations, but spatiality is not in the focus of her inquiry. Varga 
(2009) verifies empirically that localized knowledge spillovers of university and 
private R&D are more intense in case of the spatial concentration of the system’s 
participants. Several authors analyse the opportunities and effectiveness of 
university-related development-programmes (Barta 2002, Lengyel 2004, Pálmai 
2004, Bajmócy 2006, Papanek–Perényi 2006), and the opportunities of university-
based local economic development strategies (Lengyel 2009). 
3. Hypotheses 
The literature of universities’ regional effects puts the knowledge-effects into the 
focus of the interest. In present paper we also carry on with this tradition, since we 
attempt to analyse the ability of Hungarian HEIs to boost the economy of their host 
region. 
Studies that link the presence of universities to regional innovation 
performance use the number of patents or incidentally he number of newly 
introduced high-tech products as a measure of innovation. The general 
understanding of innovation (OECD 2005) is however much broader, and does not 
seem to be reducible to one given dimension. 
On the basis of the Oslo Manual’s recommendations a umber of attempts 
have been made to measure the innovation performance of territorial units in its 
complexity – ultimately to map the performance of the innovation system  
(Arundel–Hollanders 2005, Hollanders 2006, Kanerva et l 2006, EIS 2007). Such a 
complex approach seems to be especially important in transition countries like 
Hungary, since in Hungary for example less than half of the innovative companies 
carry out any R&D activity (EIS 2007). 
Therefore in present paper we attempt to link the presence of HEIs to the 
complex innovation performance of the territorial unit. Within this, the 
correspondence between HEIs and the region’s knowledge- xploitation ability is 
especially important. On this basis we conceptualized our first hypothesis: 




- Hypothesis 1: Higher education institutions contribute significantly and 
positively to sub-regional overall innovation performance, but they do not 
contribute to a substantive element of the innovatin performance, namely the 
knowledge-exploitation capacity. 
 
The literature surveyed in the previous chapter suggests that in the developed 
countries universities’ economic contribution is more general than just affecting the 
innovation performance of the business sector. They contribute to the overall 
regional economic performance and the rise of local incomes as well. At the same 
time, the validity of such an effect in a transition country is not at all obvious: 
 
- Hypothesis 2: Higher education institutions contribute significantly and 
positively to the growth of sub-regional economic performance and the 
income of the residents. 
4. Methodology 
For the purpose of our study we took the analysis of Goldstein and Renault (2004) 
as a starting point, but we carried out certain modifications on it. These 
modifications basically derive from three factors. First, we widened the focus of 
analysis; beside the change in average wages we also examined the effects of HEIs 
on the complex innovation performance with a special emphasis on the knowledge-
exploitation capacity, and the change in the sub-regional economic performance. 
Second, we carried out our analysis on local (LAU-1) level, which significantly 
influenced data availability. Therefore we had to make certain changed on the set of 
indicators used. Third, we carried out our examinatio s in such a country, where the 
sub-region of the capital (Budapest) concentrates a significant proportion of the 
population, gross value added (GVA), and research capa ities, and excels from the 
country also in a relative way. This inevitably had to be considered in the statistical 
analysis. 
The units of our analysis were the 168 Hungarian (LAU-1) sub-regions, the 
examined period was 1998-2004. The system of statistic l sub-regions undergone 
slight changes between the two dates, therefore we converted all the data to be in 
line with the 2004 system4. For the computations we used MS Excel and SPSS 15.0. 
4.1. Indicators used 
For analyzing the regional effects of HEIs, we used three set of indicators: the 
dependent variables (which indicate the potential forms of contribution), HEI-related 
                                                   
4 The data therefore refer to the 168 sub-regions defined by the Government Regulation 244/2003. 
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indicators, and control variables. During the selection of the variables we carried out 
certain modifications on the set of indicators used by Goldstein and Renault (2004). 
These changes were partially due to the differences in the focus of examination, and 
partially due to the restricted sub-regional data av il bility (Table 1). 
Table 1. Indicators of the analysis 
Change in the gross personal tax base per tax payer compared to national average (in % 
points) 
Change in the gross value added per capita compared to national average (in % points) 
Sub-regional Summary Innovation Index (SRSI) 
Dependent 
Knowledge Exploitation Index (KEI) 
Is there a HEI in the sub-region 
Is there a state HEI in the sub-region 
Is there a university in the sub-region 
Is there a college in the sub-region 
Number of teaching staff in HEIs per 1000 inhabitants 
Number of scientists with PhD per 10000 inhabitants 
Number of full-time students in HEIs per 1000 inhabit nts 
HEI-
related 
Numbers of degrees awarded in the fields of science, engineering and informatics 
Number of employees 
Population of the centre of the sub-region 
Per cent employment in manufacturing and construction 
Per cent employment in services 
Complex accessibility indicator 
Per cent of incomes generated by proprietorships 
Number of patents per 10000 inhabitants 
Per cent of incomes generated by proprietorships 
Number of patents per 10000 inhabitants 
Base-year level of gross personal tax-base per tax payer 
Base-year level of gross value added per capita 
Control 
Trade integration (Export sales per gross value added) 
Source: own construction 
 
Two of the dependent variables are related to the innovation performance: the 
sub-regional summary innovation index (SRSI), and the knowledge-exploitation 
index (KEI)5. These measures of innovation potential refer to adaptability and the 
speed of technical change. These capabilities can eve tually lead to the change in 
the other two dependent variables. 
The latter two dependent variables refer to the change in the sub-regional 
economic performance and in the incomes of the inhabitants: the per capita gross 
value added (GVA) and the gross tax base per tax payer. Per capita GVA is 
analogous to per capita GDP in its content6, while the gross tax base per tax payer 
                                                   
5 The computing method of the two indexes is outlined later in the chapter. 
6 GDP is not available for LAU-1 sub-regions, thus GVA is used as a substitute. 
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captures the disposable incomes of the residents7. The computation of the variables 
is analogous to the method of Goldstein and Renault (2004). We first calculated the 
values of the variables as a percentage of the national average for each sub-region 
for 1998 and 2004. The dependent variable is then calculated as a difference in the 
indexes for the gives sub-region between the two years. The positive value of the 
variable therefore refers to a growth rate exceeding the national average (catching-
up, or increasing the advantage). 
Thus two of our dependent variables are based on the change of the indicator 
values, while two are cross-section data. But innovati n performance refers to the 
speed of change in itself, so the introduction of the growth rate of the innovation 
indexes is unneeded. 
The presence and the performance of HEIs is measured by eight indicators. 
Four of them are dummy variables (present or not in the sub-region), while for are 
measured on scale. These latter are indicators related to the basic functions of the 
universities: the number of teaching staff, the number of full-time students, the 
number of scientists with PhD, and the number of degre s awarded in the fields of 
science, engineering and informatics. These variables – where available – refer to 
the base year (1998). 
To capture the potential effects of universities the use of university-related 
indicators is not sufficient, since the difference b tween sub-regions with and 
without HEIs may be caused by many other influencing factors. Therefore in our 
analysis we applied control variables which are potentially able to explain a 
significant proportion of the dependent variable’s variation. 
The first group of the control variables tries to capture the agglomeration 
economies, they refer to the size of the sub-region. Instead of using the overall 
population of the sub-region, we decided to introduce the population of the centre of 
the sub-region, which better indicates the size of the local concentration. 
In order to map the economic structure of the sub-regions we used two 
variables: the relative weight of manufacturing and services in the employment.  
We indicated the accessibility of the sub-region by the complex accessibility index8 
of the Hungarian Central Statistics Office (KSH 2004). Several empirical results 
prove the link between entrepreneurship and economic performance (Bosma–
Harding 2006). We used two variables in this category: the per cent of incomes 
generated by sole proprietors and the number of patents per 10000 inhabitants. 
                                                   
7 Goldstein and Renault (2004) used the wages as depen nt variable, but in this case we also had to 
face the unavailability of the data in sub-regional level. 
8 The index considers the time distance from the nearest county-centre (40%), from the nearest sub-
region-centre (40%), and the state of supply (20%), which latter indicates the extent to which the 
residents are dependent on the services of the centres. Accessibility is calculated for all the 
municipalities and then, weighted by the population of the municipalities, the sub-regional index is 
calculated.  
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We considered furthermore the base-year performance of the sub-region to 
control the endowment effect. On the top of these w introduced a variable 
reflecting the peculiarities of the transition countries: the indicator of trade 
integration (export sales per GVA). A number of empirical results indicate that in 
Hungary foreign direct investments, and in association with this export orientation 
basically influences territorial disparities (Lengyel–Lukovics 2006,  
Kovács–Lukovics 2006). 
4.2. The steps of the analysis 
We carried out the analysis of HEIs’ potential contribution in two basic steps. The 
differences regarding the innovation and economic performance of subregions with 
and without HEIs may derive from many factors. In the first step of our analysis we 
attempted to explain these potential differences by using our control variables.  
We fitted linear regression models to all of the four dependent variables in 
order to test the explanatory power of the control variables. We used the “backward” 
method of the SPSS so we gained such “base-models” where a relevant set of the 
control variables are included with the maximum possible overall explanatory 
power. Therefore the “base-models” indicate the explanatory power of the relevant 
control variables in case of all the dependent variables.  
In the second step we attempted to unfold the extent of university 
contribution. We used here two methods. First, we analysed whether there is a 
correspondence between the dependent variables and the HEI-related indicators 
when controlling for the effects of the relevant set of control variables. We 
calculated here partial correlations controlled for the independent variables of the 
base models.  
Second, if we found significant correlation between a HEI-related indicator 
and a dependent variable, than we attempted to supplement our base-model with that 
given variable. Actually, we analyzed whether the HEI-related indicators provide 
extra explanatory power to our models. 
We must mention here that both the HEI-related indicators and the control 
variables are strongly correlated to each-other, thus our regression models are 
characterized by strong multicollinearity. Hence weonly analyzed the overall 
explanatory power of the models (where the lack of multicollinearity is not a 
precondition), we could not and did not draw any conclusions on the partial effects 
of the given variables. 
4.3. The distorting effects of the Budapest sub-region 
We inevitably had to consider during the analysis that a significant proportion of 
Hungary’s population, economic performance and research capacity is concentrated 
in the sub-region of the capital (Budapest). The values of the Budapest sub-regions 
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significantly influence the average values of the dependent variables and thus distort 
the results of our examinations. 
Therefore we removed the values of the Budapest sub-region from the 
database in order to gain a more realistic picture on the remaining part of the 
country. Thus all our results refer to Hungary’s extra-Budapest parts. We certainly 
removed the values of Budapest also when calculating the average values of the 
given indicators. 
4.4. Measuring the complex innovation performance of the sub-regions9 
One of the main focuses of our study is to unfold the correspondence between the 
presence of HEIs and the innovation performance of the host sub-region. Innovation 
performance data on the Hungarian sub-regions were not available, thus we had to 
carry out our own analysis to construct these data. 
The first step of the innovation analysis was the sel ction and classification of 
the indicator set. In connection with the construction of the groups we built on 
Tödtling and Trippl’s (2005) approach on the structure of regional innovation 
systems, the smart infrastructure concept of Smilor and Wakelin (quoted by Stimson 
et al 2006), which has became widely known through the interpretation of Malecki 
(1997), and the arguments of Florida (2002) on the economic geography of talent. 
We attempted to define our sub-indexes in such a way that they should reflect to the 
elements of a “typical” regional innovation system. 
In purpose of the index selection the indicators of the Summary Innovation 
Index of the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS 2007), the Service Sector 
Innovation Index of the European Trend Chart on Innovation (Kanerva et al 2006), 
the EXIS Summary Index (Arundel–Hollanders 2005), the National Innovative 
Capacity Index of Porter and Stern (2003), the Europe Creativity Index of Florida 
and Tingali (2004), the RRSI Index of the European Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard (Hollanders 2006), the indicators of the analysis of Csizmadia and 
Rechnitzer (2005) on the innovation potential of Hungarian cities and of Kocziszky 
(2004) on the innovation potential of the sub-regions f the North-Hungarian Region 
served as a basis. 
We tried to avoid to reduce the innovation output to one certain (and perhaps 
ill-defined) indicator. However this approach would provide the advantage of an 
objective selection criteria10, the choosing of the dependent variable is problematic, 
and it would not provide a detailed picture about the innovation system’s 
performance. Besides, the sub-regional availability of data influenced the 
construction of the indicator-set. 
                                                   
9 A more detailed description of the innovation performance measuring method, and the results of an 
analysis that also includes data on the Budapest subregion can be read at Bajmócy–Szakálné (2009).  
10 Like in the analysis of Porter and Stern (2003), where the relevance of the indicators were defined by 
their explanatory power in a regression model where the number of USPTO applications served as the 
dependent variable. 
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Eventually we carried out the innovation performance analysis with 28 
indicators (Table 2), which were classed into three groups: knowledge production 
(10 indicators), knowledge exploitation (9 indicators), and smart infrastructure  
(9 indicators). Three sub-indexes measure the performance in these three categories, 
while the sub-indexes serve as the basis of the Sub-regional Summary Innovation 
Index (SRSI) with an equal weight. The indicators of the Knowledge Production 
Index measure the ability to create new scientific and technological knowledge.  
The indicators of the Knowledge Exploitation Index (KEI) attempt to measure the 
characteristics of the innovative business sectors, while the Smart Infrastructure 
Index systematizes the factors that provide a background for sustaining knowledge 
production and exploitation. 
Table 2. The indicator set of the innovation performance analysis 
1 Number of R&D performing units per 100000 inhabitants 
2 Total staff of R&D units per 1000 inhabitants 
3 Calculated staff number (FTE) of R&D units 
4 Calculated staff number of R&D units per 1000 inhabitants 
5 Number of scientists with PhD per 10000 inhabitants 
6 Investments of R&D units per 1000 inhabitants 
7 R&D costs per 1000 inhabitants 
8 Expenditures of R&D places 
9 Expenditures of R&D places per 1000 inhabitants 
Knowledge 
creation 
10 Number of patents per 10000 inhabitants 
1 Export sales as a percent of total sales 
2 Export sales per inhabitant 
3 Number of foreign owned companies per 1000 inhabitants 
4 Share capital of foreign owned companies as a % of total share capital 
5 Incomes from intellectual properties per inhabitant 
6 Percent of companies in NACE 24 and 29-34 divisions within all companies 
(high and medium tech manufacturing) 
7 Percent of companies in NACE 64 and 72-73 divisions within all companies 
(high-tech services) 




9 Number of knowledge-intensive firms with more than 50 employees 
1 Per cent of employees with university or college degree 
2 Percent of white collar workers in leading positins within all employees 
3 Number of full-time students in higher education institutions per 1000 
inhabitants 
4 Number of teaching staff of higher education institutions per 1000 inhabitants 
5 Number of ISDN lines per 1000 inhabitants 
6 Registered members of public libraries per 1000 inhabitants 
7 Cinema visits per 1000 inhabitants 
8 Museum visitors per 1000 inhabitants 
“Smart” 
infrastructure 
9 Tourist arrivals in public accommodation establishments per 1000 inhabitants 
Source: own construction 
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In the second step of the innovation performance analysis we compared the 
innovation performance of the sub-regions with respect to the SRSI and the KEI. For 
the calculation of the index values we built on them thodology of the European 
Innovation Scoreboard’s Summary Innovation Index and Service Sector Innovation 
Index. On this basis the construction of our Sub-regional Summary Innovation Index 
is as follows: 
1. Calculating the minimum and maximum values for each indicator. Regarding 
almost all of the 28 indicators, the values of some sub-regions significantly 
excelled the national average (usually positively). We considered a value to be 
an outlier if its distance from the national average exceeded the standard 
deviation more than four times. In most of the cases 1-3 values had to be 
considered as outliers. We removed the outliers when calculated the minimum 
and maximum values in order to avoid the extreme concentration of the index 
values. We also removed the values of the Budapest sub-region. 
2. Rescaling of the values. We subtracted the indicator’s minimum from each 
subregional value and divided by the difference of the maximum and 
minimum value. In this way all the rescaled values are between 0 and 1. 
Outlier received 0 or 1 depending on the direction of deviation. 
3. Calculating the sub-indexes. The sub-indexes are calculated as the 
arithmetical mean of the rescaled values of the indicators in their group. We 
faced a dilemma about the occasional weighting of the indicators, but – just 
like in the case of the EIS – we rather put emphasis on the transparency of the 
method. In addition the development of an objective weighting system would 
have raised further questions. 
4. Calculating the SRSI. The SRSI is calculated as the unweighted arithmetical 
mean of the three sub-indexes. The SRSI and the sub-index values are 
measured on scale therefore they are capable of being used for the comparison 
of the sub-regions. The distance of sub-regional innovation performance from 
the national average can also be interpreted in this way. 
 
Out of the results of our innovation performance analysis we utilized the SRSI 
and the KEI values. The other two sub-index values are heavily influenced by 
indicators that can directly or indirectly be linked to the presence of HEIs, therefore 
we could not use them in our study. SRSI is also influe ced by these indicators, 
even though we decided to use this index as a depennt variable. In this case the 
overall influence of HEI-related indicators are presumably much more modest, the 
effects of other indicators may overcompensate it. Nevertheless these results have 
restricted power. 
For the calculation of the KEI we did not use any HEI-related indicators, so in 
this case we do not have to face such problem. The analysis of knowledge 
exploitation ability has basic importance in our examinations, since it may be able to 
transform the university outputs into increased economic performance. 




While presenting the results we follow the steps of analysis outlined in the 
methodological chapter 4.2. During the given steps we first show the results 
regarding the dependent variables SRSI and KEI, and than regarding the further two 
dependent variables. This is in line with the logic of universities’ knowledge-effects, 
since innovation capacity (and especially the knowledge exploitation ability) can 
lead to the increased economic performance and incomes. 
By comparing the performance of subregions with HEI(let us call them study 
population), and subregions without HEI (control group) we gained an overview on 
HEIs’ effects on the dependent variables. The differences between the two groups 
are spectacular. 
The SRSI and the KEI value of the study population (0,36 and 0,35) is 
significantly higher than in the case of the control group (0,13 and 0,18). With 
respect to the other two dependent variables the cas seems to be more complex. 
Regarding the per capita GVA the study population departs from a significantly 
better position (well above the national average), which may be due to the size or 
partially the static income effects of HEIs. But the advantageous initial position did 
not infer a more intense growth rate. In fact the differences between the two groups 
decreased11.  
The case is quite similar regarding the change in “tax base per tax payer”, 
however the differences are not too sharp this time12. The apparently higher base-
year performance may partially explain the lower growth rates in itself, but only 
partially, since in Hungary the territorial disparities measured at both regional and 
subregional level widen (Lukovics 2008). Therefore th higher base-year values do 
not necessarily infer the lower growth rates. 
Therefore spectacular differences appeared between th  study population and 
the control group. However the direction of the deviation was surprisingly opposite 
regarding the innovation and the economic performance. Still, these differences 
cannot be unambiguously accredited to the presence of HEIs at this level of analysis, 
since they may derive from many other factors. 
5.1. Explanatory power of the control variables 
We attempted to reveal the causes of the differences between the study population 
and the control group by introducing control variables. First, we had to test the 
explanatory power of the used control variables. We fitt d linear regression models 
                                                   
11 Change in per capita GVA compared to the national average in percentage points is -7,68 in case of 
the study population and 3,81 in case of the control group. 
12 Change in gross tax base per tax payer compared to the national average in percentage point is -0,39 
in case of the study population and 0,33 in case of the control group. 
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on all our dependent variables, where a relevant set of the control variables were 
used as independent variables13 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The explanatory power of the control variables 
   SRSI KEI GVA Tax base 
Number of employees  x x x 
Population of the centre of the 
sub-region 
x x x x 
Per cent employment in 
manufacturing and 
construction 
   x 
Per cent employment in 
services 
x   x 
Trade integration x x x  
Complex accessibility indicator  x  x 
Per cent of incomes generated 
by proprietorships 
x   x 
Number of patents per 10000 
inhabitants 
x x x x 
Base-year level of Gross 
personal tax-base per tax payer 
x x  x 
Control variables 
Base-year level of Gross Value 
Added per capita 
  x  
R 0,916 0,916 0,551 0,611 
R Square 0,839 0,840 0,304 0,373 
Adjusted R Square 0,832 0,834 0,282 0,342 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0,051 0,053 48,935 3,720 
Summary 
Durbin-Watson 2,156 2,041 2,009 2,253 
Sum of Squares 2,159 2,388 168066,069 1302,942 
df 6 6 5 8 
Mean Square 0,360 0,398 33613,214 162,868 
F 138,462 139,885 14,037 11,766 
Model 
ANOVA 
Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Note: “x” means that the given control variable has been put into the “base model”. We did not mark 
the Beta and t values of the given indicators, nor did we analyse their partial effects due to the strong 
multicollinearity of the models. 
Source: own calculations 
 
The explanatory power of the control variables are high regarding SRSI and 
KEI, while relatively low in case of per capita GVA and gross tax base per tax 
payer. This step of the analysis revealed which group f the control variables 
explains the variance of the given dependent variables the best, and how strong this 
                                                   
13 The provided the detailed description of the method in chapter 4.2. 
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explanatory power is. We did not analyse the partial effects of the given indicators 
due to the strong multicollinearity of the models, but for the purpose of our study is 
was not necessary anyway. In the next step we attemp  to control for the effects of 
these relevant control variables, and try to increase the explanatory power of these 
“base-models” by introducing the HEI-related variables. 
5.2. Regional economic effects of the Hungarian HEIs 
On the basis of the results of the previous step we her  attempted to reveal the real 
effects of the HEIs. First, we analyzed the correspondence between our eight HEI-
related variables and the dependent variables while we controlled for the effects of 
the relevant control variables. We calculated partial correlations while controlling 
for the effects of the independent variables of the “base-models” (presented in Table 
3) – in other words the relevant set of control variables. These partial correlation 
results showed great differences with respect to the different dependent variables 
(Table 4). 
Regarding the SRSI all the HEI-related variables proved to be significantly 
correlated while filtering the effects of the control variables. The partial correlation 
values are relatively strong and in all cases positive. Regarding the KEI only one 
partial correlation result proved to be significant (the number of degrees awarded in 
the fields of science, engineering and informatics), but the strength of the correlation 
is weak in this case. Regarding per capita GVA and gross tax base per tax payers 
non of the HEI-related indicators correlated. 
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Table 4. Partial correlation results 










Number of teaching staff in 
HEIs per 1000 inhabitants 0,714 0,000 0,101 0,202 0,680 0,389 0,100 0,210 
Number of full-time 
students in HEIs per 1000 
inhabitants 0,678 0,000 0,057 0,476 0,114 0,149 0,054 0,501 
Number of scientists with 
PhD per 10000 inhabitants 0,663 0,000 0,068 0,390 -0,170 0,830 0,080 0,315 
Is there a HEI in the sub-
region 0,391 0,000 0,056 0,484 0,340 0,664 0,134 0,092 
Is there a state HEI in the 
sub-region 0,455 0,000 -0,044 0,580 0,820 0,298 
-
0,040 0,618 
Is there a university in the 
sub-region 0,528 0,000 0,034 0,672 -0,300 0,707 0,045 0,570 
Is there a college in the sub-
region 0,363 0,000 0,095 0,230 0,610 0,442 0,158 0,046 
Number of degrees awarded 
in the fields of science, 
engineering and informatics 0,606 0,000 0,133 0,092 0,100 0,899 0,132 0,097 
Source: own calculations 
 
On the basis of these results we attempted to increase the explanatory power 
of the base-models by entering the relevant HEI-related indicators. In case of the 
KEI the only HEI-related indicator that showed significant partial correlation did not 
increase the explanatory power of the model. In connection with the SRSI we 
managed to further increase the high explanatory power f the base model (Table 5). 
We constructed here two models. In model 1 we used th  backward method of the 
SPSS, and in this way four HEI-related indicators remained in the model. In model 2 
we entered all the eight HEI related indicators andthe control variables of the base-
model. The explanatory power of both two models is very strong. 
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Table 5. The explanatory power of HEI-related indicators regarding SRSI 
  Base model Model 1* Model 2* 
R 0,916 0,961 0,969 
R Square 0,839 0,924 0,939 
Adjusted R Square 0,832 0,920 0,934 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 0,051 0,035 0,032 
Model 
summary 
Durbin-Watson 2,156 1,821 1,905 
Sum of Squares 2,159 2,380 2,418 
df 6 9 14 
Mean Square 0,360 0,264 0,173 
F 138,462 212,4 167,8 
ANOVA 
Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Note: * Backward method. Dependent variable: SRSI. Independent variables: (1) Population of the 
centre of the sub-region (2) Per cent employment in services (3) Trade integration (4) Number of 
patents per 10000 inhabitants (5) Base-year level of GVA per capita (6) Is there a HEI in the sub-region 
(7) Number of teaching staff in HEIs per 1000 inhabitants (8) Number of full-time students in HEIs per 
1000 inhabitants (9) Number of scientists with PhD per 10000 inhabitants. ** Enter method. Dependent 
variable: SRSI. Independent variables: the control variables of the “base model” and all the HEI-related 
indicators. 
Source: own calculations 
 
The results of our analysis indicate the very restricted economic effects of 
HEIs in the Hungarian sub-regions (not counting with the Budapest sub-region). 
Although the presence of HEIs influences the overall innovation performance of the 
host sub-region (which result has a limited power due to the set of indicators used14), 
the contribution to the knowledge exploitation ability can not be proved. Differences 
between the study population and the control group in this field can be well 
explained by the control variables. The introduction of HEI-related indicators does 
not provide extra explanatory power. Therefore we accept our first hypothesis. 
Our results unambiguously show that the presence of HEIs does not affect the 
growth rate of per capita GVA (economic performance) and gross tax base per tax 
payer (incomes of the inhabitants). However these rults leave the opportunity for 
the presence of income-effects open. Since the absolute values of the study 
population are significantly higher with respect to b th two variables, the presence 
of income-effects is quite probable. At the same time these effects are static, do not 
influence the growth rates. Therefore we do not accept our second hypothesis, the 
presence of HEIs does not affect the growth of sub-regional economic performance 
and incomes in Hungary. 
                                                   
14 We mentioned this in chapter 4.4. 




In present paper we studied the link between the presence of higher education 
institutions and the innovation and economic performance of their host region in a 
transition country, Hungary. On contrary to developd countries, the local 
knowledge-effects of universities are not significant in Hungary (outside of 
Budapest), nor are the effects on the economic performance of the host region, and 
on the rise of local incomes. 
By linking the presence of universities to the complex sub-regional innovation 
performance we found that the knowledge-producing ability did not result in 
increased knowledge-exploitation ability. In Hungary the university-based local 
economic development programmes are therefore carried out in such an 
environment, where the knowledge-producing and knowledge-exploiting abilities 
are spatially departed. Hence the success of these programmes depends to a great 
extent on the endogenous development of industries that build on the local 
knowledge-producing capacity. Such a process is inevitably slow and ambiguous. 
We showed that the differences between sub-regions with and without HEIs 
do not derive from the presence of universities, they can be well explained by other 
factors. HEIs contribution is restricted to the opti nal presence of the income-
effects, they are not able to boost the local economic performance or the disposable 
incomes of the residents. 
In Hungary, in the studied period HEIs can not be considered as real 
„resources” of local development. Regional innovation systems are not able to link 
the knowledge-producing ability to knowledge-exploitation, thus the effects of 
universities may make themselves felt only in the national innovation system. But 
this inevitably infers the lower intensity of the effects, since several channels of 
university-industry relations require spatial proximity. 
Our results suggest that the nature and intensity of higher education 
institutions’ regional economic and innovation contribution differ in developed and 
transition economies. This infers a strong need for further empirical evidences from 
transition countries, and calls for a cautious adaptation of university-based 
development tool that proved to be successful in highly developed regions. 
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Role of Proximity in Regional Clusters:  
Evidence from the Software Industry 
Zsófia Vas 
 
In 1990s, the appearance of information and communicational technologies weakened the 
importance of geographical distance and changed the economic role of proximity, defined as 
small distance. Geographical proximity plays a crucial role in information and knowledge 
transfer and in improving the innovative capacity of firms. However, business partners may 
have successful cooperation in spite of great geographical distances too, due their relational 
proximity, by using the infocommunication technologies too.  
Benefiting from the advantages of geographical and relational proximity, clusters 
form in less developed regions too. Present paper attempts to explore the special 
characteristics of cluster formations in the software industry in the ‘knowledge isle’ of the 
less developed Southern Great Plain Region, in Szeged subregion. To map the relevance of 
the e geographical concentration and the industrial b se of a potential software industry in 
Szeged subregion, it is substantial to count locatin quotient of employees and enterprises. 
With the purpose of surveying the fields of cooperation and the strength of relational 
proximity between software enterprises, a questionnaire is made.  
 
Keywords: geographical and relational proximity, cluster, software industry, Szeged 
subregion  
1. Introduction 
Today, clusters are one of the most competitive instruments ensuring the future 
development of the knowledge-based economy, which st mulate a concentration of 
expertise and knowledge, acting as ‘hubs of innovati n’. Regional clusters are local 
systems of production, where companies and institutions in a particular industry 
create an innovative system of business and non-busi ess relations in a limited 
geographical area (Porter 1990, 2000). Yet the competitive advantage of clusters 
rests not only on spatial concentration. 
Clusters are considered to be the basis of local, regional and even national 
politics in many countries. They are the new poles f competitiveness forming the 
economic map of the world, enhancing the development of the global economy 
(OECD 2001). The European Union highly supports their formation and growth, and 
the European Cluster Observatory manages their mapping, roviding a wide variety 
of data on them for all the countries and regions in the EU.  
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The appearance of modern information and communication technologies 
(internet, mobile phone etc.) meant the shaping of new channels of information and 
knowledge transfer, and revealed that business partners might have knowledge-
based cooperation with each other in spite of great g ographical distances too, due to 
their common knowledge base, behavior pattern, cultural background etc. The 
characteristics of ‘being close to each other’ have changed, the importance of 
relational proximity increased. In connection with the formation of knowledge-based 
relations, the examination of different proximity dimensions, beside the 
geographical one, the ‘relational space’ and ‘networks’ also came to the front.  
The literature of regional science also started to focus on the changed role of the 
proximity; the concept of proximity has already been examined by many writers and 
institutions (Kirat–Lung 1999, Boschma 2005).  
The phenomenon of the formation of the double meaning of proximity draws 
attention to create new approaches to examine clusters and the advantages deriving 
from geographical (physical) and relational (Lagendijk–Lorentzen 2007), in other 
words used by the French School of Proximity Dynamics, organized proximity too 
(Kirat–Lung 1999, Torre–Rallet 2005).  
Information technology (IT) plays an important role in the development of 
knowledge-based economy, its role is emphasized in strategic development programs 
of the European Union. Software industry (as a partof the IT sector), has become an 
international leading branch, which contributes to the development of information 
society. It is highlighted to explore the conditions of the development of software 
cluster, based on the dimensions of proximity. Clusters appear as successful economic 
development tools in less developed countries in the European Union.  
The role of proximity has been changed in the information technology related 
clusters in Hungary too, although it has yet not been measured. It became reasonable 
to examine whether cluster formation may occur or nt it in the less developed 
Southern Great Plain Region (NUTS level 2) and in its 'knowledge island', in the city 
of Szeged and in its subregion. To explore the chances in Szeged, it is worthy to see 
the example of foreign clusters operating in the field of information technology in 
other less developed regions, and to adopt the best prac ices experienced there. The 
basic question to answer is that does the software industry have the opportunity for 
strengthening and clustering in a less developed region? What kind of effects of 
proximity can be observed in the knowledge-based software industry in Szeged 
subregion? 
With a view to demonstrate the future opportunities for clustering in the 
software industry in the Szeged, the first step is to examine the advantages of 
geographical concentration of software companies and related institutions in Szeged 
subregion, by counting location quotient, afterwards to identify the presence and 
strength of relational proximity to which interconnection can be traced back, by 
making a questionnaire with the entrepreneur circle of the software industry.  
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2. Economic role of proximity  
In the last decades, the process of globalization shed light on the formation of a new 
spatial organization of the economy (Lengyel–Rechnitzer 2004). The intensity of 
global competition revealed the increasing importance of geographical 
concentration, the co-localization of business actors, ensuring permanent 
competitive advantages for them. 
Proximity is a critical criterion in firms' choice of where to locate its 
productive units. Location and geographic concentration have become key factors in 
the diffusion and exploitation of knowledge, especially in the context of innovation, 
cluster development and knowledge spillover. Proximity reduces uncertainty, solves 
the problem of coordination, facilitates the interactive learning and thus has a 
positive impact on the economic performance and growth of a region  
(Krugman 2000). Most regional, national development programs on regional growth 
emphasize factors like the nearness of high-tech firms and universities, the 
proximity of experts and researchers or similar sectors.  
Taking a closer look at the notion of proximity in theoretical and empirical 
approaches, we find that its concept used in many wa : we may talk about 
geographical, cultural, organizational, technological, ognitive and even institutional 
proximity etc. (Torre–Rallet 2005, Knoben–Oerlemans 2006, Lengyel 2008).  
All these dimensions are certainly not identical, but refer to ‘being close to 
something’ measured on a certain dimension (Knoben–O rlemans 2006). As Ann 
Markusen (1999) described, proximity is a ‘fuzzy con ept’. In many cases 
companies in proximity, not in the geographical sense, can have successful 
cooperation due to their common language, common skills, and experiences, social 
and institutional background.  
This is also facilitated by the use of information technology. Twenty five 
years ago the only way to work with someone at another institution was to talk with 
them by wired phone or visit in person. But phone calls and travel were expensive in 
a big distance. The appearance of infocommunication technologies, like internet in 
the 1990’s explicitly changed the value and the necessity of geographical and other 
dimensions of proximity, and it became much cheaper to collaborate. As the 
example of Bangalore shows, software companies in India can develop software 
products and carry out the order of software companies in the USA, due to not to 
their geographical, but relational proximity.  
Literature (Torre–Gilly 2000, Capello–Faggian 2005, Torre–Rallet 2005) 
usually defines two main types of proximity: geographical and organized proximity. 
When the proximity concept is used, what is often actu lly meant is geographical 
proximity, which is signified as spatial, local or physical (Knoben–Oerlemans 2006). 
Geographical or regional sciences traditionally usethe notion of proximity, defined 
as short geographical distance. Distance basically means shortest way between two 
points, and refers to 'spatial non-identity', - not being in the same place  
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(Nemes Nagy 2009) and measures the amount of physical space between two units 
(individuals, organizations, towns etc.). Short distance brings the individuals 
together, favours information transfer and facilitates the exchange of knowledge, 
especially tacit knowledge. Agents in geographical proximity, benefit from positive 
externalities (Lengyel–Mozsár 2002). The positive effects may appear in the 
reductions of transfer and transaction costs, in the number of inputs at lower prices 
(Lengyel 2001). The diffusion of knowledge generates positive externalities, and 
knowledge flow increases the productivity of activities of research and development 
(R&D). Empirical studies prove that firms near knowledge (tacit and even in case of 
codified knowledge) sources can have better innovative performance than firms 
located elsewhere (Boschma 2005).  
For today, it has become clear that it is wrong to associate proximity only 
with its geographical meaning. Organized proximity, which is not geographical but 
relational, is defined as the ability of an organiztion to make its members interact. 
The organization facilitates the interactions within itself between employees and 
with other entities outside the organization. Organized proximity is built on two 
types of logic. Firstly, when two members of one organization interact, they are in 
proximity, because their interaction is facilitated by (common, explicit or implicit) 
rules, routines and behavior that they use and follow. This is the logic of belonging 
of the organized proximity, which develops cooperation between researchers and 
engineers in the same firm (Torre–Rallet 2005). Secondly, organized proximity 
reflects the logic of similarity. Two individuals are close to each other, because they 
are ‘alike”, they speak the same special language; they share a system of common 
interests, beliefs and knowledge in the same cultural sphere.  
The researchers of the “Dynamics of Proximity” group ses the notion of 
relational proximity (instead of organized proximity) that includes the spatial 
dimension of relations. The most frequently examined dimensions in addition to 
geographical ones, - as the critical assessment of Boschma (2005) underlines, - are 
the cognitive, organizational, institutional and social proximity. These four 
categories together are based on the notion of organized proximity.  
- The concept of cognitive proximity that has been developed by Nooteboom 
(2006) is generally defined in terms of common knowledge base and expertise 
among agents. Actors in cognitive proximity have similar knowledge base, 
thus they transfer knowledge and communicate with each other more 
effectively.  
- The notion of organizational proximity means relations in the same space 
either within or between organizations, and refers to the similarity between 
individuals sharing the same reference space and knowledge (Boschma 2005). 
Organizational arrangements are mechanism that coordinate transactions and 
enable the transfer of information and knowledge.  
- Actors are in institutional proximity, because they pertain to one institutional 
framework at macro-level. Relations and interactions between actors and 
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group of actors are regulated by a set of rules and l ws (formal institutional 
framework) and common habits, routines, (business) practices  
(informal institutional framework) (Boschma 2005).  
- Social proximity can be defined in terms of relationship between actors at the 
micro level embedded in the same social context. Actors share trust based on 
friendship, kinship and experience (Boschma 2005). If business relations 
(within an organization) are more socially embedded, the possibility of a 
better innovative performance is available.  
 
The dimensions of proximity are strongly linked to each other. Even if they 
operate through different mechanisms, all types increase the effectiveness of learning, 
have a positive effect on the production of knowledge-based externalities, and 
facilitates networking and clustering (Albino et al 2007). Firms in cognitive or 
organizational proximity might be able to communicate without face-to-face 
interaction using modern communication technologies, overcoming the problems 
caused by large geographical distance (Knoben–Oerlemans 2006) Taking the new role 
of information and communication technologies into account, we can state that neither 
is geographic proximity necessary per se, nor might it not be sufficient in interactions 
and cooperation. That is reason why literature differentiates permanent and temporary 
geographical proximity (Gallaud–Torre 2004). 
3. Regional clusters in terms of proximity 
The concept of proximity provides a framework for analyzing the different spatial 
organizations, like clusters. Clusters exist, their numbers are increasing and more 
and more policies are implemented to promote their d velopment, and there are 
many reasons that describe their success. It became clear that geographical 
proximity is necessary in innovation and research activities, and facilitates the flow 
of information and knowledge between actors. Michael Porter (2000) emphasizes 
the fundamental role of geographical concentration in case of clusters and defines 
regional cluster as ‘geographically proximate group of interconnected companies 
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities’. 
Enterprises have several advantages of acting within a cluster. The proximity of 
the companies leads to the inflow of skilled people from other regions and sectors. 
Therefore, the cluster members have better access to employees and suppliers. The 
cooperation of neighbouring companies can lead to the use of common services and 
realization of joint projects, processes. In the cluster, the availability of information 
(formal or informal) and technology (infrastructure, IT services) is generally higher. 
The main advantage of cluster is the increased level of innovation by using the 
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informal and formal networking and the pool of resources for research and 
development. 
The existence of clusters rests not only on geographic l proximity, but also on 
several other factors. The economic relations shaped between cluster participants are 
embedded in the social network and the latter often have strong territorial roots. 
Synergy between interconnected partners does not form, if they are not in social 
proximity. Also cooperation may occur between actors from different organizations, 
but it happens due to the same university origins or social and family network. 
Social proximity reduces the uncertainty, just like cognitive proximity. This is true 
in case of cluster members and especially in case of newly entering companies, 
when they search for new knowledge. As a rule, firms' aim is to find partners in 
proximity of their own knowledge base. Another important factor is, that 
geographical context of economic interactions is largely conditioned by the role of 
institutions. 
Cluster members are not only located in the same area, but they form a strong 
system of innovative relations, and cooperate with each other in their own interest to 
exchange information and technology, and to transfer knowledge etc.  
Lagendijk and Lorentzen (2007) based on the categorization of Torre and 
Rallet (2005) defined all the combination of geographical and relational (in their 
own words organized) proximity (Table 1). In terms of proximity, clusters can be 
described as the intersection of strong geographical and strong organized proximity. 
For example if organized proximity is strong, but geo raphical proximity is weak, it 
characterizes non-localized interactions, like value chain. The geographical and 
organized proximity are equally more imperceptible n rural, less developed regions, 
and the agglomeration is an example where the strong geographical proximity is a 
basic factor, the organized proximity is not.  
Table 1. Intersection between geographical and relational proximity 
Relational proximity Geographical 
proximity Strong Weak 
Strong 
(close) 
(1a) Local system of innovation, (milieu) 
production (cluster) 
(1b) Temporary (face-to-face) co-
localization (projects, meetings) 
(3) Co-location without interaction or 
coordination, activities in spatially 
integrated areas (agglomeration) 
Weak 
(at a distance) 
(2) Non localized interaction (e.g.trans-
local organizations, value chains, 
coordination using ICT) 
(4) Activities in isolation (e.g. in rural 
peripheral areas) 
Source: own construction on the basis of Lagendijk and Lorentz n (2007) 
 
As noted above, knowledge spillover is an essential element in innovation and 
in the development of the system of innovative relationship, like in clusters. 
Although, the high geographical concentration of firms, universities and research 
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centers in a region belonging both to the same or different sectors, is not enough to 
explain the innovation capacity of a local area or an organization (network, cluster). 
It is necessary to define the channels through which the knowledge spreads. Capello 
and Faggian (2005) introduced the concept of relation l space, and explored the 
connection between physical and relational space, as preconditions of knowledge 
spillover (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Role of physical and relational proximity in innovation and  
cluster forming 
 
Source: own construction on the basis of Capello–Faggian (2005) 
 
Relational space is created by the set of all relationship (market, power 
relationships) and cooperation between firms, different agents and individuals, who 
are characterized by a strong sense of belonging and similarity. The approaches of 
physical and relational space are outstanding tools t  analyze the innovation process 
and relationships, as in the case of clusters.  
On the one hand pure physical space (Capello–Faggian 2005) is formed by the 
geographical proximity of firms in the same sector (  exploit localization advantages) 
firms in different sectors (to exploit urbanization advantages) and typical places where 
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knowledge is produced, like in universities and research centers. Economic actors in 
physical proximity have the opportunity to contact each other, where the spread of 
knowledge and the production of geographical knowledge spillovers are managed more 
easily. On the other hand relational proximity and its dimensions (according to the 
original notion of the authors it is defined as cultural proximity) are the base of the 
formation and existence of relational capital (channel of knowledge spread) which is 
formed by explicit and implicit cooperation among actors. Actors have the capability to 
interact and to share common values, which is the fundamental element of collective 
learning. 
4. Software industry related clusters in the European Union 
The software industry plays a crucial role in the formation of the Information Society. 
The initiative i2010 (European Information Society 2010) aims to support the 
Information Society and the media industries within Europe. The software and IT 
services industry employs more than 1.000.000 European specialist (ISM 2006), and 
basically every business in all sectors (especially manufacturing, automotive industry, 
financial services, insurance and retail) in the European Union depends on it, because 
it facilitates the development, marketing, coordination etc. The European Union 
fosters the growth of the software industry, the development of the digital economy, 
especially in research and in partnership building, and support the formation and 
development of networking and clustering, through the regional policies.  
There are many examples for successful IT and even only software clusters in 
the developed regions in the European Union: Sophia Antipolis in France, the Dublin 
IT cluster, the Cambridge Network in England, the Tchnology Cluster Oulu in 
Finland (ISM 2006). But there are more and more developed and developing cluster in 
the less developed regions too (e.g. Cork in Ireland, Ostrava in Czech Republic, Tartu 
in Estonia). 
Software companies continue intensive development activities and ICT allows 
management and coordination from a distance. What is in eresting, that there are very 
few examples for software-only clusters (ISM 2006). The software industry is often 
included in a bigger regional high-tech cluster (besid s for example to the industry of 
biotechnology, medical etc.) as a ‘supporting industry’. The information and 
communication technology itself plays a special role in the software industry too, and 
contributes to its characteristics: products (software and teleservices) have an 
immaterial nature. They can be developed by a geographically dispersed team and 
directly be delivered to business partners and consumers by using digital network, 
which leads to the decreasing of the transportation costs too. It is difficult to determine 
the economic value of software, and the value of the products and activities added by 
the software related companies, because these usually are built in a complex, final 
product.  
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All of the software and IT service related cluster in the European Union have 
a unique history and structure. One of the factors hat determine the process of 
formation is the level of competitiveness of the region, where the cluster develops. 
In the less developed regions (contrary to the developed ones) most of the initiatives 
have been launched by the local or regional governmnt or by the private sector, 
where the agencies try to engage industry associatin nd individual companies in 
their efforts.  
In order to survey the opportunity of formation and development of a future 
software cluster in one of the less developed, neofordist type regions (see Michael 
Porter 2003) in Hungary, it is indispensable to examine the process of clustering in 
other less developed (neofordist and knowledge transfer) regions in the European 
Union. The cases of the IT related foreign clusters in Oulu (Finland), in Cork 
(Ireland), Ostrava (Czech Republic), Tartu (in Estonia) shows the basic role of 
proximity in practice in the formation of interactions, cooperation, research and 
development etc. All of the clusters examined hereinafter operate in a less developed 
region like Southern Great Plain, with similar geographical expansion, social and 
economic background.  
The formation of software industry in Ireland, especially in the area of Dublin, 
Cork, Galway and Limerick started as an agglomeration of major ICT companies 
which invested in the regions in business friendly environment (ISM 2006). In the city 
of Cork the software industry is also largely driven by foreign direct investment 
(FDI) attracted by the low Irish corporate tax rates, subsidies from the EU. In the 
region innovation policy was key for cluster development, which promoted R&D 
and innovation, encouraged spillover of knowledge. Due to this, actors created a 
'knowledge zone’ in Cork, to maximize the advantages d rive from the proximity of 
entrepreneurs, development agencies (e.g. IDA–Industrial Development Agency) 
and entities of local and central government (CCC 2005). The first factor, which led 
to the growth of the region, was the financial resources ensured by the government, 
especially for infrastructure and prosperous business nvironment development.  
The second has happened yet due to the bottom-up initiation and empowerment of 
the IT related companies and the proximity of skilled work force. The success of the 
cluster in Cork initially derived from the local companies, that could work together 
with the foreign companies due to the relational proximity, then later to both 
geographical and relational proximity, making the cooperation and development 
more easier, with the formation of the innovation park (National Software Center 
Campus), the University College Cork and the Cork Institute of Technology.  
In the city of Oulu in Finland, the foundation of cluster was supported by 
more factors (ISM 2006): the establishment of NOKIA as a regional and national 
‘champion’ company, the strong and consistent regional and local development 
policies, and the focus on areas where market failures could be identified. IT cluster 
in Oulu is one of the most competitive ones, be present on the 'cluster map' of 
Europe (Morris et al 2005). Key preconditions in the formation of the ‘Oulu 
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phenomenon’ were also the geographical and relational proximity, size and quality 
of the local knowledge infrastructure (research center and the science park of Oulu 
Technolopis Plc.), the access to qualified labour force (educated in the Oulu 
Polytechnic, the Oulu Region Center of Expertise). In Oulu substantial public policy 
efforts too were made the ICT cluster flourish: the central government decentralized 
its agencies in proximity to the region of Oulu, to see and represent the local interest 
more effectively (Oulu Congress 2006).  
By examining further foreign clusters and initiatives too we would observe the 
well known fact (which is underlined by the literature and many other surveys) that 
proximity plays a crucial role in the development of s ftware clusters too, (beside the 
special characteristic that software companies use ICT tools more effectively).  
In Ostrava, in the Czech Republic it is facilitated to form network of business relations 
between firms and universities by the creation of IT related industrial areas, 
technology park and innovation centers to utilize not only the advantages of 
geographical proximity, but to have more effective knowledge based cooperation 
based on cognitive proximity (CSKI 2002). Conscious steps are taken to attract labour 
force, university students and firms to the regions from outside areas to increase the 
home base of the software industry in Ostrava.  
The growth of the IT sector in Tartu region, in Estonia happened due to the 
appearance on foreign markets and to the intensive export activities to the direction of 
Sweden and Finland (Tartu Region 2007). As suppliers, firms from Tartu can join to 
foreign IT clusters, may receive the most developed technologies and can have 
common product development, research. This refers to the existence of strong 
relational proximity between partners from the Scandinavian countries. These types of 
cooperation can be also formed by the software companies from Szeged subregion. 
5. How much proximity still matters in the software industry in Szeged 
subregion 
To investigate the dynamics of proximity, in particular in the high-tech sector, we 
focus on the case of the software industry in the less developed region of Southern 
Great Plain, in the city of Szeged and in its subregion. 
The Southern Great Plain (NUTS 2) region is situated in the southern-eastern 
border area of Hungary. The region is 18,000 square kilometers, biggest region in 
Hungary with its population of 1,4 million. According to the measures revealing the 
level of competitiveness of its economy, the region is considered as a neofordist type 
region (Lengyel 2006, Lukovics 2006). The growth rate of the region is the lowest in 
Hungary, and the GDP per capita was one of the mostlowest between the regions of 
the EU271. All of the three counties (Csongrád, Békés and Bács-Kiskun) included in 
the region are underdeveloped, have a workforce with low educational level  
                                                   
1 www.epp.eurostat.europe.ec 
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(mostly working in agriculture) and yet have not passed the structural change.  
The county of Csongrád (where Szeged is located) reaches only about 48% of the 
average of EU 27.  
However this figure cannot be applied to the whole region and the county. 
The city of Szeged is the so called ‘knowledge island’ of the Southern Great Plain. 
Szeged is the fourth most densely populated city (with 160,000 people) in the 
country, almost 40% of the population in the region lives here, and located about 
170 kilometers far from capital, Budapest. Together with its subregion, the labour 
market is approximately 250,000 people. The characte istics of the city and its 
subregion differentiate from the rest subregions in the region (Lengyel 2003).  
The two-third of the workforce is employed in the service sector, the entrepreneurial 
is ‘vibrant’, and both the number of enterprises and personal income exceeds the 
average national level. The rate of the employees with higher education degrees is 
high (24,3%). More than 90% of the researchers in the county of Csongrád live and 
work in the subregion. Today the three most important f ctors, which determine the 
growth of the region are (Lengyel 2009): 
1. The university (the University of Szeged), which as we know, operates in 
the less developed, neofordist region. 
2. The function of Szeged and its subregion as a ‘knowledge isle’, with the 
high number of enterprises, the high level of education, employment rate 
and scientific background. 
3. Szeged and its subregion is a knowledge transfer region with qualified 
human resource, high number of people with scientific degrees, R&D units 
and expenditures and the number of patents. 
 
The city and its subregion have a very strong scientific and human potential that 
facilitates the subregion to become not only a knowledge transfer, but maybe a 
knowledge creation region. The endowments of the key region within the Southern 
Great Plain region (Szeged subregion) underline the nec ssity of mapping a software 
cluster. Sufficient knowledge base is available, ensured by the university 
background, educational and research activities, the big number of university 
students (around 30.000 students), newly graduates, nd finally by the Faculty of 
Informatics (with nearly 500 newly graduated students annually). These factors 
ensure the fluent re-production of the labour base nnually, and the birth of new 
enterprises found by qualified, young workforce. A circle of software enterprises is 
built, and the first initiatives have already appeared to have more efficient 
cooperation (cluster) between companies, although the effects of these are still 
hardly perceptible.  
Our aim is to understand how geographical and relation l proximity and its 
dimensions determine the process of clustering in knowledge-based activities in less 
developed regions. The growing application of information and communication 
technologies appears to indicate that there is a wekening need for geographical 
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proximity, and it causes the 'death of distance'. This has not triggered a collapse of 
'near and far' in the reality of individuals and organizations, not for actors staying in 
less developed, peripheral regions (Lagendijk–Lorentzen 2007). Usually, these firms 
depend on knowledge sources deriving both inside and outside from the region, as 
we will see in case of Szeged too.  
The first step to identify the base of a future software cluster is to map the size 
of the industry in Szeged and its subregion. If the geographical concentration of the 
software industry is proved in the number of enterprises and employees, it makes 
reasonable to examine whether the software companies ne d geographical proximity 
or not, and how strong is the relational proximity between software companies. 
6. The proof of geographical concentration  
The software industry is a potential leading branch in the micro-region of Szeged. 
Mapping the base of a future software cluster, firstly it is necessary to prove the 
existence and concentration of the basic input factors in the region. We examine 
whether the software industry has achieved a specialized critical mass in the region 
using the cluster mapping method of l cation quotient (LQ) (Patik–Deák 2005). The 
measurements are based on the entrepreneurial databases of KSH Cégkódtár 
(2007/2) and Opten Cégtár (2008).  
LQ compares the distribution of an activity to some base or standard. In this 
case the selected base is the employment and the number of enterprises. In Szeged 
and in its subregion more than 200 companies (which ave its seat or/and site in the 
subregion), and about 550 employees work in the software industry. To focus on the 
most knowledge intensive companies in the region, who have the biggest role in the 
growth of the industry, we only examine limited liability and public limited 
companies dealing with software development (NACE Rev.1. 72.21.), software 
consultancy and supply (NACE Rev.1. 72.22.) whose products have bigger added 
value. The software industry in limited sense is comp sed of 91 companies. 
As a rule, if the value of LQ is more than 1, it indicates a relative concentration 
of the activity in the area, compared to the region as a whole. The European Cluster 
Observatory determines a stricter value limit equal to 2.  
According to the value of LQ based on the number of enterprises, which is less 
than 1 in Szeged and in its subregion, we can stateth  the area has fewer shares in the 
software activity than in other regions in the country, in the case of other bigger cities 
in Hungary (Győr, Pécs, Debrecen, Székesfehérvár). It is interesting that if we not 
measure the number of enterprises in capital, Budapest (where more than 5000 
companies work in the software industry from the 9000 companies in the country), 
and we count the LQ only in the countryside (in the country without Budapest) the LQ 
is 1,256 (Table 2).  
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Table 2. Value of LQ for entreprises and employment 
 Entrepreneurial LQ Employment LQ 




Budapest  1,390  2,171  
Szeged  0,944 1,256 1,119 2,867 
Győr  0,829 1,104 0,431 1,105 
Pécs  1,016 1,352 0,557 1,429 
Debrecen  0,858 1,142 0,681 1,744 
Székesfehérvár  1,173 1,561 0,898 2,300 
Source: own calculations on the basis of data from KSH Cégkódtár and Opten Cégtár 
 
We got similar results measuring employment LQ. Taking the number of 
employees in Budapest into account, the LQ is 1,119 in Szeged and its subregion, and 
without Budapest it is 2,867. None of the other cities in the countryside can reach this 
relatively high value. According to this figure, the relative concentration of the software 
industry is secured in Szeged and its subregion in the number of enterprises and 
employees. The industry may be strong enough to grow as a potential leading branch, 
and also attract related economic activities from the region itself and from other regions 
too.  
The statistical research based on the calculation of location quotients ensured 
the observable phenomenon, that software industry i specialized in Szeged and its 
subregion. It is worthy to note, that the number of employees and enterprises in the 
software industry in Szeged and its subregion cannot be compared to the size of a 
traditional industries (e.g. agriculture, food industry in the region). But the results 
suggest surveying the opportunity of software industry as a potential leading branch 
for clustering with qualitative research.  
7. The role and strength of relational proximity 
Using the qualitative method of questionnaire, we examine how geographical 
proximity matters in the software industry, and how strong the relational proximity 
is between companies. We tried to contact to all of the 91 companies (headquarters) 
in the software industry (in the restricted sense), but only 74 companies were 
available. (It cleared out that some of the companies already not exist.) Finally,  
31 questionnaires were sent back. It was not represntative sampling, but the 31 
questionnaire is 34% of the asked ones, so we can have valid, reasonable 
consequences. The results represent the characteristi s of enterprises with the 
average number of 12 employees. The questionnaire was created based on the 
studies of European Cluster Observatory, of the questionnaire of Michael Porter and 
the literature of proximity. The main areas of the questionnaire included basic 
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characteristics of firms (year of foundation, employment, profile etc.), and the 
dimension of the proximity (the presence and intensi y of proximity) (Table 3). 
Table 3. The measurement of the presence and necessity of geographical and 
relational proximity 
 Measurement 
Presence and amount of partnership in the subregion, region and country 
(customers, suppliers, industry related companies - SME or large company, 
university, research center, goverment agencies, competitors, consultant etc.) 
The amount and the utilizing of advantages deriving from the proximity of input 
factors (qualified workforce, educational and research institutes, technology, 
business services etc.) 
Lack of input factors and its effects (business and personal, information, 
workforce, financial resources) 
Geographical 
proximity 
Amount of products and services produced and supported to other local industries 
Participating in the same programmes, and trainigs, have the same educational or 
working background of the employees, 
The continuity and intensity of R&D activities and cooperations 
Cognitive 
proximity 
Participating in business clubs, forums, organizations, conferences etc. 
Number and intensity of business relations within te organizations, and between 
the organizations (projects, consortium, tendering etc.) 
Organizational 
proximity Number and intensity of personal/informal relations within the organizations, and 
between the organizations (family, friends etc.) and their effects on the operation 
and development of the organization 
Role and evaluation social background in the operation 
Social 
proximity 
Effects of relations with family, friends or other individuals and their role: 
- to manage the wished market position 
- to form and reach the adequate market demand  
- to have and transfer information and knowledge 
Institutional 
proximity 
The effect and importance on the operation of organizations, by factors: 
- laws, rules, regulations,  
- cultural norms and habits  
- corporal routines 
- the effect and evaluation of the economic and enterprise development in the 
region 
Source: own construction 
 
The questionnaire shows that the role of geographicl proximity in the software 
industry appears in a special way in Hungary. The number and the intensity of 
business partnership between companies confirm the well known fact, that there are 
no significant distances within Hungary, and partners in the capital, in Budapest play 
an important role even in the software industry too of Szeged. More than 70% of the 
companies have customer relations in Szeged and Budapest too, every second 
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company have cooperation with the University of Szeged, and only 23% have any 
kind of connection with universities or research center in the capital (Figure 2). 
What is surprising that, about 60% of the companies occasionally work together 
with their competitors from Budapest. This relatively intensive partnership between 
the software companies in Szeged and Budapest underlines that they are in relational 
proximity. Software companies valued geographical proximity as relatively important 
factor. In a five point scale (1 not important, 5 very important) the average of the 
answers given to this question is 2,71. Beside the weaker need for geographical 
proximity there is proved relational proximity betwen companies. They do see and 
enjoy the advantages deriving from geographical proximity, but as firms reported, the 
lack of it does not mean a disadvantage especially in some stages of on-demand 
software development and services.  





























Customers Competitors Business partners University
 
Source: own calculations 
 
There are broad market borders among the IT products and activities. Thought 
many of the distinguished activities can be relocated, but it is quite obvious that at 
least temporary geographical proximity is necessary in cooperation. The need of 
permanent geographical closeness depends on the quality of the technical conception 
of the software being developed. Usually, face-to-face interactions are required in 
software development, definitely in the initial stage in functional specification, and 
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in the final stage in integration and technical assistance. Companies in Szeged and in 
its subregion are solution-orientated. They practice research and development, and 
focus on design software, instead of making standardized tasks.  
The cooperation with competitors has special characteristics. Companies in 
Szeged and its subregion cooperate and compete with eac  other, like companies in 
clusters. 78% of companies admitted that the proximity of the competitors inspire 
them to make developments much faster and more effectively. Almost half of the 
companies have participated in a project with its rival in Szeged, and about two third 
in Budapest. Typically the cooperation occurs only occasionally and focuses on 
research and development, and may be attained by the companies in relational 
proximity. The software market in Szeged and its subregion is mostly dominated by 
local partners, no matter we examine the relationship between producers, university, 
rivals, suppliers or customers.  
Mapping a software cluster in the subregion, the survey demonstrates that 
companies may enjoy the positive externalities of geographical concentration, and 
strive for conscious utilization of its advantages. The need of (at least temporary) 
geographical concentration depends on the strength of the relational proximity. 
Relational proximity and its dimensions (cognitive, organizational, social and 
institutional) are basic inputs in the innovative cooperation. In the questionnaires, 
companies emphasized three factors, as the most important inputs of innovation: 
attainment of innovative and professional workforce, id as and technologies through 
personal and business relations and finally the proximity to educational and 
postgraduating programs and institutions. The synergy of partners is substantial to 
obtain the benefits of innovation-based relationship .  
University appears to be an intermediary institution in the flow of knowledge 
and information, and manages to bring partners to strong relational proximity. It has 
significant role in the facilitation of collective learning. As the questionnaire 
revealed, the companies have cooperation usually only with the university. 45% of 
the companies have regular collaboration with the University of Szeged, and only 5 
companies have the relationship with the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics or with the Hungarian Academy in Sciences in Budapest. Only one gets 
in touch with university abroad, within the EU. 
Business and personal relations between actors determine an 'industrial 
atmosphere' in Szeged subregion, where the similarities in knowledge background, 
experience, practices and routines are natural. Cognitive proximity is a pivotal factor 
in the software sector in Szeged. More than half of the employees and almost 80% 
of the headquarters of the companies graduated in the University of Szeged, on the 
Faculty of Informatics. Companies with the same knowledge background participate 
in forums and clubs (52%), conferences (39%) and other professional programs 
together. It is favoured to have interaction between company members, because they 
share a set of common rules, specific know-how and organizational routines.  
This points out that they stand in organizational proximity too. Different forms of 
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interactions play an important role: the lack of personal and business relations 
(33%), governmental subsidies (29%) is – as the intrviewed firms mentioned – 
factor that hampers their future chance to grow. More than 80% of the companies 
stated that personal relationships like friendship of employees within and between 
organizations ensure the flow of information and knowledge. Furthermore they 
(39%) emphasized the importance of informal relationship between headquarters 
and employees, - formed in expositions, conferences - as a channel of information 
flow. This process would not be managed without socially embedded relations. 
Strong social proximity facilitates the affirmation f links, the development of trust-
based relations, hence the formation of innovative cooperation.  
Software companies are characterized by intensive innovative activities, and 
do own research and development (65%). In the past 3 years 87% of them have done 
innovation, basically product (65%) and technology development (48%), appeared 
in a new market (45%) or participated in professional trainings (42%). 10 companies 
restructured its organization, and only 7 bought and not developed its technology. 
The questioned firms valued also the factors, which as the biggest effects on their 
innovation activities (Figure 3). The results underlin d the importance and proximity 
of qualified workforce, sources of information, personal relationship, university and 
research center, and the role of local business services and organizations  
(like chamber of industries and commerce) in case of this too. 
Figure 3. Factors influencing the innovative capacity of software industry 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
The profile of the companies is very heterogeneous, but there is need to 
support and inspire them to do innovation together for the local industries. Some 
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already sell software and IT services to the food, medical, medicine industry and 
biotechnology, but these kind of cooperation are still less intensive. If the software 
companies have permanent connectivity to other local industries, it can also decrease 
the cost of collaboration.  
The problem faced by the software industry in Szeged and in its subregion is, 
that the relations are not results of constant or recurrent cooperation. They are 
supposed to receive financial sources within a commn project or trade development 
competition. Companies in general are not willing to have regular cooperation, 
because they fear to loss their market position or to have their good ideas stolen. 
However, they already stated (68%) that they would be ready to work together 
within a cluster. Solving the problem, the key is to draw up a conscious development 
strategy creating the synergy between partners (software companies, university and 
other knowledge producer institutions and the representatives of local government).  
Companies in macro-level are embedded in one institutional background. 
They are in strong institutional proximity; they are applied to the same laws, rules 
and regulations. However actors' satisfaction in conection with institutions is a very 
different question. Interviewed companies valued some related factors with a 5 point 
scale (1 not satisfied, 5 very satisfied). They are discontent with the administrative 
obligatory (1,57), legal environment (2,03) and with the representation of their 
interests (1, 72). Local government does not have the sufficient tools to promote 
relation e.g. with industrial parks, cluster building, the foundation and registration of 
new firms, the appearance in external markets, the organization of trainings, clubs 
and the development of technological infrastructure. 
These experiences can be traced back to the lack of a conscious cluster 
development policy in Hungary. Some policy tools are lready included in the 
central economic development programs, but only a few steps were made to focus 
only on clusters, not only on national, but even in regional level, in harmony with 
the bottom-up initiations of enterprises in different sectors (Grosz 2006).  
By drawing up adequate cluster development orientatd plans, and having a 
consensus made by the private and public sector, the default may eliminate.  
The process of cluster development may speed up due to an effective institutional 
and governmental background. Governments contribute to diminish market barriers, 
control market competition, ensure inputs (eg. infrastructure, technology etc.) for 
economic actors and mediate between companies and institutions, which produce 
knowledge and labour force. Thus, government may facilitate the cooperation of 
companies in clusters too. 
8. Conclusion 
In Szeged subregion it became reasonable to explore the opportunity of the 
formation of a potential clusters in the software industry. The existence of the 
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relative geographical concentration and the home base of the software industry in 
the amount of enterprises and employees in the ‘knowledge isle’ of the Southern 
Great Plain were proved.  
Findings ensure the importance of both geographical and relational proximity 
between the actors in the software industry in Szeged and in its subregion. Proximity 
has a positive effect on the innovative capacity, the development of corporate skills 
and the decreasing of transaction costs. The pool of researchers and qualified labor 
force has been built-up; companies are motivated to eepen their existing business 
relations, which determine the formation of the criti al mass of a cluster.  
Qualitative survey revealed that geographical concentration is necessary, but 
not sufficient to create business and non-business r lations in practice. At least 
temporary geographical proximity and strong relational proximity of the partners is 
needed to create cooperation with the aim of software development.  
There are two main reasons, which explain the intersection of the weakness or 
strength of geographical and relational proximity between software companies. 
Firstly, the number of collaboration of software companies in the region and 
between regions in Hungary (mainly in Budapest) reveals the need to access 
knowledge sources formed outside the region too, especially in case of a less 
developed regions. Secondly the software industry cannot be compared to a 
traditional industry. There are immaterial products, which may be developed in 
bigger geographical distances too, and can be transferred to anywhere by the 
information and communication technologies. Furthermore the necessity of  
face-to-face interactions depends on the stage of the cooperation with the aim to 
develop new products or technologies.  
Relational proximity and its dimension together and separately define cluster 
formation. Software companies are in cognitive proximity sharing the same 
knowledge background, having the same or similar university origins, and 
participating in conferences, clubs and forums. They ave an extensive system of 
business and personal relations, determined by the same behaviour patterns, cultural 
and social values, rules and regulations, which underli e the existence of 
organizational, social and even institutional proximity between them. Each dimension 
of relational proximity separately and also together affects the capacity of innovation 
and collective learning. 
There is a lack of more trust-based relations and partnership of companies, 
local government and knowledge producer institutions, but it can be counteracted by 
not only occasional, but also frequent cooperation, and by conscious economic and 
enterprise development, which is absolutely important in a less developed region.  
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IPR Protection Strength and the Market for Knowledge 
Benedek Nagy 
 
The world of today is called information society. This means, that information, knowledge 
and achievements of the intellect are gaining in importance in production over the more 
conventional factors of production like labour or capital. Who has the knowledge and the 
know-how, also has the advantage in competition.  
Knowledge or intellectual products have, however, characteristics of a common good, 
which preclude its trade, and hinders specialisation in its production. Knowledge is common 
good inasmuch as there is no rivalry in its use, and lso no natural excludability. Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) are an artificial way to at least partial excludability which can – 
beside encouraging innovation – render intellectual products tradable.  
In this paper I am going to focus on the trade relat d aspects of intellectual property 
rights from an institutional economics point of view. I intend to explore the relationship 
between tradability as determined by the strength of the actual IPR regime and the intensity 
of trade in intellectual properties across countries. I am exploring the theoretical basis for 
the relationship between international mobility of intellectual products and the country’s IPR 
regime. Based on models and cross-country empirical data the strength of intellectual 
property rights does influence the magnitude of trade of intellectual products between 
countries. My hypothesis is, that when a country’s IPR regime becomes stricter relatively to 
its trading partners, this facilitates the inflow of knowledge to the country. This is the 
technology transfer that can help developing countries to grow. 
 
Keywords:  intellectual property rights, patent, international trade, efficiency 
1. Introduction 
In the last decades it becomes increasingly clear, th t those countries will be able to 
benefit from the new kind of international competition which can better adapt to the 
challenges of the knowledge-based economy. Knowledge is gaining in importance 
as an input to the production process. Therefore it is n the best interest of the 
countries and governments to facilitate knowledge production and try to manipulate 
its international spread in their own favour. This paper uses an institutionalist point 
of view to show how this can be done by an appropriately formulated intellectual 
property rights protection regime.  
Intellectual property rights, or property rights more broadly, are institutions 
which are taken as given or exogenous by neoclassical economic models. In this 
paper, however, what is seen to influence important economic outcomes is the 
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design of this institution itself. Therefore I have to tackle the problem from a 
different point of view.  
The New Institutional Economics seems a good choice. Institutions have 
always played an important role in the life of mankind, but their economic aspects 
have just recently started to be explicitly investiga ed. Starting with the influential 
works of R. H. Coase as far back as the 1930s, the new institutional economics  
a) views institutions as not being neutral, but influencing economics outcomes,  
b) rather than discarding the whole apparatus of the neoclassical economics, tries to 
link functioning of the institutions with the marginalist methodology and c) tries to 
use institutional variables as endogenous within the neoclassical framework. 
Thinking about property rights and their causes and effects has a long tradition in 
philosophy, dating back of course to the Greeks, to Aristotle. This line of thinking 
found its way to economic thinking only recently. In his 1960 paper, the Problem of 
Social Costs, Coase emphasises the economic importance of property rights. The 
famous Coase-theorem about how clearly established property rights enhance the 
efficiency of the market system in the presence of xternalities is already a part of 
most every undergraduate microeconomic textbook. In the next decades numerous 
distinguished scholars such as Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Douglas C. 
North, Oliver Williamson and Richard A. Posner – to name just a few – contributed 
to this new economics of property rights.  
Property right in economics means “actual power to control or affect the use 
of an object, of some aspect thereof” (Makaay 1999, p. 247.). This controlling or 
affecting can typically mean 3 things: a) usage of the object (usus), b) appropriating 
the returns thereof (usus fructus) and c) the transferring of these rights partly or fully 
to another person (abusus). Clearcut property rights and their guaranteed 
enforcement are perquisites of a well-functioning, Pareto-optimal market economy. 
If any of these essential rights is restricted, either by a government authority or by 
the nature of the object of the property rights, efficiency can not be warranted. 
The third of these rights is in connection with thefr edom of contracts and 
trade. As Makaay writes (1999, p. 248., italics mine): “A person who controls the 
use of an object may find it profitable to allow another person to use it, or to exploit 
it with the help of another person. To this end, the owner enters into an agreement 
with the other person. The agreement defines the permissible uses for the other 
person, and thereby confers on him or her some economic property rights.”  
The above quote implies, that both using our property ourselves or selling it to 
someone is driven by the profit-motive and leads to the efficient usage of the 
property. If there are any limitations to any of these parts of the property (that is, 
limiting the economic property right that can be conferred on someone, or limiting 
this conferring itself), efficiency cannot be ascertained. 
We also have to be aware of the fact, that the property right system is not 
static, but dynamically changing. Since it is, in the institutionalist view, an 
endogenous variable, it is not merely a given factor that determines other variables, 
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but is itself dependent on other economic variables and processes. The emergence of 
new kinds of objects with new characteristics requires the emergence of appropriate 
property rights. The tailoring of property rights to the characteristics of the different 
objects can be a natural, evolutionary process, left to the market, but more often than 
not it is done by the government.  
In the first section I identify special characteristic  of intellectual products 
which the appropriate property rights system has to handle to be able to facilitate 
trading. In the second section I present predictions  the model-level and findings 
on the empirical level how the system of property rights influence trade. The third 
section compares the cross-country empirical results to the Hungarian situation. 
Throughout the whole paper I will concentrate not on the built and structure of the 
IPR protection system, but only on its strength. 
2. Special characteristics of intellectual products and intellectual property 
rights 
Intellectual products differ by their very nature from physical products in some 
important aspects. The most important of these for us now is their being common 
goods. This means, that there exists no rivalry in the usage or consumption of 
intellectual products. Once a certain piece of an intellectual product has been 
produced – written, invented etc. – it can be used even simultaneously in more 
production processes without any one specific usage precluding any other. 
Considering knowledge a common good in this sense supports the argument that 
knowledge should be freely available for anyone and everyone. It has been quickly 
recognised, however, that the producers of intellectual products will not be 
sufficiently interested in producing them if they can not appropriate the returns from 
their inventions due to their non-excludability characteristic as a common good. 
Based on this recognition, intellectual property protection by way of property rights 
appeared in England for example as early as the 14th century (David 1992). 
The role of intellectual property rights is to artificially create shortage in the 
case of a product where scarcity is necessarily absent by virtue of the nature of the 
product (May 2005). This artificial scarcity serves as a basis for the (at least partial) 
excludability of intellectual products, and enables the (again at least partial) 
appropriation of the returns thereof. By creating excludability, intellectual products 
are rendered tradable, price can be set for their usage, which may result in profit for 
the producer of the intellectual product. This kind of partial excludability is 
indicated by the name quasi-common good. 
The goal of the different instruments of intellectual property rights protection 
– patents, trademarks, copyright – is to make it rat on l to invest resources in the 
production of intellectual products, meaning the “promot[ion of] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts “ by “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
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the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” (David 1992, 
quoting the constitution of the United States). 
Many studies exist that show how the patent system can foster the creation of 
intellectual products, or knowledge, starting with t e seminal works of  
Arrow (1962) and Nordhaus (1967). In this paper I am more interested in how the 
patent system, more broadly, the intellectual property rights system influences 
trading in knowledge. 
Intellectual property protection aims not only at protecting the creators of new 
intellectual products – this was also not the main reason for which it was used in the 
14th century England mentioned above – but at encouraging the spreading of new 
knowledge. Clear property rights allow of trading. Market prices which can be set 
due to excludability encourage not only efficient production, but also efficient 
allocation, which means that by the logic of the market mechanism the intellectual 
products will find their way to the most efficient users through trading.   
Intellectual products have some important characteristics that can be 
identified as influencing their tradability1:  
1. Appropriability, meaning the possibility that the inventor be the exclusive 
beneficiary of the profits from the invention. 
2. Fungibility, meaning the possibility to simultaneously use the same unit of 
knowledge in more than one production processes. 
3. Complexity, meaning the diversity of complementary pieces of knowledge 
required to generate a new piece of knowledge. 
4. Cumulability, meaning complementarity between the alr ady existing stock 
and the new flow of knowledge. 
5. The stickiness of knowledge to human capital and routines (Antonelli 2004,  
p. 423.). 
 
An intellectual property right regime has to be able to adequately handle all 
these characteristics in order to enable efficient trading on the intellectual products’ 
market. 
Trading in intellectual products involves transaction costs both on the supply 
and demand side. These costs cover the cost of finding the right trading partner, that 
is, the cost of inspecting the quality and expected usability of the ware to be traded, 
of the elimination of opportunistic tendencies and the risk of inappropriable 
derivative returns (Antonelli 2004, p. 423.). 
                                                   
1 Tradability can be defined, following Antonelli (2004) as the degree to which a certain intellectual 
property without physical form can be bought and sol  on the market. 
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3. Intellectual property protection and trading with intellectual products 
Establishing a clear intellectual property rights (IPR) system makes trading with 
intellectual product possible. The possibility of trading in turn leads to 
specialisation, meaning that it is no more necessary fo  everyone to produce 
knowledge and innovate for themselves, but the production of these can be done by 
specialists having comparative advantage in their production. Knowledge can then 
be acquired from these specialists through the market. Research and development 
can be detached from production. Producers can have t e necessary knowledge and 
technology from the researchers, and researchers do not have to bother with the 
commercial development of their ideas, like they had to in earlier centuries 
(Lamoreaux–Sokoloff 2001). The separation and cooperation of the two spheres are 
rendered possible by the market for intellectual products by way of intellectual 
property protection measures. 
In this section I am talking about knowledge transfer in a very general sense. 
The model I introduce and the empirical test of its predictions are at the macro level. 
These do not say anything about the actual process, how knowledge is being 
transferred from one country to another. Neither is it important here, how individual 
firms find out, what knowledge and what innovations it is worth to acquire from 
outside the home country, or what determines the regional spreading of knowledge 
and innovations. Although these are all certainly important questions, I will 
concentrate here only on the aggregate, macro level. 
There exists a number ways to transfer knowledge from one country to 
another. “International technology transfer refers to the process by which a firm in 
one country gains access to and employs technology developed in another country” 
(Falvey–Foster 2006, p. 23.). This has many ways and methods, that can and has 
been both theoretically and empirically explored. The possible ways include 
international trading in technology-intensive products, international flow of foreign 
direct investments, cross-country licensing, or even patenting in a different country.  
International trading in intellectual products is one these market-conform way 
technologies can spread in the globalised world2. The same way it is important for a 
domestic market of intellectual products to clearly establish property rights, 
international trading in intellectual products is strongly influenced by the relation of 
the different national property rights regimes. As to how exactly national differences 
in the strength and design of the IPR system influece international trade in 
intellectual products, no generally accepted theoretical explanation has yet emerged 
in the literature. 
                                                   
2 As opposed to certain non-market-conform ways like non-market transactions and spillovers (Falvey–
Foster 2006) 
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4. Modelling the link between IPR regimes and technology transfer 
There are at least two characteristics of a country’s intellectual property rights 
regime, that can influence the inter-country flow of intellectual products, namely its 
design and its strength. The first model I will cite here shows how the design of the 
system influences trade (although differences in design can be translated into 
differences in terms of strength), and the second mo el will concentrate on the 
system’s strength or strictness as an important determinant variable. 
Building on the work of Dornbusch et al (1977), Taylor (1993, 1994) models 
at the macro level, how the strength of an IPR regim  influences international 
trading in products and services and intellectual products. The model is a Ricardian 
trade model, where production and R&D is carried on in the different countries 
based on the relative factor costs. International trade then may or may not equalise 
factor costs in R&D depending on the institutional setting. Taylor finds, that there is 
„a link between asymmetries3 in patent protection [between countries] and resulting 
trade distortions” (Taylor 1994, p. 363.). His model finds, that „Asymmetric 
protection of intellectual property rights: (1) distorts the pattern of trade in both 
goods and R&D, raises the relative wage rate of the country that imported R&D, and 
eliminates technology transfer between countries; (2) lowers the amount of labour 
allocated to R&D activities worldwide. […] (3) lowers R&D in the country that 
exported R&D, and raises R&D in the country that imported R&D.”  
(Taylor 1994, p. 374.). It is important to observe, that the second statement is in 
connection with the encouraging role of IPR protection in the production of 
intellectual products (and its role in promoting economic growth, in turn), the first 
and the third makes a statement about the role it plays in influencing international 
trade in these. The first statement is especially remarkable as it establishes a link 
between the relative strength of IPR regimes and the trade in conventional goods 
and services. The model’s third prediction basically means, that if a country’s IPR 
regime discriminates against innovations made abroad, and the country is one that 
originally imported knowledge from outside, he will be less able to do so, and has to 
conduct R&D himself, even though he has comparative disadvantage.   
What is more important in Naghavi’s 2007 model is the explicit 
differentiation of the more developed North, capable of conducting R&D, and the 
less developed South, willing to acquire knowledge from the North directly or 
indirectly. Naghavi shows, that the looseness or strictness of the IPR regime in the 
South not only influences knowledge flow between North and South, but also 
determines for the North the more profitable way to enter the Southern market. In 
his model, trading with goods embodying new knowledge is an indirect way for the 
                                                   
3 He defines the IPR regimes symetric if results of research and development conducted in another 
country enjoys the same degree of protection domestically, as those conducted domestically, and 
asymetric if the regime offers protection only for those intellectual products whose researches are 
conducted domestically  Asymmetry therefore means a difference in the scope of the protection. 
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South to acquire new technologies through imitating or reverse engineering, while 
Northern firms’ investing directly in the South makes copying the new technology 
easier. For the Northern firm, this two ways of entering the Southern market are 
complementary: by exporting it incurs tariff costs, but lowers competition as the 
technology itself is not readily available for copying in the South. In the FDI case 
transportation costs can be spared, but only at the cost of higher competition because 
of imitation. The model finds two bottom-line variables determining the export 
versus FDI question for the North: efficiency of the R&D project in the North 
indicated with g4 and the level of technology spillovers in the South marked β,5 
which is an institutional variable to be set strategically by the South6. Figure 1 shows 
how these two variables determine the way Northern firm enter the Southern market, 
that is, the channel through which knowledge is being transferred from one country 
to another. 
















FDI (SP) FDI (SP)
g  
Source: Naghavi (2007, p. 69.) 
 
β shows the strength of the IPR regime in the South. Higher values mean less 
strict protection. β* shows the value at any g, at which it the North is indifferent 
between exporting to the South or investing directly abroad. If β is smaller than that 
(more strict IPR protection in the South), it is more profitable to invest directly, and 
spare tariff costs. If exporting is the outcome, the Northern firm becomes a 
monopoly in the South, in the FDI case, however, a duopoly arises. βˆ is the 
threshold value, under which it is not profitable to the Northern firm to access the 
Southern market through FDI and β** is that level of IPR protection, under which it 
                                                   
4 Meaning basically how a unit of R&D cost incurred by the North reduces Northern production costs. 
5 Meaning in turn how a unit of Northern R&D cost reduces Southern production cost. 
6 The variable β itself is the product of the imitation costs b and the strictness of the Southern IPR 
protection regime ι. The model takes b as given, it is thus only scaling the effects of the actual 
institutional variable to be set. 
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is profitable for the Northern firm to invest directly, but it should spend as much on 
R&D that it becomes unprofitable for the Southern fi m to compete, and a restrained 
monopoly situation arises. In sum, a low β value is supposed to induce more R&D in 
low-tech industries (crowding out exports, though) and stimulate high levels of 
R&D spending in hi-tech industries. Thus both in the case of less and more 
technology-intensive industries it is rational for the Southern government to pre-
commit itself to a strict IPR regime, as it induces transfer of technology to the South 
(Naghavi 2007, p.71.)7. 
If the differences in national IPR regimes do have n impact on international 
technology diffusion, then their appropriate fine-tuning can become a new way of 
competition between countries and also a new possibility for levelling off. 
Endowment with or accessibility to knowledge might be less predetermined, 
constrained than endowment with natural resources, apital or labour. If it can be 
proven that the type (strength) of IPR systems as a new tool in the hand of a national 
government can influence international flow of capit l and technology transfer, than 
using Ghosh’s words we can speak of a „new mercantilism”, of a new tool a 
government can use to compete more efficiently at the international level (Ghosh 
2003, p. 85.). 
5. Empirical studies of the link between IPR strength and transfer of 
technology 
To test empirically, whether a link between the strngth of IPR systems in a country 
and transfer of technology to that country could be established, two questions have 
to be answered: first, how to measure the strength of national IPR regimes, and 
second how to measure the magnitude of transfer of t chnology. 
For the measurement of the strength of IPR regimes, Ginarte and Park 
developed a composite index in their 1997 paper8. Their index measures IPR 
strength along 5 dimensions, giving a number 0-1 to each, and then taking the sum 
of these to be the Ginarte-Park index, later referrd to simply as Patent Right Index. 
The five dimensions are coverage (meaning what can and what can not be subject of 
protection), membership in international treaties (the Paris Convention, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty and the International Convention f r the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants), enforcement (whether the legislation provides adequate 
                                                   
7
 Naghavi also shows, that stringent IPR protection des not only attract more FDI to the South and 
induce higher levels of R&D in the North, but also enhances Southern welfare more, than does a looser 
IPR regime.  
8 Beside this Ginarte-Park index, empirical studies use another, called Rapp-Rozek index to which due 
credit is given both in Ginarte–Park (1997) and Falvey–Foster (2006). 
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mechanism for the law to be enforced), and restrictions to exercising IPRs (eg. 
compulsory licensing), and duration of protection.9  
For the measurement of the magnitude of transfer of technology many 
different indicators can be used. Falvey and Foster (2006) enumerate 4 basic 
channels through which technology can flow from onecountry to another, and that 
is through international trade, through foreign direct investment, through licensing 
agreements and through cross-national patenting.  
In their original study Ginarte–Park (1997), the aim of the study was to 
examine, what determines the Ginarte-Park Index as a dependant variable. In Park 
and Lippoldt (2003) the authors conducted an empirical study to examine whether a 
statistical relationship can be established between th  strength of IPR regimes as an 
independent variable and technology transfers, either in the form of foreign direct 
investment or in the form of technology-intensive merchandise import. They 
conducted a regression analysis where they use the above mentioned Ginarte-Park 
Index to measure the strength of the IPR system as an explaining variable. Beside 
that, their regression analysis has many control variables (like country-risk or per 
capita GDP), accounts for individual, country-specific effects like culture or quality 
of institutions (Park–Lippoldt 2003, p. 16). The countries involved are grouped into 
two groups of developed countries and least developed countries. Table 1 shows the 
percentage change (and the significance level in brackets) in inward and outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and exports and imports due to a one percentage 
change in the strength of IPR regimes (as measured by the Ginarte-Park index). 
Table 1. Ginarte-Park Index elasticities 
Effect of strengthening 





Inward FDI to GDP 0,49 (p=4,4%) 0,73 (p=1%) 2,76 (p=2%) 
Outward FDI to GDP 1,69 (p=0,0%) 1,90 (p=0,0%) 6,11 (p=0,1%) 
Exports to GDP 0,172 (p=16,6%) insig. insig. 
Imports to GDP 0,315 (p=1,1%) 0,243 (p=14,4%) insig. 
Source: Park–Lippoldt (2003) 
 
The effects of increasing the IPR index raised both inward and outward FDI 
for both country groups, and the effect was stronger for the least developed 
countries. The result thus is, that a rise in a country’s IPR index will on average rise 
inward FDI and technology intensive merchandise imports to the country. The IPR 
index had only a moderate effect on aggregated import and export, and this effect 
was not even significant for the least developed countries. This leads the authors to 
the conclusion, that intellectual property rights protection affects exports and 
imports only in a very roundabout way, and on the other hand that trading and direct 
                                                   
9 In a 2008 paper (Park–Lippoldt 2008), this patent right index is developed further, and an index for 
the strength of copyright protection and trademark right protection is included. 
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investments function as complementary in the case of t chnology transfer10. This 
latter conclusion is completely in accord with the results of Naghavi’s model. 
Strengthening the IPR systems can contribute to the flow of technology 
transfer towards the developing countries (Park–Lippoldt 2003, p. 8.), be it either 
through foreign direct investments or the import oftechnology-intensive 
commodities. The strength of intellectual property regime is however not the only 
determinant of knowledge diffusion. Some other influencing factors, the effects of 
which could even be studied at the model level might be the extent of the market, 
the quality of the labour force, the infrastructure, political stability etc.  
Even if we take the strictness of IPR protection as a determinant of knowledge 
inflow into a country, it may not be the absolute, but the relative strictness of the 
protection that matters. In the next section I will use the Ginarte-Park index of 
countries to measure the differences in the strictness of IPR protection between 
trading partners, and see whether and how this influe ces knowledge inflow as 
understood by Park and Lippoldt (2003, 2008). I will use Hungary as a target 
country. Based on the above studies of Park and Lippoldt, my prediction is, that as 
Hungarian IPR protection gets stricter relative to that of its trading partners, this 
encourages knowledge inflow, while as it gets looser, it discourages knowledge 
inflow. 
6. Patent Right Index and technology transfer in the case of Hungary 
Neither the original 1997 study by Ginarte and Park, nor the 2003 study by Park and 
Lippoldt includes Hungary. Park in his 2008 paper (p. 2.), however gives the values 
of the Ginarte-Park index for Hungary. For the years 1960-1990 Hungary scores an 
average of 2,20. For the year 1995 the index is 4,04 remaining unchanged for 2000, 
and rising to 4,5 to the year 200511. Having the scores of the patent right index for 
different years, and having the model of Park–Lippoldt (2008), we can see, whether 
the Hungarian data support my predictions. Park–Lippoldt (2008) has the 
methodology of what to measure and how to measure. Th y regress a) stock of 
inward FDI, b) technology-intensive merchandise imports and c) technology-
intensive service imports to the Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights. In their paper, 
they use data from altogether 120 countries, which they divide into three groups: 
developed countries (25), developing countries (68,including Hungary) and least 
developed countries (27). What they find is, that 1% rise in the Ginarte-Park index is 
                                                   
10 Falvey and Foster (2006) also enumerate (p. 25) many other ways how technology transfer can be 
measured with the corresponding methodological difficulties. 
11 The Patent Rights Index for Hungary is, however, different, being 3,71 in 2000 and 3,37 in 1995 
(Park – Wagh 2002, p. 40.). Partial figures are: 0,71 for Coverage, 1,00 for Duration, 0,67 for 
Enforcement, 1,00 for Membership in International Treaties and 0,33 for Protection from Restrictions 
on Patent Rights. 
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accompanied by a 1,65% rise in inward FDI to developing countries (as opposed to 
11,2 to developed and 1,66 to least developed countries). A 1% rise in the Patent 
Right Index goes together with 1,34% rise in merchandise imports to developing 
countries (compared to 9,86 to developed countries and 0,54 to least developed 
countries). Also, the coefficient for service imports to developing countries is 0,99 
(9,99 to developed countries and 0,97 to least developed countries). They also give 
coefficients in a sectoral breakdown: they list those parts of merchandise imports 
and service imports which are the most likely to bring along with them the transfer 
of new technologies, and see how these are related to the strength of the IPR 
system12. In the case of the merchandise imports these are: pharmaceuticals, office 
and telecom equipments, organic and inorganic chemicals, electrical and electronic 
products, aircraft and spacecraft-related products and optics and precision equipment 
(Park–Lippoldt 2008, p. 37.). In the case of services imports they list communication 
services, computer and information services and royalties and license fees  
(Park–Lippoldt 2008, p. 43.). I also acquired data for Hungary in these categories. 
Table 2 shows foreign direct investment, technology-intensive merchandise 
import and technology-intensive services import for the years 2000 and 2005 into 
Hungary. As a reference, I indicate in the first column the Ginarte-Park index for 
Hungary. 











2000 4,04 22 869,9 16 101,3 461,0 
2005 4,50 61 970,1 32 842,4 1 956,8 
Note: All boldface numbers are in million current USD 
Source: MNB, KSH, UNCTAD 
 
It is important to note here, that Hungary fits the original Park–Lippoldt 
prediction inasmuch as a rise in the IPR index from 4,04 to 4,50 is in fact 
accompanied by an increase in technology-intensive merchandise and services 
import to Hungary. My objective now is to see where th se merchandise and 
services come from: do they come from countries where intellectual property rights 
are strongly or loosely protected? Do they come from c untries that have a stronger 
or looser IPR regime, than Hungary? Is this inflow f merchandise or services 
sensible to changes in the absolute IPR protection s re gth or its relative state to the 
trading partner?  
Having data of the above categories broken down to countries of origin it is 
now possible to see, whether any connection can be seen between change in 
Hungary’s relative IPR strength to its trading partne s and the change in stock of 
                                                   
12 The model certainly also uses control variables. 
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inward FDI, technology-intensive merchandise imports and technology-intensive 
service imports, respectively. To see this I used data for only those countries, for 
which Park (2008) gives a Ginarte-Park index, which is, 120 countries. This means, 
that in the case of inward FDI, in 2000 88,1% and i 2005 90,3% of the whole 
inward FDI is covered. In the case of the technology-intensive merchandise imports, 
this means 99,46% and 98,64%, respectively, and in the case of the technology-
intensive service imports, 98,57% and 97,56%, respectively. From the sample I 
excluded those items, where trade or FDI stock was 0 in at least one of the years, 
and also excluded outliers, where the change in either way was more than tenfold 
during the five-year interval. After these exclusions my data account for 86,7% of 
the inward FDI stock in 2000 and 76,68% in 2005, in the case of merchandise 
import these percentages are 99,45% and 98,58, respectively and for the services 
import they are 97,28% and 83,42%, respectively. I took into account further 
variables that could also have their effect, like th absolute value of the IPR index or 
GDP growth. 
According to my prediction if Hungary employs a relatively stricter IPR 
protection regime as a trade partner country, technology-intensive merchandise and 
service import and FDI from that country should increase. 
Statistics, however, do not show any discernable relationship between the 
change in relative IPR strength of a partner country and the change in the value of 
technology-intensive merchandises coming to Hungary from that particular country. 
All the variables together explain only a tiny percentage of the change in 
technology-intensive imports and FDI inflow.  
This could on one hand be interpreted, that a change i  the trading partners’ 
relative IPR regime strengths can in and by itself not determine the magnitude of 
knowledge inflow, and is not even the most important f ctor determining it. It seems 
odd, however, that while an increase in the strength of IPR protection does attract 
more knowledge from outside, we cannot attract significantly more just by putting 
ourselves in a relatively better protected situation. On the other hand this could mean 
as well, that inflowing knowledge requires a certain level of IPR protection, and 
once it is reached, Knowledge can be imported regardless of the level of IPR 
protection in the exporting country.  
Still the data show that the higher the partner countries score on the 
independent variable (relative IPR strength), the gr ater the upward spread of the 
dependent variable (knowledge inflow in the various above mentioned forms) can 
be. This could be meaning, that the change in the relative IPR strength does not, per 
se, determine technology transfer through these channels, but a greater positive 
change in Hungary’s relative IPR strength is able to allow for higher technology 
transfer, while the smaller the positive change or the greater the negative change, the 
less it is able to do so. It is also possible, thate data are heteroskedastic, meaning 
that countries to the right has better chances of exhibiting higher growth in 
knowledge transfer than countries to the left, for s me reason in connection with 
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their scoring higher on the independent variable, but this heteroskedasticity 
hypothesis can not be tested on this model. 
This model should be extended and studied further. The main task to be done 
is identifying further variables that influence knowledge inflow to Hungary from the 
trade partners. My aim is to identify country groups that behave significantly 
differently than other countries, when it comes to transferring knowledge-intensive 
products and services to Hungary.  
On the international level, there are continuous efforts being taken to facilitate 
the mobility of this quasi-common good. The institutional measures are trying to 
benefit everyone, including the seller and buyer country of the intellectual product, 
and also its creator. 
One field of these efforts are The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty proposed by the World Trade Organisation. This 
aims at the international harmonisation of national IPR regimes. The treaty was 
signed at the Uruguay round of GATT/WTO, and entered into force on the 1st 
January, 1995. This treaty prescribes minimal standards for national IPR legislation, 
specifying also some exceptions. Second, it also includes rules regarding the 
enforcement of the treaty. Third, it also designs a dispute resolution mechanism.  
It would however exceed the scope of this theoretical paper to examine the effects of 
the TRIPS agreement on the international market of intellectual products. This way, 
the trade-distorting effects of different national legislations can be circumvented. 
A second field is the development of the institutional foundations of the trade 
in intellectual properties, including ways for example to reduce transaction costs. 
7.  Conclusion 
Theoretical studies show, that the actual shape and built of a nation’s intellectual 
property rights protection system can and does haveeffect on the international flow 
of intellectual products through the markets. Stronger IPR protection attracts more 
intellectual products into a country.  
My objective was to test if there is a link between the strength of a country’s 
IPR protection system relative to the partner countries and knowledge-intensive 
import from that particular country. If this is the case, different countries can shape 
their IPR regimes to profit more from the international flow of knowledge, while 
this can be a disadvantage for others. 
In the case of Hungary, however, I found no such link of any significance, 
which could possibly mean, that if an IPR protection regime is strong enough in 
absolute terms, certain units of knowledge can be imported, otherwise not, 
regardless of how much the protection is stronger than this threshold value.  
The international efforts to standardise IPR system indicate, that differences in 
relative strength still have some effect. 
 Benedek Nagy 
 
196
It is thus up to further studies to examine, how exactly varying relative 
strength of IPR systems influence technology transfer o  the above mentioned kind, 
or other kinds, like the international flow of knowledge workers and human capital, 
and the resulting knowledge products as embodied in patents or copyrights. 
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Manageable and Unmanageable World Crises 
(Climate and Economy) 
Károly Kiss 
 
This study examines the two world crises, climate change and the financial meltdown, 
followed by an economic depression, and compares how t ey can be managed. Climate 
change has set in and to most probability it will cause immensly big damage, human suffer 
and loss. Still, for the time being international community is not suited to avoid it. In contrast 
to this, huge efforts, including international co-ordination, are made to combat the financial 
and economic crisis. This comparison is astonishing: why is there a sudden solution for the 
one, and why there is not for the other?  
As concerns climate stabilization the main question is whether present mainstream 
economics, interest relations, moral patterns and iternational institutions give an adequate 
framework for the solution. The economic crisis also raises basic questions concerning 
mainstream economics and economic policy: Can bankers’ greed be tamed or it is part of the 
system? Are crises inevitable? Can better co-ordnatio  on the international level solve the 
problem? The combination of the management of the two crises is also examined: whether is 
there a green way out from the crisis. But to save the world economy via a green energy 
revolution also seems to be a questionable enterprise. 
 
Keywords: financial crisis, climate crisis, manageable, unmanageable, green way out, 
regulated capitalism, temporary taming 
 
Was the Earth a bank, it has been 
already bailed out long ago. 
(the Greens) 
1. Climate crisis 
In the Intergovernmental Panel on Cimate Change of the UN experts of almost all 
countries participate on an equal parity. The credibility of the reports is underlined 
by the fact that they are published when unanimity was reached. Reports of the year 
2006, and especially that of Feruary 2007 contain very depressing statements. The 
most importants ones are as follows (IPCC 2007): 
- Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the 
mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations  
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- The observed widespread warming of the atmosphere and ocean, together 
with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that it is extremely unlikely that 
global climate change of the past fifty years can be explained without external 
forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone. 
- Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries due to 
the timescales associated with climate processes and feedbacks, even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations were to be stabilized.  
- Both past and future anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will continue to 
contribute to warming and sea level rise for more than a millennium, due to 
the timescales required for removal of this gas from the atmosphere.  
 
The expressions very likely and extremely unlikely have not yet been occured 
in the IPCC reports; they express a new stage of scientific conviction. A figure from 
the referred IPCC report demonstrates temperature va iations in function of the 
world economy development. What does matter here is that even without any 
antropogenic green house gas emission surface temperature slightly increases, by  
0,3 centigrade in this century. Warming up has already become „self-sustaining”. 
Temperature increase due antropogenic emissions may vary from minimum 1 to 
maximum 6,5 centigrades. 
We have started a natural process what we cannot stop anymore. Positve 
feedbacks emerge: with warming up ice cover is melting, the albedo of the Earth 
decreases, warming up further increases. The melting of permafrost also has begun 
which results in escaping to the air of an immensly big volume of methane from the 
frozen swamps. Its green house gas effect is many times more than that from 
antropogenic activity. With the slow warming up of the seas methane is also coming 
up from the organic residuals on the bottom of the seas. 
What is at stake now is the measure of warming up. Scientists should like to 
stabilize temperature increase at 2 centigrade. Above that the damage of ecosystems 
becomes irreparable and warming up unhaltable. We must have in mind that average 
surface temperature during the ice age was only 5 centigrade lower. Let us imagine, 
what could happen with a similar change in the opposite direction. (And forecasts 
for the end of the century vary between 1,5 and 6,5 centigrade.) 
The Stern Review on Climate Change (Stern 2006) in October 2006 revealed 
completely new facts concerning the costs and benefits o  climate stabilization. 
Earlier, leading politicians and economists thought that mitigation should not have 
two much sense because there would be winners of the climate change as well and 
costs of avoidance should be extremely high in contrast to gains. The report proved 
that even Nordic countries would be losers after an initial gain and benefits of 
mitigation far overtake costs. Namely,while preventio  should claim for roughly 1 
per cent of World Gross Product yearly, in the lack of it 5 to 20 per cent of WGP 
would be lost in every year for ever. (For illustration: the costs of prevention of a 
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world epidemic should be roughly l per cent of WGP, or world wide advertisement 
costs make up the same amount.) 
Observing the principle of auditur et altera pars, let us mention some opposing 
views1. These views are forming three groups: those which question the fact of 
climate change itself, others object to its antropogenic character (Hans Labohm, 
Fred Singer), and, thirdly, which do not deny the antropogenic climate change but 
not rank it as first priority for mankind. Björn Lomborg Danish environmentalist 
lately emphasises that the the envisaged costs of climate stabilization should be 
spent on supporting poor countries, combatting famine or AIDS in Eastern Africa 
(Lomborg 2007). 
For many, like myself, James Lovelock is the author number one in climate 
affairs. He evaluates the possible consequences even more heavily than the Stern 
Review. While the latter says that consequences might equal as those of a world 
war, Lovelock adds that as a global nuclear war. According to him half a billion, but 
maximum one billion people could survive climate change by the end of our 
century. In an interview given by him to Rollingsotne.com, he explained that even if 
mitigation measures will have a high profile, the warming up could not be stopped 
(Goodell 2007). Earlier, Lovelock thought that the massive use of nuclear energy, 
replacing the fossils may save mankind but in this interview he saw no solution. 
At last, the question of adaptation should be mentioned. As concerns nature 
and species, many think that it is possible, but the process of climate change will 
accelerate and all this will take place in such a short time, that genetic adaptation 
would be absolutely impossible. As concerns people and nations, the richest will 
have better chances to survive but the poor will vanish. 
 
1.1. The theoretical framework of analysis2 
We should examine whether economics and social sciences in their present form are 
apt to manage the problem. The climate change raises serious challanges in the 
following aspects: 
- intra and intergenerational unequities, 
- intertemporal unequities, 




The centrepiece of mainstream economics is welfare economics. Welfare 
economics is designed to be implemented within one country, supposing one 
                                                   
1 This is based even if we only want to follow the criteria of science by Karl Popper (namely, it is 
scientific, what can be questioned). 
2 This point roughly follows the argument exposed in the Stern Review. 
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jurisdiction and one decision maker (government) and it is not apt to examine 
climate change, due to its global character. Its mot important criterion is the social 
welfare function, meaning that welfare is maximal when the volume of goods and 
services sonsumed by households is maximum. The welfare function also can be 
interpreted only within one country, besides, it has a serious shortcoming from the 
point of view of the examined question. Namely, the social welfare function can be 
maximized at any (!) income distribution pattern. But implementing the social 
welfare function for the effects of climate change it would be unacceptable to defend 
mankind from the natural catastrophe in the way that only global effect matters, the 
differences in damages suffered by the single countries were neglected. 
The ruling economic paradigm is equally unapt to manage uncertainties and 
risks. To the contrary, it is embedded in positivism, trying to quantify everithing, not 
taking account that economics is not a discipline without values. But analysing the 
effects of climate change, uncertainties and risks have an enormous importance.  
In most cases effects and damages to come can be fixed only within wide limits and 
given with a high coefficient of uncertainty. 
The concepts which can bring us to our purpuse, to find the proper framework 
for the analysis, are externalities, public goods and free riding. It is because, 
- the climate itself is a huge, global common good, the service of ecosystems, 
- climate change is the world’s biggest externality so far (never has been seen 
something similar), 
- but climate stabilization policy is also a public good (as nobody could be 
excluded to enjoy its benefits), 
- and free riding emerges with an all decisive weight: countries that make no 
effort will also enjoy the benefits of climate mitigation policies. 
 
As a result, these concepts should be reinterpreted, implemented in global 
dimensions: 
- The climate change as a global externality means that we should cover not 
only damages caused to others in our country and now, but we are responsible 
for damages caused in other countries and other continents, to other 
generations and in the future as well. 
- Climate mitigation as global externality means that success can be achieved 
only by international co-operation, and the free-ride s are the countries who 
do not participate in it. The international community has not any enforcing 
powers so far on the dissident countries and efforts will be fruitless while 
institutional solution will be born to include all the countries.  
 
One of the many theoretical problems appears in the field of discounting. 
According to the well known method used in business calculations comparing and 
unifying costs and benefits accruing not in the same time are made through 
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discounting. Future benefits and/or expenses are expressed in present value with the 
help of discount rate and they can be compared this way. It seems to be evident that 
this method should be used in case of climate change s well, if we want to compare 
damages accruing in different places and times and costs and benefits of a climate 
stabilization policy which similarly appear in different times and places. But heavy 
methodological problems appear because the traditional discounting is apt only for 
comparing small scale differences by one trayectory, while in case of climate issues 
there are separate trayectories (countries, regions, affected by the climate change in 
a very different way) and separate time dimensions (present and future generations) 
and differences are huge. 
All this is raising underlying moral and ethical problems: how to evaluate in 
the present damages caused unintentionally to other countries in the future; are we 
fully responsible or each country, each generation and each age should solve its own 
problem. The discount rate chosen depends on the moral answer given to this 
question. If it is high, it delivers a message that today’s value of the damages 
accruing in the future is low, and as a result, it has not too much sense to make high 
sacrifice today to avoid it in the future and other places. And vice versa: if the 
discount rate is low, today’s efforts should be increased to avoid big damages in the 
future. 
Surveying the moral facade of our age we can state th t consequentionalism, 
the background ethics of welfare economics has becom  the ruling orientation: it is 
the result, which does matter, the way through which it is achieved, is not important. 
The concept based on rights, truth and freedom, embracing the moral side of the 
processes as well (see at Amartya Sen), remains in minority. From the point of view 
of our topic the moral concept of sustainability and stewardship should rule that 
everybody should take into consideration the effects of decisions on others, the 
nature and future, this way enabling us to follow a successful climate stabilization 
policy. 
1.2. International climate agreements 
Climate stabilization can be pursued on internationl, regional, national and 
company levels, but individuals also can make a lot in favour. With a view on the 
above mentioned conditions, the most efficient instrument is the conclusion of 
international agreement. All we know the Kyoto Protocol and its shortcomings.  
If there is not a binding and general international agreement, which comprises all the 
important countries with high emissions, the phenomenon of free riding appears, the 
system is „leaking” and is inefficient3. Countries with obligation in the Kyoto 
                                                   
3 To illustrate this: if Great Britain unilaterally stopped all its energy power plants from one day to the 
other, after 13 months world emission of CO2 would be on the same level as before, because it would 
be eliminated by the growing emission of China. But if Great Britain ceased to emit any CO2, it would 
take 2 years for the world to reach the same level by the same reasons. 
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process undertook a 5,2 per cent average reduction. And those with the biggest 
emissions did not subscribe it. According to a general position, held by all countries 
a 50-80 per cent reduction is needed by the middle of the centrury. As a result, the 
situation is very gloomy. 
The mitigation measures may be of economic, administrat ve, technological 
or other character (e.g. an economic policy supporting local development vis-á-vis 
globalization; such a policy would yield in lower transport intensity and hence, 
lower CO2 emission). 
Within the frames of an international agreement the best instrument for 
achieveing the mitigation targets would be the emission trading scheme. It can be 
realized both within the Kyoto Protocol and the EU has also created its own quota 
system. However, the international implementation is doomed, because there is no 
agreement, on what principle the qoutas should be distributed between the different 
states. (There are many principles, and each represnt different interests which 
widely contrast. E.g., qoutas should be distributed proportianal to the former 
emissions, or the number of inhabitants or the energy intensity of GDP, etc.) 
The main frontline is between the US and the emerging countries, headed by 
China and India. (By now, China has reached the total emission of America.) China 
and India rightly argue that their CO2 per capita emission is only a fraction of the 
US. (Namely, 3,3 and 1,1 tonne respectively, vis-á-vis the 23 tonne per capita of the 
US.)4. Besides, they emphasize the historical responsibility of the developed nations 
in forming the present situation5. In contrast to this, America argues that obligations 
should be equally shared. What has been achieved during the negotiations within the 
UN is the principle of shared but differentiated responsibility (although not equal). 
A special case is Poland, which, on the one hand, has huge coal deposits, on the 
other, due to historical reasons, it does not want to be depending on Russian oil and 
gas. 
The all-decisive climate negotiations will take place in Kopenhagen, end of 
2009. Many call it as the most important negotiation in history so far. Perspectives 
are a bit better as in the USA itself there is a definit  progress towards climate 
protection. As concerns the US and West-European attitudes, the main difference is 
that while West Europe seems to consider possibilities n consumption reduction as 
well, the USA follows an active climate policy; it wants to defend climate by doing 
something, not by doing nothing (or less).  
A new element in the mitigation policy is the suggestion to implement game 
theory in the climate discussions. A conclusion which underlines this is that climate 
agreements for long periods are not productive because countries which do not sign 
                                                   
4 It should be mentioned that Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil belong to the countries with highest 
emission, if land use is taken into consideration. 
5 USA is responsible for 29,3% of the total CO2 emissions since 1850, the European Union for 26,9% 
and the G8 for two thirds. The respective figures for other countries are: China 8,3%, India 2,3%, 
Brazil 0,8%. See: Schwägerl, 2009. 
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the agreement become fixed in the position of free rid rs. In the spirit of game 
theories during the continuous negotiations the dissi ents should be kept under 
permanent pressure and renegotiations may yield the result. 
1.3. The energy sector and climate change  
At last, some interrelations between energy and climate change should be 
highlighted. If scarecity was a real danger, environmentalists would have nothing to 
do just sitting and waiting how the market settles he problem. It should price fossil 
fuels according to scarecity and no enforcing measures should be needed. But this is 
not happening. New discoveries of large deposits make expected exploitation 
periods longer and longer. Besides, coal deposits seem to be enough for centuries, 
and the worst option for environmentalists would be, if China and India changed for 
coal, using it directly, without liquifying. Oil prices are sometimes soaring, but this 
is not a manifest of scarecity. (Take e.g. the two decades between 1980 and 2000, 
when oil prices gradually sank from 65 to 15 dollars, while the world permanently 
chatted about scarecity.) 
However, the solution lies in price increase. Final consumption prices of 
energy and raw materials should be increased in each year in the same measure as 
the productivity of these resources improved in the previous year6. This could limit 
the increase of energy use and promote its productivity. A good example of the 
viability of the idea is pricing labour in welfare states: price and costs of labour 
gradually increased during decades, parallel with labour productivity. As a result, 
demand for labour decreased, and the case of structural unemployment appeared in 
the developed countries. 
The frequent reference to low price elasticity of energy holds true only in the 
short run. In the long run the demand adjusts to prices, energy and fuel usage 
decreases, travel and transport habits change, demand for environmental friendly 
infrastructures increases. 
Another basic problem is the production of renewable energies: whether they 
could replace fossil fuels and on what prices. Theoretically, renewables are 
undepletable and the only limit of their implementation is their price7. And their 
pricing depends on the actual price of oil and whether externalities caused by fossil 
fuels are internalized. And this brings us to the issue of social cost of carbon. From 
among the many calculations and variations let me ref r to those I have herd 
recently in the concluding conference of the so called petrE research of the English-
German Foundation (petrE 2009). To comply with the 20 per cent GHG reduction 
target up to 2020 in the European Union, a €53-68 per tonne of carbon price would 
be needed, but the 30 per cent reduction would necessitate a €180-200 price. 
                                                   
6 This is an idea by Ulrich von Weizsäcker. 
7 In chapter 4. of this study I shall refer to the practical obstacles of the unlimited use of renewables. 
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We know the many (environmental and food market) problems of the biomass 
as well. As a result, the question seems to be more c mplex as it appeared at the 
beginning.  
 
Investment bankers  
may have nothing to gain  
but their chains 
(Karl Marx, inverted) 
2. Financial and economic crisis 
Alternative economists have been warning at least since 20 years that stock 
exchanges and international money markets are blowing ever increasing bubbles 
which are not covered by real values, bond and stock pri es are artificially inflated 
and the bubbles can burst out at any time. Well, this happened. 
The volume of derivatives grew to an uninmaginable huge sum, $596 trillion, 
which was only 142 billion in 2002. Gross World Product is a tiny sum compared to 
this, 54,3 trillion in 2007, only tenth part. Another base for comparison: total 
capitalization of firms on the New York stock exchange was $25.000 bn8. Warren 
Buffet, the richest investor of America calls derivat es as weapons of mass 
distructions. Besides derivatives, hedge funds also contributed to blowing the 
bubbles.  
A substantial part of derivatives is made of CDSs (credit-default swaps). 
These instruments „allow investors to separate the risk of interest-rate movements 
from the risk that a borrower will not repay. For a premium, one party to a CDS can 
insure against default.” The Economist rightly calls this financial „innovation” 
gambling on ruin. Since 2001 their volume grew above $60 trilllion9. Derivatives 
increased the weight of banks and financial institutions in an immense proportion; 
their share of the American stock market climbed from 5,2 per cent in 1980 to  
23,5 per cent in 2007 and makes ¼ of all profits10. 
As concerns the concrete causes of the financial meltdown, securitisation of 
the mortgages played a key role in it. The big mortgage banks, to share risk, 
securitized loans, bundling them into packages and then sold them to outside 
investors. These investors got the monthly payments as interest payments on their 
bonds. Both sides gained: the mortgage bank could write the obligations off its 
balance and the investors got assets that yielded more than government bonds. 
                                                   
8 Der Spiegel, 40/2008, p. 28. (In the original article: $596.000 milliard; in this paper I translate 
German milliard into English-American billion.) 
9 The Economist, October 18th 2008, p.76. 
10 I.e. 
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Besides, commercial banks could raise money by securitizing mortgages, instead of 
the slow, costly business of attracting retail deposits. 
The driving force of the housing estate boom was the beleif that the real estate 
market will continuously enlarge, with increasing prices and occasional individual 
defaults do not endanger stable repay. But the decline in demand and mass 
bankruptcies lowered real estate prices and this trigge ed off a chain reaction of 
defaults in the money markets. 
On 29 September the Dow Jones sank by 776,68 points, a  unprecedented 
decline since its existing. The MSCI World Index fell 840 points between 29 August 
and 29 September. The total value of papers traded on the stock exchanges of the 
world devaluated by $10.900 bn in the four weeks preceding 10 October. In the Gulf 
states stock exchanges suffered a $158 bn loss. Many of the big financial institutions 
and banks went bankrupt11. 
And that was the beginning of the world’s economic crisis. The financial 
losses were followed by a credit crunch and a mass lo  of confidence. Credit 
squeeze resulted in consequences similar to heart att ck in the economy: low 
demand, massive bankruptcies and high unemployment. 
2.1. The visible hand takes over the rule 
In the past decades, economics taught that a world crisis like that of 1929-32 could 
not happen again because national economies co-ordinate business cycles and 
international financial institutions guard over the safe of international finances. As 
the melt down began, governments of the leading countries started to help the 
economy and bail out the banks and financial institutions with an unprecedented 
haste: they have bought out the shares of banks in trouble, provided them with 
capital and credit sources, purchased their claims, rai ed state guarantees for small 
shareholders, etc. Central banks lowered interest rates to around 1 per cent in a quick 
and co-ordinated way. Still, the crisis burst out in its full scale with deep economic 
depression and high unemployment. 
The situation is absurd. In the past three decades th  ruling paradigm of 
economics, starting from the Anglo-Saxon countries12, has been preaching the 
superiority of market above the state. It has attribu ed balancing and efficiency 
increasing character to the market in contrast to the low effficiency and perilous 
character of state intervention... And now, it is the scolded state, the visible hand 
that saves the market, tries to improve what went astray due to the market. What is 
even more, the state becomes owner of the banks that went bankrupt. 
In the six months following the burst out of the crisis, $3000 bn has been 
allocated by the governments worldwide for stabilization and economic 
                                                   
11 Der Spiegel, 42/1980, p. 114. 
12 Developed by Milton Friedman and the Chicago School and first implemented by Ronald Reagan in 
the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. 
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stimulation13. To characterize this, the Nobel laureate Stiglitz coined the expression 
„American socialism”, meaning socializing the losses and privatizing the profits. 
The American governement, besides the $700 bn stimulus package, assumed 
liability for the $5.400 bn mortgages of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and expended 
further $200 bn for taking under state control the two financial institutions. 
On October 8 2008, to start credit flow, the leading central banks of the world 
took on an unprecedentedly quick, co-ordinated action: decreased interest rates.  
The Fed increased short term money supply to banks to $900 bn and began to buy 
the liabilities of commercial banks what never happened before.  
2.2. Gambling and greed, or is this the nature of capitalism? 
The first comments criticized greed and gambling, dominating the world of finances. 
Rightly done, as all derivative deals are based on which of the parties reckon better 
future events. It is natural, that Alan Greenspan, the main financial guru of the past 
decades also has been seriously criticised.  
Greenspan presided the Fed for two decades (1987-2006) and not only 
accepted but openly encouraged those financial market developments and 
innovations which led to blowing of the bubbles and then to crush. He viewd 
derivatives as necessary instruments to spread risk. In 2000 he persuaded 
congressmen to deprive the Securities and Exchange Commission of its right to 
control the market of derivatives. In 2003 he instructed the Senate that a more severe 
control of these papers would be a mistake: „Nothing is in favour of that state 
control would be superior to the self-control of markets”14. His main political aim 
was to provide the American economy with abundant money, he realized the policy 
of cheap money supply. (In some years under his presidency the leading interest rate 
was 1-2-3 per cent.) Analysts mention as main causes of meltdown as follows: 
- Deregulation and market liberalization: since the beginning of the ’80s this 
was more than a ruling economic dogma; it was even intellectually 
fashionable. 
- Cheap money, cheap credit: this was the official policy of Fed.  
- Asian savings: the Asian (mainly Chinese) goods floded the American 
markets; this was made possible by the huge deficit of trade balance; beside 
this, the Asian savings appeared on the money markets. 
- The culture of gambling (Stiglitz) and irresponsibility became general; they 
were supported by the financial innovations as „intellectual background”; the 
system was called „cowboy capitalism” as well (Fukuyama). 
- The endeavour to spreading and sharing risk played a ecisive role. 
Greenspan frequently argued with this. The problem is that even if risks are 
spread, their volume remains unchanged and it is still in the system. 
                                                   
13 Der Spiegel, 43/2008, p. 29. 
14 Der Spiegel 42/2008, p. 28. 




It is worth to consider the case from the point of view of the banking and 
financial sector. Their strive for independence is an evident motive; to be more than 
the mere financing agents of the real economy. Let us see, e.g., the background of 
securitization of real estate mortgages. The classic l bank collects private savings by 
a tiresome work and uses them as backing credit loans. When the bank sold the 
securitized mortgages to the investor, freed its balance from a negative load and, at 
the same time, could get income. According to the 1988 Basel agreement, banks are 
obliged to form reserves for the case if their big orrowers go bankrupt. So it could 
be understood that they wanted to get rid of the negative items on their balance.  
With the passing of time analysis appeared that search d for the basic rules 
and shortcomings of the system. „Each step on the long deregulatory road seemed 
wise at the time and was usually the answer to some flaw in the system” – The 
Economist explains15. In 1971 the gold-standard world economy was put an end. 
Since then, floating currences appeared and to avoid exchange rate risks, they were 
hedged by currency futures (first in the Chicago Stck Exchange). Today’s complex 
derivatives are direct descendents of those early cu rency trades16. The abolishment 
of capital controls was a consequence of floating exchange rates. From the late ’70s 
pension funds were allowed to act as institutional i vestors and began to roam over 
national borders. In 1999 the separation of commercial and investment banking was 
abolished. The SEC allowed for commercial banks andinsurance institutions to 
trade in CDSs. These were the main steps on the long deregulatory road which led to 
the present situation. 
A further system-specific cause was the social preference of conservative 
ideologies. Both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher favoured the nation of 
property owners, and on liberalised financial markets it was easier for homebuyers 
to get mortgages. The American Government backed th borrowing activity of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, what is more, in 1977 the US Congress passed the 
Community Reinvestment Act which disposed that banks should meet the credit 
needs of the „entire community”.  
And, at last, the digital techniques and the web created the possibility for the 
multiplication of financial deals. 
2.3. Regulated capitalism or temporary taming? 
Many of the critiques began to bury free market capitalism and forecasted a future 
with accentuated state intervention. However, the French model of state dirigism is 
not so successful as suggested by some politicians17. And what is embarrasing, the 
                                                   
15 The Economist October 18th, 2008. 
16 It is not an accident that the Chicago School appeared in the vicinity of Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 
17 See e.g. The Economist, October 25th 2008. The stat  as owner. Re-bonjour, Monsieur Colbert. 
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political left, all over Europe, does not want to overthrow capitalism, despite 
economic decline and unemployment around 10 per cent. (What is more, in the 2009 
European Parliament elections the Left has been defetead in most countries.) 
Most leading economists and heads of international fi ncial organisations 
emphasize the need of better international co-ordinatio , arguing that the world 
economy has become global, while management remained mainly in the competence 
of nation states. No doubt, this is right. As concer s mainstream thinking, a 
revitalisation of Keynesianism is spreading. But it does not seem probable that state 
intervention goes beyond the bailing outs and buying outs of the shares and 
liabilities of bankrupted banks and financial isntitutions. I am inclined to accept the 
above analysis of The Economist and a very similar an lysis by the Newsweek18 that 
the crisis stems from the very nature and logics of functioning of capitalism. Free 
market logics realy needed those steps on the long r ad of deregulation. But it 
should also be admitted that the principles of the C icago School have frozen into 
dogmas and lived as intellectual fashion. 
A ruling opinion seems to appear from the turmoil: s nce the Thatcherite 
revolution and Reaganomics the Western world has experienced a lasting upswing 
of almost 30 years. This ended with a deep recession, h gh unemployment and huge 
stimulus packages of taxpayer money. This is irritating because the bankers, whose 
greed was one of the causes of the meltdown, now are b iled out. However, all this 
seems to be a fair price for the past three decades. 
My forecast is that of course, we shall have a period of accentuated state 
regulation, the visible hand may dominate for a while, as the confidence in the 
invisible hand has weakened. But if world economy was restaured and a new 
upswing began, we shall tread on the same or similar way as before. It is a misbelief 
that growth and stability were the normal state of the economy.The cyclical 
character of capitalist economy is unavoidable. 
The most characteristic feature of capitalism is the permanent growth of 
productivity and supply. The problem lies in the lagging demand. In the 70’s an 
originally thinking Hungarian economist, named Ferenc Jánossy illustrated this with 
the analogy of a well, which abundantly pours water without stop and cannot be 
closed (Jánossy 1975). (This stands for the ever-increasing productivity.) The main 
concern is to find the proper vessels to contain the water. I think, this will not be 
different in the future. The biggest problem will alw ys be how to increase demand. 
To stop, choke down and retrain production are contrary to the very nature of 
capitalism. Hence, regulation and limits cannot have  longlasting role. 
                                                   
18 Newsweek, October 13th, 2008. 
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3. Lessons from and conclusions of managing the two crises 
The time scale. No doubt, this is the major difference. What happens here and now 
and with us, is more important than that with others, later and there. Economics calls 
this time-preference and to compare effects taking place later and in other places 
uses discounting, counts present value. A similar effect is expressed by the law of 
decreasing marginal benefit: the more we consume something, the less will be the 
use of the additionally consumed units. 
It is our moral pattern, hidden behind these rules. The idleness and lameness 
against climate change is a moral issue. In contrast o this, the sudden reaction and 
activity to combat financial and economic crisis is not a moral issue; decision 
makers and leaders are not driven by the anxiety towards the fate of small people but 
they are concerned mostly of their own power and wealth. But in climate policy 
decisions not realized today do not mean a threat to their power and influence. 
Natural and financial capitals. We have still not accostumed to attribute a 
financial value to natural capital. Notwithstanding that the life supporting services of 
natural eco-systems make possible our life on the earth. Ecological economists have 
already long calculated that only the value of the water-cleaning service of the 
oceans approaches the Gross World Product19. According to an actual calculation, 
the yearly loss in natural capital is 2-3 times higher than the total capital loss due to 
the financial meltdown (Black 2009). 
Asymmetry of interests. Climate change will affect the poorest countries first 
of all, that are the less capable to protect against it. But the costs of climate 
stabilization today should charge, first of all, the richest countries (the biggest 
energy users) and the most powerful industries (energy, car manufacturing, 
chemicals, road building). The latter make an uncomparably srtonger coalition than 
the former ones. 
Unlike climate change, the finacial crisis affects rather the most developed 
countries (where the centres of international banks and money markets are located), 
and the drying out of credits affects everybody. To av id climate change it is the 
United States that should make the biggest sacrifices ( hange in lifestyles, modest 
housing conditions, less luxurious travels and energy use), therefore the US is the 
less interested in climate stabilization. In contrast to this, in combatting financial 
crisis the US is the most interested country, being the mostly concerned one20. 
State intervention. The comparison of the two crises rves as an interesting 
field for discussing on the character and necessity of state intervention. The standard 
welfare economics suggests state intervention in two cases: in case of market failure 
                                                   
19 Evaporation – the formation of clouds – precipitation makes, as a matter of fact, a huge distillation 
system; this is how nature cleans the dirty water of rivers discharged to the seas and replaces it with
clean water, delivered back to the continents. 
20 This held true for the beginning of the financial crisis. After, less developed countries were more 
affected. 
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or if politics wants to achieve an income redistribution. Market failure appears in 
case of monopoly, lack of information or externalities. Climate change is caused by 
global externalities! According to the theory, externalities should be internalized, 
namely, if they are negative, the casual agents must bear the damage caused. Due to 
intervention, the volume of polluting/damaging activity will reduce and social-
economic optimum will be reached. All this will be the result of state intervention. 
Hence, according to the standard theory, to avoid climate change, state intervention 
is needed, but there is not enough of it. 
And what grounds does economic theory give for state intervention in case of 
financial crisis? To qualify financial damage and loss as externality would be 
evidently a nonsense, as they emerged as a result of regular market operations, 
derivatives do have their markets (alas, what a big market!), unlikely the emission of 
green house gases (because if there were a market of GHG emissions, the emitter 
should pay the total cost and in that case sould not be there a climate change)21.  
Nor can we speak about monopolies, as the financial cruntch was caused by the 
cheap credits, available for everybody. And if we dared to be involved in a 
discussion about the income-redistributive functions of the financial and credit 
systems, we would be lost in the terminology of a neo-Marxist discussion22.  
The lack of information – in contrast to the previous items – is something to ponder. 
On the one hand, the digital techniques and informatics create such an abundance of 
information – especially in finances - , which is inconceivable for human brains.  
On the other hand, there must be still lack of information, otherwise the crises could 
not come, there would be foresight. This seems to be a paradox, but it is not difficult 
to answer it: the capitalism, originating from its nature, is still a system, operated by 
uncontrollable and unforeseenable market forces in the last instance23. 
As a result, in the case of financial crisis state in rvention does not have the 
theoretical economic grounds, but it happens. 
Institutions. The financial crisis has also a globa character, like climate 
change, and the international financial network functions as a hydraulic system: may 
the pressure change at any point of the system, it can be felt at any other point24. 
Still, it is manageable because the proper internatio l institutions do exist. But the 
international institutions which are inevitable for an effective climate policy, are 
missing. Their creation is mostly hindered by the United States which has a counter-
                                                   
21 When speaking about externalities, instead of using the regular criteria, it is more simple and suitable 
to refer to that of Samuelson: an external effect is what the market cannot manage. 
22 Probably there are not many, especially among the young people who know, how the classical Soviet 
political economy defined inflation: a process, during which incomes are redistributed through price 
increases in favour of the capitalists. (And this is true!) 
23 A question can be asked retrospectively: could the former socialist central planning be improved by 
the abundance of information delivered by IT of ourage? The answer is probly no: the main deficiency 
of central planning was not the lack of information but the lack of proper material incentives for good 
management, technological development and labour productivity via high profits, wages and payments. 
24 An analogy by László Bogár. 
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interest in this. According to some experts, the lack of institutions can be replaced 
by the implementation of some elements of the game theory. 
Does environmental crisis correlate with financial and economic crisis?  
Of course, the answer cannot be negative in the age of lobalization. But the real 
question is whether does one of them aggravate the other, or how the solution of one 
helps the other.  
It is evident that in time of economic recession resource use and pollution are 
less, but this could be considered as postponed demand, which will be satisfied 
during the coming take off. The question that really does matter is that how an acute, 
unmanageable and prolonged climate crisis does affect th  economy and finances. 
This is the case we are having now. If environmental degradation will be further 
worsening, biodiversity suffering further damages, the life supporting capacity of the 
bioshere will further weakening. The apparent result of these processes will be the 
worsening of human health and decline in human production and activity. Let us 
refer again to the statements of the Stern review. In case of BAU 5-20 per cent of the 
Gross World Product will be lost, in every year, until the endless future. We cannot 
exlude that such a development could favour financial markets. Namely, one of the 
most important effects of climate change will be thimmensely growing risks and 
uncertainties. (Financial markets have already acquired experience in implementing 
CDSs to share risks.) On the other hand, risks and uncertainties (due to increased 
and more frequent weather irregularities) will be reflected in the large volatility of 
exchange rates and prices.  
But let us ask the other question too: How a successful and effective climate 
policy should affect the economy and the financial system? In practical terms, such a 
policy would mean the squeeze of the supply of energy and natural resources (or 
replacement of the fossil fuels with renewables). A switch off of the market 
mechanism is hailed only by biassed and badly informed environmentalists.  
The changed conditons could be imagined as a further limitation of the business 
sphere. In the welfare state public education and public health are out of the reach of 
the competitive sectors (and evidently, the traditional state adminsitration and 
services too). From that time on, part of the resource management and use of the 
environment will also be out of the competitive sector. (The share of this part is 
decided by the carrying capacity of the ecosystems.) 
Rosa Luxemburg said at that time that the natural ch racter of the capital is 
expansion. And when all the white spots will disappear on the world map, namely 
the expansion will be limited, something must be happened. And the first world war 
broke out. Wars, time by time unleashed by the Americans can be viewed as susch 
expansions, but this holds true for the enlargements of he European Union as well 
(which are by no means expressions of sympathy of the citizens of Northern and 
Western Europe towards the newly acceeding countries). (But the above mentioned 
analogy of water containing vessels by Jánossy also c n be adopted to this situation.) 
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Theoretically there is a possibility for the capital to expand not in an extensive 
way (occupying new territories and resources), but increasing output from the same 
amount of inputs, developing technology and improving efficiency. But in this case 
it is the new consumer markets which are lacking... (Life is so complicated, but 
everything would be simple if the Say dogma was viable. Namely: that every 
production creates its market.) 
The US objects to any element of a climate policy which involves in some 
way or another a kind of limitation (in resource use, pollution emission, 
consumption decrease). The Americans want to do something in favour of the 
climate and not not-doing: plant forests, improve rsources efficiency by 
technological development, replace fossil fuels by renewables, etc25. 
In principle, the economy may develop dinamically even at stable or 
decreasing energy and resource supply26. But there are too many escapes. (Let us 
take the case of the new oil deposits to be exploited soon under the ice of the Nordic 
See; it is made possible by the climate change itself!) If scarecity occured in fossil 
fuels, with oil prices permanently increasing and costs of substitutes remained very 
high (including the different, environment frinedly uses of coal), it would be easy to 
take global climate stabilization measures. But amidst of energy abundancy it is 
practically impossible. 
4. Is there a green way out of the crisis? 
Soon after the financial crisis had broken out, a new idea appeared, how to save 
capitalism: the idea of Green Rescue, green energy revolution. UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon called the cause „a green New Dal that would rebuild and 
reshape the economy of planet Earth in ways reminisce t of the programs that 
President Franklin Roosevelt used to revitalize the economy of the United States 
during the Great Depression” (Dickey–McNicoll 2008). The great political leaders 
of the world have taken up this cause: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy and – at that time presidential candidate – Barack 
Obama agreed with connecting the necessity of fightin  climate change and 
combatting the economic crisis. Obama promised to invest strategically $150 bn 
over 10 years in a clean energy-economy, help the private sector to create 5 mn new 
green jobs, to manufacture plug-in hybrid cars, to invest in renewable energy 
projects, to enhance energy efficiency, to develop low-emission coal plants, next 
generation of bio-fuels, etc. The Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso talked of „a 
great opportunity for new growth” and vowed that „we ill achieve the low-carbon 
                                                   
25 The production of biofuels is reaching very high levels in America. This was one of the reasons of 
the food crisis in the world economy at the beginning of 2008. 
26 This is the case, when the proper word to be used is „development”. „Growth” should be used for an 
economy with increasing energy and resource supply. 
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society that is compatible with growth ahead of the rest of the world”. According to 
MITI, the Japanese industrial ministry: building a new industrial infrastructure is 
needed by banking on more efficient use of energy and innovative technologies. 
Gordon Brown said that „…climate change should not m ve to the back burner of 
international concern…. I beleive the opposite is the case.”27. 
Leaders of world organisations also declared their preference towards a green 
energy revolution and combining issues of energy, climate and economic crises. 
Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank admitted that „It needs to 
interconnect energy and climate change.”... „A new multilateralism is needed.  
It should reach beyond the traditional focus on finance and trade. Energy, climate 
change and stabilizing fragile and postconflict states are economic as well as 
political issues... A newly started $6 bn World Bank program on climate 
stabilization aims at completing UN negotiations with practical projects 
(technologies, forestation and adjustment)”28. „The solution needs a globally 
coordinated crisis management package, which aims at developing the new 
generation of low consumption and low exhaustion cars and creating green jobs” 
(Kemal Dervish Chief Administrator of UNDP) (Dervis 2009). 
On the other side, no such ideas have been voiced by the most renowned 
economists, such as Stiglitz, Krugman, Summers or Phelps. Neither leading figures 
in international affairs, such as Pascal Lamy, James Wolfensohn, or George Soros 
made similar statements. 
Huge energy saving projects have been started in the Western countries, with 
a special view on insulation of buildings,where most f the savings potential lies. 
These will result hundreds of thousands of new jobs. The most ambitious 
programme of all is that of President Sarkozy, launched in October 2007. The 
„Environmental Grenelle” consists of 268 recommendations, including 40% drop of 
CO2 emission from building heating by 2020, constructing 2000 km new TGV 
tracks by 2020, charging extra tax on fossile energies and offering tax credit on 
renewables, etc. In some respects Germany is the most pr gressive country in the 
EU, with a federal scheme to insulate the entire housing stock and an investment in 
wind power which puts the UK (with far greater wind resources) to shame  
(Monbiot 2008). Germany is specially well developed in the world market of green 
technologies. 
A transformation in energy industry from fossils to renewables both could 
serve climate stabilization and giving new impetus o technological development 
that could overcome economic crisis. Historians of economics, such as Harold 
James of Princeton pointed out that each depression could be overcome by either a 
new wave of technologies or formation of new structures. The agricultural crisis in 
the 1840s was ended by the industrial revolution; the Great Depression in 1929-32 
was followed by the development of services; the big oom of the end of last 
                                                   
27 I.e. 
28 Newsweek, Special edition 2009. 
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century was a result of dotcom revolution; the lastboom was due to the financial 
innovations in the housing estates sector29. 
Despite all this, the International Energy Agency is pessimistic. In recession 
consumption and energy prices go down and that discourages the development of 
alternatives. The development of alternative energy sources would require enormous 
amount of capital, with a distant payoff. Presently, with tight capital and credit and 
low oil prices private investors do not put billions in a distant clean energy future. At 
$140 oil prices alternative programmes pay off. At $70 development of alternatives 
make less sense, at below $40 not at all. Market volatility undermines long-term 
planning. According to the calculations of the IEA to reduce carbon-dioxide 
emissions 50% lower by 2050 requires investment of $45 trillion – now! Anyhow, if 
governments are funding for banks, why not for green industry, too  
(Dickey–McNicoll 2008)? 
The US has a special interest in the green energy rvolution. Michael T. Klare 
has published an article about the topic in the Special Edition of Newsweek under 
the title: „Time to Kill the Oil Beast”. The heavy oil dependence of America might 
give an important impulse in the green overhaul of the world’s energy industry, says 
the author. The US gets 40 percent of its total energy from petroleum and 23 percent 
from dirty coal. 60 percent of America’s oil is obtained mostly from hostile 
countries. The US spends $50 bn a year in military costs on protecting its petroleum 
interests in the Middle East – yet it spends far less on trying to actively replace oil. 
Both this and a growing concern over global warming requires a large increase in 
reliance on reneable energy sources. Reducing oil’sro e as America’s primary 
energy source (from 40 to 25 percent) and increasing the share obtained from 
renewables and hydropower to the same percentage (up from from 6 percent) by 
2030 should be an ambitious goal (Klare 2009). 
If we look at the character of the stabilization policies and packages of the 
leading countries, there are no signs of such a development: the overwhelming 
majority of the public money goes for the bailing out of banks, revitalizing the 
existing structures, promoting new car purchases with scrapping old ones and the 
development of green energy and industry is only margin l so far. 
The British stabilization package is one of the world’s least green, „Britain 
has allocated 7% of total spending to environmental causes, compared with 12% in 
America and 83% in South Korea.”30 But even the Chinese spent significantly more 
on the green cause. This is, why the Economist calls it a „Keynesian splurge”. In 
absolute terms, China allocated $220 bn on low carbon investments, while America 
only $100 bn, Korea $31 bn and Germany $14 bn. 
In July 2009, Green Alliance, a British NGO published a booklet under the 
title „From crisis to recovery – New economic policies for a low carbon future” 
(Hewett 2009). In the foreword its leading idea is formulated as follows: „The initial 
                                                   
29 Figyelő, 2009. január 1-7. 
30 The Economist July 18th 2009. 
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step in response to the financial crisis, advocated by most governments around the 
world, and coordinated rather remarkably between natio s, was a major public-
spending stimulus... most if not all contained a ’green element’... But that phase is 
now over, and expecting the next wave of investment in green initiatives to come 
simply from the public purse is over-optimistic. The major investment drive for a 
low carbon economy must now come from the private sector...” The publication puts 
special emphasis on how to raise private money for greening the British economy 
and energy industry. 
Earlier, I have surveyed the opinion of leading politicians and economists of 
the world concerning the green rescue. A special notice should be made to Angela 
Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. For many years, she had been a pioneer of green 
thinking and policies, a fervent agent of climate sabilization. However, with the 
break out of economic crisis, she followed an economic stabilization policy, pushing 
green considerations completely into the background. Germany has become the dirty 
man of Europe – writes George Monbiot in Guardian, evaluating the Poznan 
conference of the UN in December 2008: „It was Merkel who demanded weaker 
standards for fuel efficiency in cars, Merkel who pushed hardest for a €40 bn bail-
out of the motor manufacturers, Merkel who now insists that the big cement, steel 
and chemicals companies are allowed to get away without paying” (Monbiot 2008). 
What are the chances of the green rescue in the long run? Are the objectives 
of reducing green house gases 50-80 per cent by the middle of the century feasible? 
Nate Lewis of the California Institute of Technology made interesting scenarios for 
2050. He supposed that world population will be 9 bn at that time, per capita world 
GDP increases on an average yearly 1,6 per cent and emissions should be decreased 
by 80 per cent. In case of a business as usual scenario present world energy use of 
14 TW should grow to 45 TW. But with an unprecedented improvement in energy 
efficiency, 500 per cent relative to current US levels worldwide, world energy claim 
would be only 28 TW. To keep to the 450 ppm of emissions’s concentration to be 
able to stabilize warming up at 2 centigrade, 26,5 TW of the 28 should be carbon 
free. So this is the task ahead of a green energy rvolution, if consumption would 
not squeeze (Lewis 2004, Begley 2009). 
One option is nuclear energy. If 10 TW of the 26,5 should be produced by 
nuclear, a new reactor should be built in every second day in the coming 40 years. 
„If you use every single breeze that blowes on land, you’ll get 10 to 15 terawatts” 
(Begley 2009). But let us be realistic. 27 per cent of he land surface is good for 
producing wind energy. From the global potential, 4 per cent of the earth’s surface 
could reasonably be used and that would provide 2 TW. o get 10 TW of solar 
energy by 2050, we would need to cover 1 million roofs with panels every day from 
now until then. As concerns biomass, its land requirement is even bigger. 20 TW by 
biomass needs 31% of total land area of the earth.31 T e main conclusion of Lewis is 
                                                   
31 Lewis gives data concerning geothermical energies and carbon sequestration as well. 
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that „It’s not true that all the technologies are available and we just need the political 
will to deploy them... we need Nobel caliber discoveries.”  
And as concerns my conclusion: maybe, there is no technologicl solution for 
the climate change. As a result: reducing energy use and consumption in general, 
becomes inevitable. And for that, the political decision would be extremely difficult. 
 
The first angel blew his trumpet, 
 and there followed hail and fire, mixed with blood,  
which fell on the earth; and a third of the earth  
was burnt up, and a third of the trees were  
burnt up, and all green grass was burnt up. 
(Revelation 8) 
5. Summary 
The leading politicians of the world are aware of the dangers and risks to be brought 
about by climate change. However, solution is made lmost impossible by the 
character of the problem: climate stabilization, as well as the climate itself, are 
global public goods. And as a rule, the phenomenon of free riding appears. Free 
riding can be managed in one country or in the frames of a regional integration, but 
not in international dimension, where enforcement is missing. This needs an 
institutional solution. Welfare economics does not provide an adequate frame to 
manage the issue because the social welfare function an only be interpreted with 
one jurisdiction and within one country. Nor discounting could be implemented in 
the long run and among different countries, and standard economics cannot manage 
risks and uncertainties to set in with climate change. Similarly, a very huge problem 
is the burden-sharing in climate mitigation, which raises responsibility for the past 
and the future, not to speak about divergent interes s and different power relations. 
All this is caused by consequentionalism, the moral b ckground of welfare 
economics and the consumer society. The solution supposes different ethics: the 
moral concept of sustainability and stewardship should rule that everybody should 
take into consideration the effects of decisions on others, the nature and the future, 
this way enabling us to follow a successful climate stabilization policy. 
In contrast to this, financial and economic crisis can be managed within the 
ruling paradigm, with the existing institutions. True, there is a contradiction between 
the overall globalization of economic and financial processes on the one side and the 
overweight of nation states in economic decisions o the other, but the activity of 
international financial organizations can be improved. Business cycles could not be 
eliminated, they are part of the system, similar to greed and and the rush for profit. 
The beleif in the allmightiness of markets has been shocked and the visible hand of 
the state now plays an important role, but after stabilization economic liberalism will 
return. The general defeat of the political left in the elections to the European 
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Parliament at the beginning of this summer is a cler proof that people do not want a 
basic change in the ruling capitalist system.  
An apparent solution would be to connect the two crises: giving a 
technological impetus and innovation to the stagnating economies by launching a 
green energy revolution, developing the renewables. No doubt, that would both help 
the economy and contribute to save the climate. However, thorough calculations 
underline, that the total energy demand of a busines  as usual extrapolation could 
not be satisfied with renewables and nuclear energy. The massive decrease of energy 
demand is inevitable. And it is difficult to imagine, how to achieve. As a result, 
unless basic scientific breakthroughs happen in energ tics, our world could not be 
saved. 
Financial and economic crises will set in time by time, they are unovidable, 
but they will be solved. Climate change will be only once, but it will not be avoided. 
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The Social Role and Responsibility of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises – Results of an Empirical 
Investigation Applying the Social Capital Approach 
György Málovics 
 
An increasing number of projects deal with the social role and responsibilities of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The special literature on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and most projects determine social responsibility standards for SMEs based on the 
best practices of large companies. Thus they take the CSR activity of large companies as a 
benchmark for SMEs. This happens despite the fact th t SMEs are structurally different from 
large companies to a high extent – and thus so is their potential regarding social 
responsibility. 
In our study we analyze these differences and the way they influence SMEs’ social 
responsibilities. Based on our literature review and the results of our qualitative results we 
conclude that the structural differences of SMEs from large companies should be considered 
in the relating empirical work and the social role and responsibilities of SMEs can be 
understood in the light of social capital theory. 
 
Keywords:  small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate social responsibility,  
social capital 
1. Introduction 
Even more projects deal with the social role and responsibilities of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The special literature on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and most projects determine social responsibility standards for 
SMEs based on the best practices of large companies. Thus they take the CSR 
activity of large companies as a benchmark for SMEs (Jenkins 2004, Jenkins 2006,  
Supino–Proto 2006). 
This situation is problematic for at least three reasons. First, we have no 
empirical evidence that the CSR activity of large companies contributes to positive 
macro-level social or environmental processes (Banerjee 2008, Málovics et al 2008). 
Second, if we are to implement policies based on it there is a good chance that 
SMEs are not going to be able to meet the required standards because of their 
difference from large companies. Third, we may neglect positive social practices of 
SMEs because these are not to be found at large companies. 
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Thus in the first part of our study we briefly analyze the characteristics 
SMEs have compared to large companies. We also showhow these influence the 
social responsibility of the sector. Since a relevant part of the modern special 
literature concludes that the social responsibility of SMEs may be understood in the 
light of social capital theory, in the second part of our study we analyze how SMEs 
relate to social capital. Afterwards we introduce the results of our Hungarian 
empirical work before we draw our conclusions. 
2. The characteristics of SMEs’ and its consequences on social responsibility  
One of the structural characteristics which distingu shes SMEs from large 
companies is their continuous financial difficulties (Kállay–Imreh 2004, Vecsenyi 
2003). Financial and liquidity problems are present on a daily basis at many SMEs. 
This is even true for SMEs which have otherwise no pr blems regarding their 
overall business performance (Béza et al 2007). According to one view, a 
consequence of these permanent financial problems and the lack of resources is that 
ethical aspects are less important for SMEs since they are fighting for survival on a 
daily basis (Fülöp–Szegedi 2006). Although this statement seems to be quite one-
sided, many authors emphasize that SMEs are very sensibl  to the changes in the 
macroeconomic situation and so are their CSR activities (Vives 2006). A 
macroeconomic recession has a higher negative impact on SMEs – it may even 
endangers their survival – and thus the general state of the economy may influences 
their ethical activities to a high extent. 
As long as CSR is basically a risk management tool for large companies, it is 
not true for SMEs. Most SMEs are not as much visible as large companies. They 
usually do not have their own brand and have no resurces to plan risk management 
activities. Their primary goal is survival, so costly CSR activities rather enhance 
their risks than reduce them (Jenkins 2004). Since SMEs are not in the middle of 
media attention, there is a good chance that their do not look at CSR in the light of 
brand image and reputation (Jenkins 2006). There is also no empirical evidence that 
SMEs could attract better workforce or that CSR would contribute to the financial 
performance of SMEs – two reasons why large companies carry out CSR activities 
(Vives 2006). Therefore, it seems that even if strategic CSR is important for SMEs, 
it is probably not of critical importance. Thus other type of motivations  
(non-business ones) may occur for being responsible (e.g. enlightened self-interest, 
social consciousness and altruism) (Jenkins 2006, Vives 2006).  
Access to economic resources may influence the introduction and adaptation 
of management systems to a high extent (Cambra-Fierro et al 2008). The lack of 
such resources often does not allow the introduction of formal management systems 
and standards (Jenkins 2004). The SME manager is furthermore often responsible 
for several business functions in the same time and thus has no consciousness 
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regarding issues not connected to the daily busines activities (Jenkins 2006).  
In addition, the training of the manager may be insufficient to identify the 
implications of certain regulations or manage the ncessary technology  
(Cambra-Fierro et al 2008, Csigéné Nagypál 2008). There is a good chance that 
SMEs’ responsibilities will not at all (or only to a very limited extend) be 
formalized. It is an unrealistic requirement towards SMEs to have a written code of 
ethics or sustainability strategy. SMEs react on ethical dilemmas based on 
professional codes and norms rather than codes of ethics. Thus industrial norms, 
professional ethics, regulatory and moral obligations and their equilibration are 
behind ethical activities rather than standards and written documents  
(Vyakarnam et al 1997). 
SMEs’ social responsibility activities are not regular and usually not related 
to the enterprise strategy. They often do not even know that they are carrying out 
CSR activities (Szlávik et al 2006). The reasons for that are manifold: the high 
extent of (real or perceived) costs; lack of capacity (lack of time to identify 
stakeholders, lack of know and know who); certain attitudes (lack of knowledge of 
business benefits, fear of bureaucracy) and the present supply of CSR tools 
(basically applicable to multinationals). 
The fact that ownership and management are often not separated, gives the 
chance to a certain level of autonomy (Jenkins 2006). Ethical action is thus 
influenced by a wide range of factors (Vyakarnam etal 1997,  
Cambra-Fierro et al 2008): the culture and values of the owner, certain personal 
characteristics, stakeholders (including the quality of stakeholder relationships), 
market forces, industrial norms, professional ethics, socio-cultural context and 
sectoral characteristics. 
Lack of shareholders may result that SMEs are not necessarily under the 
pressure of short-term financial growth (as it is basically the case at multinationals). 
Thus they theoretically have the chance to carry out s cially responsible activities 
like environmental protection or community involvemnt (Jenkinks 2004) and this 
characteristic theoretically opens the space for personal convictions and moral 
decision-making (Fuller–Tian 2006). Thus the profit maximizing criteria is not 
necessarily characteristic to SMEs. They can follow ther goals like producing 
products considered useful by the owner-manager, community support, helping 
certain community members in disadvantageous situation. This does not mean that 
SMEs are not interested in making profits. It only means that their goal may be 
satisfactory profits instead of profit-maximization (Vives 2006). On the other hand 
there is no necessity for them to reduce their payoffs with CSR as long as they 
provide a satisfactory standard of living for their owners, since the main goal of 60% 
of SMEs is survival (Jenkins 2006). 
Because of the embedded nature of SMEs employees and local community 
have an outstanding importance among the stakeholders. Thus SMEs potentially 
contribute to the development of the local community to a large extent. SMEs are 
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naturally local institutions, their owner-manager, mployees and customers are the 
members of the same community. Most of the employees p rsonally know the 
owner-manager who thus has more information regarding the well-being of the 
employees and may be more committed towards it (Matolay et al 2007). Based on 
this it seems logical to assume that these enterpris s are committed towards the local 
community and local environmental and social issues. But there are also factors 
which cause that they are not as involved as one would accept. These are basically 
the lack of resources and knowledge and the fear of regulation (Vives 2006). SMEs 
also often operate at peripheries, detached from the local community. Furthermore, 
the dominant stakeholder for many SMEs is often one, large customer company, to 
which the SME is financially tied. The reliance on e large customer may push 
SMEs to adopt voluntary standards such as the environmental standard and SMEs 
may be obliged to address CSR (Jenkins 2004). On the ot er hand such mandatory 
responsibilities based on standards do not necessarily works towards real locally 
responsible behavior or even works in the opposite direction by the reduction in the 
number of local stakeholders. Thus, while according to some SMEs play an 
important role in local and regional development there are many who states that they 
are detached from local (economic) initiatives (Spence–Schmidpeter 2003). 
According to the empirical data (Spence–Schmidpeter 2003, Szlávik et al 2006, 
Observatory of European SMEs 2002, Jenkins 2006, CERFE 2001) SMEs’ 
involvement regarding local environmental and social issues is definitely more 
significant than it is in the case of national and international issues. 
To conclude, we may say that the social responsibilities of SMEs differ to a 
high extent from those of large companies (Cambra-Fierro et al 2008). Based on 
these differences we can not state that company size determines the level of social 
responsibilities to one direction or the other. But we can clearly state that there is a 
good chance that there are real differences (Table 1). 
Because of the aforementioned characteristics it is not possible to understand 
SMEs’ social role and responsibilities by simply searching for CSR methods applied 
by multinationals. According to one approach, the notion of social capital offers a 
proper frame to understand the societal role of SMEs. Mainstream CSR and business 
ethics concepts – e.g. triple bottom line or balanced scorecard – are not applicable to 
SMEs since all of these are bureaucratic methods demanding administrative 
structures, professional implementation and well-paid experts (Spence et al 2003). 
Therefore, it is not enough to simply broaden present approaches but we need a 
totally new approach in order to understand the relationship of SMEs to CSR. The 
notion of social capital offers new perspectives and research methods since there is a 
good chance that its embedded and interactive nature is relevant from the aspect of 
SME responsibility. 
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2.1 The social capital and its positive and negative eff cts 
Social capital is an interdisciplinary (Woolclock–Narayan 2000) “umbrella concept” 
(Adler–Kwon 2002, p. 18.), since it includes a wide range of notions e.g. informal 
alignments, trust, culture, embeddedness, social and inter-organizational networks 
(Csizmadia 2003). According to one categorization SC definitions have two groups. 
One identifies social capital with certain components of social structure (horizontal 
and vertical relationships, power relations, governme tal system and formalized 
institutions) while the other one identifies it with beliefs and behavioral dispositions 
(norms of cooperation, trust). Most approaches of scial capital do not fit 
unambiguously into one of the aforementioned groups but contain elements from 
both of them (Kopasz 2005). Thus a common feature of m dern social capital 
frameworks is that they define social capital by structural (networks, social ties) and 
cultural (trust, norms, values) characteristics. 
Table 1. Divergence in CSR theory for large and small organiz tions 
 Corporate CSR Small Business CSR 
Responsible to wide range of stakeholders Responsible to fewer and/or different 
stakeholders 
Perceived responsibility to society at large Perceived responsibility to the local 
community 
Who 
Importance of shareholders SMEs often don't have stakeholders 
Protection of brand image and raputation Protection of customer business 
Pressure from consumers Pressure from business customer  down the 
supply chain 
Shareholders pressure, the SRI movement Pressure from money lenders? Unaffected by 
SRI movement 
Why 
The business case Proven business case lacking 
Based on 'corporate values' Based on principles of 'owner-manager' 
Formal strategic planning for CSR Informally planned CSR strategies 
Emphasis on standards and indices Emphasis on intuitio  and ad hoc processes 
Key involvement for CSR professionals No dedicated personnel for CSR 
programmes 
How 
Mitigation of risk Avoidance of risk 
Prominent campaigns e.g. Cause Related 
Marketing 
Small scale activities such as sponsorship of 
local football team What 
Publicity linked to CSR activities Activities often unrecognised as CSR related 
Source: Jenkins (2004, p. 51.) 
 
The basic idea behind social capital is that communities disposing of a divers 
stock of non-governmental organizations and social networks are in a favorable 
position in fighting poverty and vulnerability, handling conflictual situations and 
taking advantage of new opportunities (Woolclock–Naray n 2000, Woolclock 
2001). Social capital provides informational, power and solidarity advantages for 
its owners. Furthermore, social capital helps collective action (Adler-Kwon 2002) 
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since it enhances the costs of opportunism and helps the emergence of trust, altruism 
and cooperation (Kopasz 2005). 
On the other hand social capital also has its risks (Adler–Kwon 2002).  
The high level of a focal actor or group may result in negative externalities for the 
whole group itself. The informational advantage of focal actors may lead to tragedy 
of the commons. Furthermore, minority actions aimed at the enhancement of 
minority influence may lead to a suboptimum at the level of the community. Social 
capital may thus lead to nepotism, injustice and corruption – the exclusion of actors 
having no (or low level of) social capital (Woolclok–Narayan 2000). This is the so 
called negative social capital (Portes 1998) (Figure 1). 















Membership in Networks and other
Social Structures
Norm Obervance (Social Control)
Family Support
Network-mediated Benefits
Restricted Access to Opportunities
Restrictions on Individual Freedom
Excessive Claims on Group Members
Downward Leveling Norms
 
Source: Portes (1998, p. 8.) 
 
Therefore the high level of social capital is potentially of significant social 
and environmental relevance. On the other hand social capital is a quite complex 
notion which is very hard to test empirically – espcially in connection with social 
responsibility. 
2.2. SMEs and social capital 
The social role of SMEs is nowadays even more seen in the light of their 
contribution to social capital and thus the common good (Spence–Schmidpeter 
2003). The conclusion of the relating special litera u e is that SMEs are involved in 
a wide range of socially and ethically conscious actions but this simply can not be 
measured in the same way as the CSR of large companies (Spence et al 2003). 
Since the social capital approach is an embedded on, it places the economic 
actor in its social environment. Thus business ethics and social responsibility does 
not operate in a vacuum, independent of the other parts of the world but rather in a 
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social context. “Social capital is an interactive con ept. Small and medium-sized 
firms are not >microcosms< that could be conceptualized as a >hermetic world< 
with its own rules and laws. Rather they exist predominantly because of a constant 
and essential exchange with their economic and social environment. This is true 
even where SMEs are considered to be disconnected from their local settings. Still, 
economic, physical and social ties, we argue, can be important.” (Spence et al 2003, 
p. 19.). “In addition, the social relationships and etworks in which these owner 
managers are entwined cannot be separated from the business.” (Spence–Rutherford 
2003, p. 2.). Thus businesses can not be handled as separated units motivated by 
making profit alone, but rather in the light of their complex social relations which 
often appear as social capital. 
SMEs’ motivations to invest in social capital may be manifold (Spence et al 
2003). Such motivations are the stabilization of mutual expectations and enabling 
collective action (trust), to form a kind of insurance and to have access to relevant 
information. 
Spence and Schmidpeter (2003) found the following factors regarding SMEs’ 
contribution to social capital: 
- SMEs’ social involvement is influenced by sectoral differences. 
- The engagement of owner-managers is not always business-orientated. Local 
involvement often offers them a change of focus and ifferent challenge. 
This has no positive effect on business performance i  most cases – so the 
profit motive is not the main reason for involvement. CSR usually does not 
result in a win-win situation. Owner-managers are oft n motivated by ethical 
and social aspects. 
- The major restriction to engagement is time and perceived opportunity for 
engagement. 
- A significant element of SME CSR is small favors for the employees and 
neighboring enterprises. 
- SMEs are not really involved on a national or interational level where they 
feel to be pretty much dependent on politics. 
- Informal networks play a very important role for SMEs by giving access to 
information. 
 
According to another research (Spence et al 2003) there are many forms of 
social capital which are relevant from the aspect of SMEs’ social responsibility. 
Such are informal and formal business relationships, networking within sectors 
(including exchange of information, borrowing of equipment, recommendation and 
subcontracting), networking across sectors (where gographical proximity plays a 
crucial role) and classic tools of responsibility like voluntary activities and charity 
(sponsoring local art and local health care, often do e by the companion of the 
owner-manager). Regarding the motivations for such involvement and contributions 
to social capital the authors found several reasons: some invoked notions of 
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community and a feeling of wanting to “give something back”, others considered 
that they were simply the right or wrong personality type, and again others identified 
the benefits which came from engagement, which emerge over the long term. 
Fuller and Tian (2006) aimed to understand SMEs’ social role and 
responsibilities based on the assumption that social capital is indeed a resource for 
SMEs and thus has an instrumental characteristic for them. They define symbolic 
capital „through its function of mediating power though prestige, and can consist of 
economic, social or cultural capital.” (Fuller–Tian 2006, p. 291.). The symbolic 
capital of SMEs emerges based on the personal values of the owner and through the 
key stakeholders and may contribute to their economic capital. Thus ethical behavior 
may provide business benefits (e.g. opening up new markets) through contributing 
to symbolic capital (creditability). 
Figure 2. Social capital concepts, orientations of responsible entrepreneurship and 
the interchange of capital in the narratives of small businesses 
1. Public duty
2. Sustainable employment
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Source: Fuller–Tian (2006, p. 294.) 
 
Based on Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) there are thre  types (or dimensions) 
of social capital: structural, cognitive and relational dimension. The structural 
dimension of social capital refers to the overall pttern of connections between the 
different actors. That type of social capital means  valuable source of information 
benefits. The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to those resources which 
provide shared representations, interpretations and systems of meaning among 
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parties. This type of capital allows the exchange and combination of knowledge and 
enables people to create common ground which facilit tes future cooperation and 
information exchange. On the other hand the cognitive dimension of social capital 
„implies a requirement on the agent to share responsibility and resources with 
partners or stakeholders in their networks.” (Fuller–Tian 2006, p. 290.).  
The relational dimension of social capital refers to the personal relationships people 
have developed through a history of interaction. Increased relational social capital 
can to a large extent contribute to the opportunities of an enterprise by enabling to 
access more informational, physical and emotional support in the business process. 
Based on these three dimensions of social capital there are three different 
motivations regarding SMEs’ contribution to social capital. The motivation 
connected to the structural dimension is value. SMEs provide value for stakeholders 
(first of all customers) by which their motivations are mutuality, trade and business 
value and advantages. Regarding the relational dimension their motivations are 
social expectations – contributing to basic charity actions, paying bills on time, not 
being corrupt and helping other enterprises. These r fer to the strategies aiming to 
create trust and cooperation by meeting the expectations of the society and business. 
Motivations regarding the cognitive dimensions (e.g. creating the balance of work 
time and free time, enhancing happiness) are beyond any type of expectations and 
refer to normative motives (Figure 2). 
Contribution to social capital is thus not mere altruism but often serves self-
interest because of the instrumental character of social capital. On the other hand 
SMEs need to meet local expectations because of their embedded nature. Otherwise 
they loose they symbolic capital and thus their license to operate especially since the 
owner-manager personally can not be detached from the enterprise in the eye of the 
stakeholders. Thus the embeddedness of the owner manager in the local community 
means a social regulator for SMEs (Fuller–Tian 2006). 
3. The results of the empirical research 
Based on the aforementioned results of the special literature our research aim was to 
explore the characteristics of SME social responsibilities and to examine weather 
the concept of social capital is appropriate to understand the social role of SMEs. 
We formed the following hypothesis in connection with our research aim: 
- Hypothesis 1. The concept of social capital provides an appropriate 
framework for understanding the social responsibility of SMEs. SMEs 
contribute to social capital in many ways (involvement in local environmental 
and social issues, supporting local NGOs, providing voluntary work in order 
to reach local environmental and social goals, providing small favors for the 
employees and contributing to networking within and cross sectors). 
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- Hypothesis 2. SMEs’ social activities and stakeholder relations are informal. 
Instead of formal relations and arrangements SMEs emphasize local and 
industrial norms, ethics, values and laws. 
3.1. Research methodology 
Because of the relatively “under-researched” nature of the topic (Spence–
Schmidpeter 2003) we applied qualitative methods. The application of such a 
research method was also important since empirical evidences show that SMEs’ 
social responsibility (as a result of SMEs embedded nature) is to a high extent 
influenced by the local environment (Spence et al 2003). Thus, although we find 
aspects in the international special literature to guide Hungarian empirical research, 
a preliminary exploratory research phase seems necessary before beginning with any 
quantification. 
We conducted 9 in-depth semi-structured interviews during July and August 
in 2008 (we mark our interviews from V1 to V9 when introducing our results).  
Our research population was the ISO 14001 qualified SMEs of the South Great Plain 
Region of Hungary. We decided beside this population because it can be considered 
as the leading companies of the given region in the field of environmental 
protection. We developed the structure of our interviews based on  
Matolay et al (2007). 
We consider it important to emphasize that the aim of our research stayed 
hidden in front of the interviewed through the whole interviewing process. This was 
necessary because CSR is a sensible topic surrounded by significant social 
expectations. In such cases using an indirect research method is important in order 
not to reveal “greener” or more socially conscious entrepreneur preferences through 
the research process than the real ones. 
3.2. Research results 
Accordingly, our research aim was to explore the characteristics of SME social 
responsibilities and to examine weather the concept of social capital is appropriate to 
understand the social role of SMEs. 
Regarding our first hypothesis, in connection with involvement in local 
environmental and social issues and supporting local NGOs we found that the 
interviewed organizations consider it very important to minimize the negative local 
environmental effects of their operations (V1, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9). This can be 
seen as a form of enhancing eco-efficiency). But these results may stem from our 
research population since all of its members are ISO 14001 qualified - a standard 
aiming to reduce the negative effects of the given firm’s operations. 
Three enterprises stated that they do aim to preserve certain local 
environmental assets through their activities. These assets were water (V1), clean 
landscapes (V6) and the general natural environment through proper waste treatment 
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(V8). Several SMEs are involved in local environmental and social issues, generally 
in strong connection with their own activity. Such involvements are the subsidy of a 
local TV station and producing TV programs (V1), enha cing environmental 
consciousness and environmental education in schools (V1, V8), foundation and 
operation of an environmental NGO (V8), supporting schools by securing 
opportunities for the otherwise missing vocational training (V3, V4, V5) and 
providing material support and free or preferential services (e.g. repairs) for schools 
and kindergartens (V7). Involvement independent from the core activity is a lot 
rarer. However, examples for that are the support of local sport clubs (V4, V5), 
schools (V4) and health institutions (V6). 
We found several examples for networking within sector. The forms of such 
networking activity are: mutual recommendations forwork in case of lack of 
capacity (V1), the combination of sub-contractor and competitor relationships  
(V4, V6, V7, V8) and long-term business (supplier or customer) relationships  
(V1, V2, V3, V7, V9). On the other hand we only found one example for 
networking across sectors (V7). 
We also found examples of small favors – another element of social capital 
(Bodorkós–Kelemen 2007). These exist first of all in the relation of employees. 
Their most common form is financial help (V1, V2, V7) but we also find examples 
of helping employees having problems in their private life (e.g. family problems) 
(V1, V2), securing flexible work-time (V2), education (V7) and tommy (V8). 
We also found examples of formal business or work relationships being 
transformed into informal relationships. Such sign is the co called homely relations 
of employees and the manager (V1, V2, V3, V5, V6). Almost all of the interviewed 
emphasized that their employees can ask them (the managers) for help in case of any 
personal problems (e.g. children being in a bad company, divorce, administration). 
Common programs organized for the employees also contribute to the strengthening 
of informal relationships (V2, V5, V6, V9). These are “brigade dinners”, collective 
outdoor cooking, sport days and family days. Similar programs are also organized 
for business partners in several cases (V4, V6, V8,9). More interviewed 
emphasized that these events help the emergence of consolidated, correct competitor 
relationships and trust which are essential in certain industries. 
 
“Our relationship with the suppliers is trustful. This is necessary since 
we are the ones who weight for them. Trust enables th m to accept our 
weighting. There is a “friendly-business” relationship which guarantees 
accuracy. This works back and forth and acknowledges itself on the long 
run.” V2 
 
Thus our first hypothesis is confirmed since most categories of social capital 
(networks, local involvement, small favors and informal relationships) are relevant 
from the aspect of SMEs activities. In addition, SMEs contribute to social capital in 
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many ways (local involvement, supporting local NGOs, small favors for employees 
and networking within and across sectors). 
In connection with our second hypothesis the interviewed basically did not 
mention any formal tools or relations regarding social involvement and 
responsibility. However, we found that they perceive certain norms and values as 
mutual expectations in their stakeholder relationships. In reference to employees 
these are trust (V1), security (V1, V2, V4, V5, V7, V9), reliability (V2), honesty 
(V3) and fairness (V3). In reference to business partners the interviewed mentioned 
computability (V1), trust (V2, V5), fairness (V3, V6, V9) and honesty (V5, V7) as 
mutual expectations. 
 
“expectations are accuracy, fairness, working on time and precise, 
reliable work” V3 
 
We found similar values in connection with entrepreneur credo. 
 
„…computability, accuracy, honesty and if it has a result than it is 
good.” V1 
 
We only found one enterprise (V6) which emphasized that they have a code 
of ethics (formal instrument) to guide the actions f their employees. 
We also found evidence that industrial norms are relevant regarding ethical 
behavior. Many SMEs mentioned that one of the main obstructive factors regarding 
ethical and legal operation are competitors engaged in illegal employment and 
dumping pricing (V1, V2, V4, V5, V6, V8). Therefore the interviewed attribute high 
relevance to state regulations and the establishment of even conditions of 
competition. 
 
„Ethical behavior is hindered by the unethical behavior of others. In such 
cases the equilibrium of competition is kipped. This is not obvious but one 
can guess it. E.g. if someone takes a job under procurement costs than it 
is dubious. One can not go for sure, since it is posible that they are well 
stocked but it is still dubious.” V5 
 
Tilley (2000) found the same through her empirical nvestigations. According 
to these SME managers do not support self regulation in environmental issues. The 
reason for that is their opinion of the economic structure rewarding selfishness 
instead of rewarding contributions to collective interests. Therefore, environmentally 
friendly activities work against competitiveness. There is a significant tension 
between environmental and economic responsibility within the present economic 
structure. This does not mean that SME managers do not care about the 
environment. It only implies that in case of such tensions economic concerns are 
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more important than environmental ones since the economic system and the 
business climate are dominant forces acting against voluntary involvement. Thus 
self-regulation encourages opportunistic behavior. 
We also found significant tensions between legal regulations and 
local/industrial norms (see also Matolay 2007). Thus industrial norms, habits and 
economic characteristics determine the opportunities for legal or ethic behavior to a 
large extent. 
 
„Getting work for the company is a continuous task. It requires the best 
decisions. You have to compete for the job and find the job. A firm which 
is ethical today bankrupts. One has to be a bit evil and shameless in 
order to be effective. I like football so here is an example. Elbowing 
became normal in football nowadays. Rules allow it. If you do not accept 
that you can play like that because rules are deformed, you are going to 
loose.” V4 
 
Furthermore, based on the aforementioned, Many SMEs equate legal 
operations (e.g. legal employment) with ethical behavior (V1, V4, V5, V6, V8, V9). 
 
„Black work (illegal employment) is present in Hungary because there 
are costs and revenues, bur revenues are fixed, prices are >depressed<, 
and thus black work becomes natural. We do not apply black work 
because the owner opposes it, despite the fact that black money attracts 
workforce because of the higher wages.” V4 
 
Not only industrial norms are the ones which determine the interpretations of 
and opportunities for ethical behavior but also the economic and other 
characteristics of industries. Regarding economic characteristics: SMEs which are 
involved in mutual debit feel a strong pressure to reduce costs at each area including 
the area of social responsibility. In connection with other industry characteristics: in 
the case of industries working with hazardous materials a certain minimum level of 
responsibility (the protection of human health) cannot be questioned. 
 
„In our profession there can be no limits to taking responsibilities since 
people can die because of the chemicals. We always h ve to carry out 
everything very consciously. The responsibility is enormous.” V7 
 
Thus our second hypothesis is also confirmed since SMEs social activities and 
stakeholder relations are rather informal. We found no signs of formal instruments – 
except of one mention of a code of ethics. On the ot r hand local and industrial 
norms, ethics, values and laws are quite important egarding SMEs’ self perceptions 
of ethical and unethical behavior. 




SMEs – although being quite heterogeneous – have significant structural differences 
compared to large companies. These determine their soc al role and responsibilities 
to a large extent. Regarding this role and these reponsibilities the notion of social 
capital is of high relevance. The reasons for that are that on one hand it is applicable 
to helping the understanding of SME’s social role, on the other hand SMEs main 
responsibilities come from their contribution to social capital. 
Based on the special literature and our Hungarian empirical research we can 
say that social capital provides a proper frame in understanding the social 
responsibilities of SMEs. Hungarian SMEs contribute to social capital in many ways 
– e.g. involvement in local environmental and social issues, supporting local NGOs, 
volunteering for local environmental and social goals, providing small favors and 
contributing to networking within and across sectors. Furthermore, SMEs’ 
stakeholder relationships and social responsibility are of an informal character. 
Local and industrial norms, ethics, values and laws play a central role in the self 
perception of SMEs regarding their social responsibility instead of formal relations 
and arrangements. 
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Is Their Consumption Sustainable? 
An Inquiry into the Consumption Habits of Citizens and 
University Students of Szeged 
Mónika Tóth  
 
The unsustainability and the potentially self-destruc ive character of the current 
socioeconomic processes have become a problem to be c nsidered by public opinion and the 
researchers of environmental issues. The paradigm of sustainability emphasizes importance 
of the ecosystem that generally apprehends in economics through the notion of natural 
capital. It is a scientific fact that these process can restrict the socioeconomic options in 
the near future by irreversibly ruining certain unsubstitutable ecosystem services. Since the 
publication of the Stern Review these facts have also been recognized in economics. 
Regarding these tendencies, even more authors emphasize that it is necessary to reduce the 
environmental effects of the personal consumption of the citizens in developed countries, 
including Hungary.  
In the first part of my study, I examine whether the ecological footprint is an 
appropriate measure for environment-conscious consumer behaviour. I conclude that it can 
be an important tool since it measures the real enviro mental effects of consumer behaviour. 
There are several criticisms regarding EF because the measure has some weaknesses, but 
presently there is no tool for sustainability which is complete and none will satisfy everyone 
perfectly. The size of the ecological footprint is in connection with the following factors: 
population, consumption per capita and technological efficiency. From these factors the 
individuals can have an effect on their own consumption. Therefore, in my study I investigate 
what influences the environment-conscious consumer behaviour of the inhabitants of Szeged 
based on my former research.  
  
Keywords:  sustainability, sustainable consumption, ecological footprint, Value-Belief-
Norm Theory (VBN Theory) 
1. Introduction 
The concept of sustainable development has become an integral part of current 
political and scientific discourse. Nowadays the unsustainability of our social-
economic system has been reinforced by influential documents (IPCC 2007,  
Stern 2006). The paradigm of sustainability emphasizes importance of the 
ecosystem that generally apprehends in economics throug  the notion of natural 
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capital1 (Ekins et al 2003, Gutés 1996). Nature provides vital ecosystem-services for 
the economy through ecological processes supported by biodiversity  
(Ekins et al 2003). Humanity damages biodiversity and ecosystem-process, therefore 
human transformation of the biosphere (Takács-Sánta 2004) is becoming a severe 
problem from the aspect of future consumption possibilities and life circumstances  
(Stern 2006). Thus, the restraint of human effect on biosphere is essential for 
sustainability. Consequently, examination of the effects of consumption and the 
chances for reducing consumption is an essential field of study. It is important to 
examine which factors influence consumption and consumer behaviour.     
Neoclassical economics, considered as the mainstream paradigm of economics, 
assumes that resources (thus the natural capital) can be divided and available 
infinitely, which assumption does not hold its own si ce changes in natural capital 
are often irreversible (Norgaard 1995). Neoclassical e onomics treats nature as a 
subsystem of economy, however, this question should be viewed quite the contrary, 
that is defining economy as a subsystem of nature since human economy cannot be 
imagined without the services of the natural capital. Thus I agree with the latter 
approach – the economic system embedded in nature. Literature differentiates 
between weak and strong sustainability. Supporters of weak sustainability consider 
artificial and natural capital replaceable with each other. According to this opinion 
the stock, that is the joint value of the natural and rtificial capital, cannot decrease. 
In the case of strong sustainability one of the main criteria is that the natural capital 
should remain on a certain level, irrespectively of the artificial capital. Thus the 
natural and artificial capitals are not perfect substitutes. So the three keystones of 
sustainability – economy, society and environment– cannot be substituted for each 
other, but they are interwoven.  
Hereafter, from the differentiated strong and weak sustainability I consider the 
former and the approaches of ecological economics as determining. In the following 
part I present the ecological footprint, a tool which can help transfer the above 
mentioned strong sustainability to planning.  
2. Background and methods 
In my study, I investigate what influences the environment-conscious consumer 
behaviour of the inhabitants of Szeged. I use the ecological footprint (EF) measure 
which can be an important tool since it measures th real environmental effects – 
and not only environmental intentions – of consumer b haviour. The ecological 
footprint measures humanity’s demand on the biosphere in terms of the area of 
biologically productive land and sea required to provide the resources we use and 
to absorb our waste  (in global hectare – gha) (WWF 2006). According to the data 
                                                   
1 Natural capital is defined as the stock of environme tally provided assets, which provide a flow of 
useful goods and services (renewable, non-renewable and generally non-replaceable) (Goodland 1995).  
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of 2006, an “ordinary citizen” has an EF of 1,8 gha. But we can also find huge 
differences. The EF of Western countries is extremely high, within this category, the 
North-Americans have 9,4 gha and the Canadians have7,6 gha of EF. These are 
followed by the East-European countries, the Hungarian citizens’ average ecological 
footprint is 3,7 gha. It is worth noting that nowadays the ecological footprint of 
humanity exceeds the biocapacity of the Earth (1,8 gha) with 25 % (this is the so 
called global ecological deficit). This means that humanity’s demand on the 
biosphere exceeds the carrying capacity of the biosphere (WWF 2006). For this 
reason, the ecological footprint of humanity has to be reduced below the present 
world-average. According to present estimations, by 2050, an overshoot of 200% 
will be reached if humans do not change their lifestyl  and initiate new, 
environment-friendly technologies.  
The size of the ecological footprint is in connection with the following 
factors: population, consumption per capita and technological efficiency.  
The ecological footprint calculation is a multiple-stage process and the indicator can 
be determined with a simple formula (Ekins 2004):  
I = P • C • T 
where I is Impact, P is Population, C is consumption per capita and T is technology, 
which is used for consumption and production. The ecological footprint is similar to 
the formula which illustrates the humans’ effect on the environment, whereby the 
scale of humans’ biosphere-transforming activity depends on three factors, which 
are in close connection: population number (P), consumption per capita (C – GDP 
per capita), and environmental effect of consumption unit (T – environmental 
effect). The latter is the technological component (T) in the EF, because production 
technology determines the environmental effects of a given scale of consumption to 
a great extent.  
There are several criticisms regarding EF because the measure has some 
weaknesses, but presently there is no tool for sustainability which is complete and 
none will satisfy everyone perfectly. Furthermore, the ecological sustainability is not 
absolutely measurable, especially not with a one-dimensional indicator (van den 
Bergh–Verbruggen 1999, Costanza 2000, Moffatt 2000). Nevertheless, based on our 
present knowledge, I regard EF as the most comprehensive sustainable indicator. 
“Since 2003, a prestigious academic and science political advisory council (Global 
Footprint Network Advisory Council) has been dealing with this index (since 2005 
with José Manuel Barroso’s support, President of the European Commission) and 
the footprint is already an officially accepted sustainability index in several 
countries (Switzerland, Germany and Finland)” (Vida 2007, p. 1603.). 
The development of the ecological footprint can be influenced by many 
factors, for instance choosing residence, that is the type and location of the dwelling, 
the size of the house and usage of different means of transport. Obviously, if 
someone lives on the outskirts and drives to work every day, they leave bigger 
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footprint behind than if they lived in the city and covered the distance between their 
house and workplace on foot ceteris paribus. It is worth emphasizing the fact that in 
contrast to the poor, the well-to-do people have more options (for example, they can 
move to an expensive urban house), they can change their way of living more easily, 
decreasing their ecological footprint. It is questionable how much they are willing to 
make changes. In addition, the growing number of divorces may also contribute to 
the increase of ecological footprint, because two houses are needed instead of one, 
with double building material and expenses.  
The result of EF indicator is affected by the standard and character of 
consumption, the technology, the population density and the size and quality of the 
area available for society (Wackernagel–Rees 2001). The former factors can be 
paralleled with the I = P • C • T formula, on the basis of which I present the 
elements that influence the value of ecological footprint in the following.  
It is important to highlight the problem of overpopulation, since without 
solving it the ecological footprint of humanity cannot be decreased to an appropriate 
level. The ecological footprint of poor countries would be high in result even if rich 
countries reduced their consumption. If “the growth of population cannot be 
controlled and harmonised with basic human needs, malnutrition, wars and diseases 
will cause the mass destruction of people, resulting in a drastic decline in number.” 
(Buday-Sántha 2006, p. 27.) 
Analyses regarding ecological footprint point out an extremely important 
problem, namely while the consumption of rich countries exceed threefold over the 
Earth’s biocapacity, the inhabitants’ basic needs in poor countries (food, drains, 
electricity) are still not satisfied. Consequently the question arises about who should 
be urged to reduce their ecological footprint and who could increase theirs for the 
sake of satisfying their basic needs. 20 % of the world’s population living in rich 
countries consumes 80% of the resources, exceeding the lobal carrying capacity 
(Wackernagel–Rees 2001). Industrial production has grown fourteen times since the 
1920s; however, besides the fact that this growth has made many people rich, it has 
not put an end to poverty.   
In developed countries the ecological footprint may be reduced by introducing 
new technologies, on the other hand, the Earth’s biocapacity cannot be increased to a 
great extent by it. Although new technologies may seem to increase our planet’s 
capacity, it actually stagnates and remains unchanged. Here it is worth mentioning 
the concept of rebound-effect2, because efficiency improvement resulted by the 
introduction of a new technology may work against resource conservation. So the 
ecological footprint per capita is determined by technology and personal 
consumption. Thus, the ecological footprint per capita can be reduced by 
introduction of new technologies. In the literature of sustainability, eco-efficiency 
                                                   
2 According to rebound-effect efficiency, sale and growing use of resources are closely connected to 
each other (Alcott 2005). E.g. in spite of the increasing fuel efficiency of cars, the total consumption 
does not decrease, because more and more consumers use their car more and more often.  
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has a significant role in relation to technological change; increasing of eco-
efficiency is regarded as the principal tool for moving in the direction of 
sustainability. A unit (enterprise, national economy, etc.) is more eco-efficiency than 
the others if it produces a certain output with less nvironmental effect. 
The reason for this is that a (relative) increase in co-efficiency enlarges the 
scale of human transformation of the biosphere in absolute terms instead of 
decreasing it (Alcott 2005). The rebound-effect is observable both at micro and
macro level. In case of households, the increased technological efficiency is 
typically used to enhance comfort and the standard of living instead of decreasing of 
resource-consumption. For example, improvement of households’ energy saving 
leads to the increase of the size of residence, higher room temperature or the use of 
electric domestic tool (Hanssen 1999). In the case of nterprises it can happen that 
eco-efficiency improvement is followed by an increas  in production so enterprises’ 
absolute resource-use is entirely growing (Dyllick–Hockerts 2002). At the macro 
level, in the case of public transport in Great Britain for instance, the increase of 
fuel-efficiency was followed by expansion of number of cars and car-use per capita 
(Hanssen 1999).  
Due to more efficient use of energy and material, companies can raise pay and 
bonus while reducing prices, which can lead to a growth in consumption. 
Improvement of energy-efficiency can increase energy consumption, partly by 
making it appear as cheaper than other input, partly by intensifying economic 
growth, which increases the use of energy (Alcott 2005). It is worth mentioning the 
advantageous consequences of the technologies based on renewable energy  
(e.g. solar energy). The use of solar collectors is qu te expensive for the time being, 
but an environmentally friendly solution. It is demonstrated by the example 
according to which warming up a given amount of water with solar collectors leaves 
a hundred times smaller footprint than heating it with fossil energy  
(Wackernagel–Rees 2001).  
It turns out that quite many components have to be considered and changed in 
the interest of reducing EF. Individuals (with changes in their environment, 
residence and consuming habits), experts and countries (with working out 
appropriate technologies) can contribute to the decrease, in addition they have to 
face such serious and hard to handle problem as overp pulation.  
During my studies I familiarised myself with several indexes and procedures 
ISEW, HDI (Human Development Index)3, material flow analysis (Material flow 
accounting and analysis – MFA), but it can be establi hed that all methods we know 
at present have limited information in connection with sustainability. There has not 
been a procedure so far which can be accepted without criticism, covers all details 
and can be used with maximum precision. However, from among the existing 
                                                   
3
 The aim of HDI is to make economies rankeable on the basis of important values that are not 
measured by GDP (Kerekes–Szlávik 2003). 
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calculation methods, the ecological footprint has become widely accepted and used 
in several fields as an index to define the extent of he burden on the natural 
ecosystem. It is proven by the fact that WWF’s Living Planet Report calculates the 
ecosystem burden data of the world’s countries based on EF year after year  
(WWF International 2006). In addition, Meadows et al (2005) also use the EF for 
presenting the potential negative consequences of overshot, and emphasise the 
necessity of reducing EF.  
Through moderating consumption, the development of environment-
conscious consumer behaviour can contribute to decreasing ecological footprint. 
There is not a standard definition of environment-conscious consumer behaviour; 
different names exist in the literature with regard to it (pro-environmental behaviour, 
environment-conscious behaviour, environmentally significant behaviour). 
According to Kaiser (2003), environment-conscious behaviour is all the 
actions that contribute to conservation and/or sustaining of nature. This, among 
others, includes recycling, the economical use of energy and water and commitment 
to the activity of environmentalist organisations. 
Stern (2005) examines environmentally significant behaviour (ESB) that can 
be defined by its impact: the extent to which it changes the availability of materials 
or energy from the environment or alters the structure and dynamics of ecosystems 
or the biosphere itself (Stern 2005). Paul Stern (2000, 2005) differentiated four types 
of ESB:  
1. environmental activism, 
2. non-activist behaviour in the public sphere, 
3. private-sphere environmentalism,  
4. other environmentally significant behaviour. 
 
Active participation means that individuals take part in the work of 
environmentalist organisations and demonstrations. Active citizenship (for instance 
membership of environmentalist organisations) is distinguished from the support or 
acceptance of public policies (for the willingness to pay higher taxes for 
environmental protection). Private-sphere environmetalism examines to what 
extent individuals take the preservation of environme t into consideration during 
consumption, e.g. the use of domestic products. Thus private-sphere 
environmentalism has direct environmental consequences.  Finally, individuals may 
affect the environment through other behaviour, such as influencing the actions of 
organisations to which they belong. From these types of behaviour I examine the 
private-sphere behaviour, whereas individuals’ environmental effect depends on 
their decisions as consumers. 
Environmentally significant behaviour has several versions, but Stern (1999) 
differentiates three fields, which show the effects of individual behaviour on 
environment, namely the personal, the behavioural and the contextual fields. The 
personal field includes the basic individual values, and Schwartz’s (1992) norm-
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activation theory, the value-belief-norm theory (Stern et al 1999), the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein, quoted by Stern 1999) and the planned behaviour model 
(Ajzen, quoted by Stern 1999). The behavioural field covers the four fields 
mentioned above, that is environmental activism, non-activist behaviour in the 
public sphere, private-sphere environmentalism and other environmentally 
significant behaviour. Finally, the contextual or structural field includes the 
individual characteristics that are typically defind from birth (cultural background, 
religion, social class), acquired skills (qualificat on), living conditions (residence in 
the country or in the city; tenant or owner; having a car or not), opportunities and 
restrictions of community politics (regulation, tax, motivation programs), economic 
factors (income, access to financing sources) and other factors.  
On the whole, the definitions are identical in emphasising primarily the 
preservation of environment. The most accurate definition was given by Paul Stern 
(2000), so I also accept his one, which I later describe in details. 
Regarding the models of environment-conscious behaviour it can be stated 
that almost all the models emphasise different factors which influence the behaviour. 
One of the oldest models (the linear flow model of environment-conscious 
behaviour) considered environmental knowledge and environmental attitude 
determining (Kollmuss–Agyeman 2002). According to others there is a 
contradiction between environmental attitude and enviro ment-conscious behaviour 
(Rajecki 1982, quoted by Kollmuss–Agyeman 2002). In addition, among the early 
models Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1980) theory of reasoned action appears, which has a 
huge influence in social psychology, one of the most frequently quoted models. 
Furthermore, Hines, Hungerford and Tomera’s (Hungerfold–Volk 1990) model of 
responsible environmental behaviour can be highlighted, which is the improved 
version of the Fishbein-Ajzen model. The altruism, empathy and prosocial 
behaviour models are next ways of approaching the study of environment-conscious 
behaviour. The prosocial behaviour is a voluntary behaviour which appears in the 
form of good deeds towards other people and society. Altruism4 itself is a subsystem 
of society sensitive behaviour. Several researches have built their assumptions on 
the theory of altruism, according to which altruism is needed for developing 
environment-conscious behaviour.  
The most known models are Schwartz’s “norm-activation model”, and Stern’s 
et al “value-belief-norm theory” (VBN Theory). Schwartz examined the general 
structure of values in several countries. Schwartz’s value structure became current in 
the literature, thus this system also forms the basis of Stern’s et al (1999) study. 
During his works, Schwartz explored human values in the field of psychology, then 
he divided them into ten value types (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, 
                                                   
4 Altruism is a prosocial behaviour which is based on c nsidering the other people’s needs. It can be 
observed in the case of people who think that certain problems and harmful effects threaten the 
others, their well-being and health, and they think they are able to ease these consequences  
(Piliavin–Charng 1990). 
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self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security) and 
further four value categories (self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to 
change and tradition). 
Stern’s et al (1999) flow model takes Schwartz’s model as a starting point and 
draws the attention to the fact that it takes a long process to develop environment-
conscious behaviour. My questionnaire is also based on this model and the factors 
presented in it. Stern et al (1999) assumed that actions taken for the sake of a 
successful environmental protection are in connection with personal values, belief 
and norms, which motivate people to do something to achieve their aims and to 
protect the environment.   
The authors in the course of creating VBN Theory started out from that the 
norm-based actions derived from three factors:  
- acceptance of certain personal values,  
- belief concerning that the realisation of this values may be hindered by certain 
factors and 
- belief that actions initiated by the individual can ease the obstacle and restore 
the values  
 
Stern et al (1999) examined the following five variables and the connection 
among them: values (especially environmental-altruist values), New Ecological 
Paradigm – NEP, Awareness of consequences – AC, Ascription of Responsibility – 
AR and pro-environmental personal norms. 
The elements are in close connection with each other and one element affects 
the variable that follows it. The model starts out from the assumption that 
environment-conscious behaviour is in close connection with certain basic values. 
Stern differentiated four value categories based on Schwartz’s work: altruist, egoist, 
traditional values and the openness to change. The egoist and altruist value 
categories in Stern’s model are equal to Schwartz’s self-transcendence and self-
enhancement categories. The altruist behaviour appears as a response to personal 
ethical norms, which can be observable in the case of people who think that certain 
problems and negative effects threaten the others, their well-being and health; in 
addition, they think they can ease these effects. The egoist values include such 
elements as wealth, prestige and money. The traditional values include honesty and 
respect. The openness to new things emphasises exciting and varied life. The 
environmental values are in connection with the development of environment-
conscious behaviour.  
According to the New Ecological Paradigm, humanity has a significant 
impact on the more and more vulnerable biosphere. Th  NEP scale is one of the 
most wide-spread social psychological measuring instruments that examine the 
effect of humanity on biosphere, to which the harmful consequences of ecological 
changes can be traced back. In 1978, Dunlap and Van Liere worked out the New 
Environmental Paradigm – NEP, and then in 2000 it was rewritten so the New 
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Ecological Paradigm was created. The authors found it necessary to renew the 
former NEP scale, because they thought environmental problems had changed in a 
respect; they had become more and more global. Althoug  certain elements, such as 
pollution caused by household refuse, are still local problems, the consequences of 
narrowing of the ozone layer, deforestation, decrease of biodiversity and climate 
change have global effects. (Dunlap et al 2000). 
The original theory emphasises that one should be awareness of consequences 
(AC) of certain events on other people (as the main feature of altruists’ values). 
Schwartz’s general theory stresses being threatened, o matter what kind of 
intention stands in the centre of the values founding norm. In case of environmental 
protection the threatening of not human species and the biosphere can be important.  
Finally, in Schwartz’s theory, the activation of norm depends on the 
Ascription of Responsibility (AR), by which he means that people ascribe to 
themselves the causing of undesirable consequences for others, that is the belief or 
denial of the fact that individual people’s actions contributed or eased the 
consequences. The generalised theory emphasises the belief in taking responsibility 
in connection with anything considered as value or in the ability to ease the 
threatening.  
The authors started out from that personal norms directly affect the three 
forms of environment-conscious actions. All types of supporting the actions can 
have an effect on the individual’s abilities to take the necessary steps to provide the 
appropriate type of support. Thus the certain types of upporting the actions are 
based on personal values and belief.  
Stern et al (1999) also studied the theory of cultural biases; they differentiated 
four groups in their research: ierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. 
The above mentioned four categories appear in the questionnaire of my own making 
and I give details about the results of my research in t e following.  
It turns out from the results measured on NEP scale th t the altruist values are 
in positive while the egoist values are in negative connection with environment-
conscious beliefs  
The third large group of environment-conscious behaviour models is models 
classifying social and psychological factors. Fietkau and Kessel (1981), quoted by 
Kollmuss–Agyeman (2002) examined environment-conscious behaviour and its lack 
with the help of social and psychological factors. In their “model of ecological 
behaviour” they studied five independent variables, which affected directly or 
indirectly the environment-conscious behaviour: possibilities to act environmentally, 
environmental attitudes and values, incentives for pro-environmental behaviour, 
perceived consequences of behaviour and environmental k owledge. Blake (1999) 
writes about an attitude-behaviour gap that he calls Value-Action Gap. According to 
the author, the models of environment-conscious behaviour are restricted because 
they ignore the individual, social and institutional restrictive factors. In addition, 
they assume that people are rational and they use information available for them, so 
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they do not care about collecting information separately and deal with only what 
reach them. Blake (1999) differentiates three obstacles which stand between 
environmental responsiveness and real action: individuality, responsibility and 
practicality. 
Within environment-conscious behaviour we can speak about environment-
conscious consumer behaviour, which is a narrower category.  
Princen (1999) emphasises the harmful effects of overconsumption5. 
Consumption raises important questions from the point f view of both researchers 
and decision makers, still neither side deals with the problem adequately.  
Consumption is close connection with environmental problems, since people use 
energy and raw materials in the highest degree so far, causing serious consequences 
in global climate, biodiversity (diversity of specis, biomes and regions), soil and 
further environmental factors. Beyond that, certain ctivities intensify the problem: 
the more and more widespread shopping fever, vehicles onsuming a lot of fuel, 
luxury consumption and buying disposable products. Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) 
examine three large groups in their model of environment-conscious behaviour: 
demography variables, external factors (institutional, economic, social and cultural 
factors) and internal factors (motivation, environmental knowledge, consciousness, 
values, attitudes, locus of control, responsibility and priorities).   
According to Christensen et al (2007) three factors can lead to increased 
consumption if they co-exist with economic growth and increasing disposable 
incomes, they are: rapid production innovation, individualization and spreading of 
stress and time pressure. Production innovations are increasingly urging people to 
replace consumer goods more and more frequently with newer and more attractive 
ones, complying with the constantly refreshing fashion and other trends  
(Röpke 1999). The information and communication technology (ICT) plays an 
important role in the increase of consumption. Constant innovations appear in the 
field of computers, due especially to the continuous development of hardware. It is 
likewise present in the case of communication technology, mobile phones have 
newer and newer functions (electronic calendar, MMS, camera), which generates 
more consumption. The average lifespan of a mobile is about 18 months.  
Countless researches can be found regarding the question: who are the 
environment-conscious consumers? Straughan and Roberts (1999) first examined 
the demographic variables which can be in connection with environment-conscious 
behaviour and/or consumption, these are:  





                                                   
5  Overconsumption is the level which destroys the system of species’ subsistence (Princen 1999). 
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In the case of age, the general assumption is that younger consumers are more 
sensitive to environmental questions, because they have grown up in times when 
environmental problems have already come in the for(Straughan–Roberts 1999, 
Diamantopoulos et al 2003). However, researchers’ opini ns differ on this question; 
according to some researchers there is a significant positive connection between age 
and behaviour, others say that there is a negative corr lation. In the case of sex, most 
researchers agree that women’s attitude to environment is more positive than men’s, 
which can be explained by that women consider the effects of their actions on others 
more, and they do environmentalist activities more ft n (Straughan–Roberts 1999, 
Diamantopoulos et al 2003). In the case of income, th  general view is that 
consumers having higher income are willing to pay the higher prices of 
environmentally friendly products. However, in this case opinions differ; according 
to some researchers there is a negative connection between income and 
environment-conscious behaviour. Willingness to pay does not necessarily mean 
actual purchase (Majláth 2005). As for the study of qualifications, they draw the 
conclusion that qualifications correlate positively with environmentally friendly 
behaviour, which may be explained by that people with higher education have more 
information relating environmental problems and theimportance of environmental 
consciousness.  
Besides demographic variables, factors such as values and the effect of 
environmental knowledge have to be taken into consideration (Majláth 2005). 
Probably the consumers who find environmental values important pay more 
attention to environmental protection and prefer enviro mentally friendly goods to 
imported products. 
3. Results and discussion 
In my study I present the results of my quantitative survey, which was done in May 
2009. The sample consists of 225 inhabitants of Szeged, Hungary6. My 
questionnaire consists of three major parts (see in Appendix): 
1. ecological footprint (18 questions), 
2. questions based on the VBN Theory (5 questions), 
3. general demographical data (5 questions). 
 
In the first part of this section I introduce some d scriptive demographical 
data of my sample. Afterwards I explore the relationship between the examined 
variables and EF (Table 1). 
                                                   
6 In 2008 we made a survey among university students of Szeged and our actual study 
based on the former examinations.  
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Table 1. Structure of my examination 
Descriptive statistics Measurement of relationships 
Ecological Footprint (EF) EF + 5 types of values 
Environmental philosophy and values EF + cultural bi ses 
General demography EF + NEP 
 EF + adverse 
 EF + responsibility 
 EF + demography, especially income 
Source: own construction  
 
First I set up five hypothesis based on the literature, especially on the basis of 
the examinations of Paul Stern (2000, 2005), Stern at al (1999) and the literature of 
ecological footprint (e.g. Bagliani et al 2006). Furthermore, the hypothesis covers 
my former examination among the students of Universty of Szeged.  
- H1: Respondents who prefer egoistic values have higher EF. 
- H2: Respondents who think that global climate change have negative 
consequence for themselves have smaller EF.  
- H3: Respondents who believe that single persons and small communities may 
play an important role in the solution of environmental problems have smaller 
EF. 
- H4: Respondents who prefer egalitarianism (as a cultural bias) have smaller 
EF.  
- H5: From the demographical variables income has a significant role in 
influencing personal EF. That is respondents whose monthly net income per 
capita is high have higher EF.  
 
In the first part of my questionnaire I measured the ecological footprint of the 
inhabitants. There are several EF-calculators but none of them fulfilled the 
requirements of preciseness and intelligibility simultaneously and in addition, each 
of them showed different results when I tested them. First, I chose Earth Day’s and 
Global Footprint Network’s common EF method. However, in the course of the test 
survey the calculator proved to be difficult to understand for the students in my 
former examination and the questions were also too long. Therefore, in my study I 
used Eric Krause’s ecological footprint calculator, which is intelligible but the result 
are not precise, it only determines the EF approximately. Moreover the major 
problem is that the calculators present rather different results. According to my 
experience, Eric Krause’s calculator shows essentially higher EF results than the one 
of Earth Day’s and Global Footprint Network’s. Therefore, in our analysis I do not 
analyse absolute levels of EF only the relative effects of the influencing factors 
within our sample. Eric Krause’s calculator measure the EF with 18 questions that 
are divided into 5 parts.  
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3.1. Testing the hypotheses  
The average ecological footprint of the inhabitants of Szeged is between 6-7,8 gha. 
This number is incredibly high, it is approximately twice as large as the Hungarian 
average (3,7 gha).  
As I mentioned above, Stern et al (1999) link five variables to 
environmentally significant behaviour: values (especially altruistic values), new 
ecological paradigm (NEP), adverse consequences (AC), ascription of responsibility 
to self (AR), and personal norms for pro-environmental action. In my study I 
measured five types of values (four from the VBN Theory completed with nepotistic 
values), NEP, AC, AR, and cultural biases based on VBN Theory. Later Stern 
(2000, 2005) examined only three values (altruistic, egoistic and biospheric values). 
In my study, however, I chose the first classification and below I show that our 
values can be divided into five types with principal component analysis – aside from 
several exceptions regarding the original categories g ven by Stern (1999). 
First I formed five components with principal component analysis7 from the 
values based on Stern et al (1999) – nepotistic values do not occur in the original 
theory. I aimed to get principal components that explain the largest proportion of the 
variance of the original variables. In the course of examination of the relationship 
between the five components and the EF, I have found that EF was positively 
correlated with egoistic values. Likewise EF was poitively correlated with openness 
to change values. The results confirmed my first hypothesis, that is the respondents 
who prefer egoistic values have higher EF (Table 2). In the other three cases there 
were no significant correlations.  








4-6 ha 84 -0,1834 0,8865 0,0967 Egoism 
principal 
component 6-7,8 ha 93 0,2038 0,9427 0,0978 
Source: own calculations 
 
In my study, NEP was measured with a short NEP-scale (consists of five 
statements) which were valued on a five-grade scale by the respondents. However, 
there were not any significant connections between EF and NEP. Earlier (among the 
students) I measured NEP with three statements, which were connected to the role of 
technology in the solution of environmental problems. The students who consider 
modern technology as a solution for the environmental problems without the need 
for changing their lifestyle have higher EF (correlation is significant at the 0,05 
                                                   
7 According to our expectations the minimum value of the loading variables was 0,7. We expected the 
principal components to preserve 60% of the amount f the information (communality) (this is the 
generally expected level in social sciences). 
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level, Pearson Correlation is 0,126). This finding is consistent with my former 
hypothesis thus it has been confirmed, that is the students who consider modern 
technology as a solution for the environmental problems have higher ecological 
footprint. Consequently, techno-optimism leads to higher ecological footprint. It is 
easy to see that the individuals who believe development of technology is the best 
way may not take part in the protection of environme t.  
Within the category of Adverse Consequences, the respondents had to 
determine how large problem the global warming is goin  to mean for themselves 
and their family, for the future generations, for their country, for the developing 
countries and for other species of plants and animals. I found that the respondents 
primarily worry about the well-being of country, soI refused my second hypothesis 
that the inhabitants who think that global climate change have negative 
consequence for themselves have smaller EF. In my earlier examination I found that 
students think environmental problems have negative consequences principally for 
the next generation and they have smaller EF. I explain it with the fact that these 
respondents potentially have more information about sustainability than the others, 
since the official, scholar definition of sustainability or sustainable development is 
strongly connected to the well-being of future generations - see for instance the most 
cited definition of Bruntland (1987).  
In my study I measured the r lationship between AR and ecological footprint. 
First I divided the agents who may be responsible for the solution of environmental 
problems into four principal components with principal component analysis.  
My first component, “small community principal component” contains individuals, 
small communities, civil organisations, local/national environmentalist organisations 
and smaller settlements. Therefore these respondents expect the solution from the 
local level. The second one is “mezzo principal component” contains cities, 
regions/counties and countries. The third one is “international principal 
component” contains international organisations and internatio l environmentalist 
organisations. Finally, the last one is “business principal component” contains 
small-, and medium-sized businesses and multinationl businesses. EF was 
positively correlated with business category. In the other three cases no significant 
relationship were found. Thus I refused my fourth hypothesis that the inhabitants 
who consider locality important regarding the solution of environmental problems 
have smaller ecological footprint. In my earlier study I found that EF was negatively 
correlated with small community category. It is interesting that the inhabitants 
believe in the category of business.  
Finally, cultural biases were measured using 8 statements from the research 
of Stern et al (1999). These items were divided into four groups: egalitarian, 
individualist, hierarchist and fatalist cultural bias.  In the course of principal 
component analysis I found that my results are consistent with the original theory.  
I examined the relationship between the four principal components and the EF but 
there were significant relationships in two cases, namely between egalitarian and 
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individualist cultural bias and EF there is a significant relationship. Thus I confirm 
my fifth hypothesis - the respondents who prefer egalitarianism have smaller EF, in 
addition, inhabitants who prefer individualism have smaller EF as well.  
I think it is very difficult to measure values and cultural biases based on a 
model which was tested in another country, because diff rent people and nations 
have different means of values or, for example, statements of NEP. ‘Everyone 
should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference’ 
statement has a different meaning for an American and a Hungarian. Consequently, 
it is not possible to adapt and apply models used in other cultures, however, useful 
information can be obtained, but it may need refinement.  
In the last part of my survey I asked general demographical questions about 
the respondents (age, qualification, income). My first hypothesis is confirmed since 
the income of the respondents is correlated positively with EF. We can say that 
higher income means higher EF. This observation is consistent with my 
expectations and the results of the literature. Income plays an important role in the 
extent of EF, because it influences the EF through consumption. The results show 
that the females have smaller EF than males, furthermore the respondents who have 
primary education have smaller EF which can be connected with income, because 
generally lower qualification means smaller income. However, it is an interesting 
question that among people with lower qualifications diseases are more frequent, 
which lay considerable expense on the state and the citiz ns, but its extent does not 
appear in the course of EF measures, besides it can be measured with difficulty. 
During examining the age, I created four groups, namely: under 31, 31-48, 49-65 
and over 65 (Table 3). 
Table 3. The connection between EF and age 
  Age 
  < 31 31-48 49-65 > 65 
4-6 ha 30,6 % (15) 42,9% (21) 45,8% (22) 80,6% (29)
6-7,8 ha 69,4% (34) 57,1% (28) 54,2% (26) 19,4% (7) 
Ecological 
Footprint 
Total 100,0% (49) 100,0% (49) 100,0% (48) 100,0% (36) 
Note: the number of respondents are in brackets 
Source: own calculations 
 
As for the distribution according to age, inhabitants' EF over age 65 is the 
lowest, while inhabitants under 31 have the highest EF, which also can be related to 
consumption, as the younger age group consumes muchore and they are more 
open to novelties (see newer and newer mobile phones).  




Ecological footprint shows that humanity’s effect on environment is already 
unsustainable. From the three factors determining EF, developed countries could 
make steps in the field of technological development and most of all in the field of 
consumption. Relying on the literature we can say th t the increase of eco-efficiency 
itself – besides current consumption values – does not lead to the decrease of EF 
(because of the rebound-effect). For this reason the key issue for the developed, 
western countries is the transformation of values that is people could move towards 
the ecological values from consumption values.  
In my study I seek answers for the above-mentioned problems with an 
empirical research. I emphasized some important conclusions from my results: 
- Inhabitants who prefer egoistic or openness to change values have higher EF. 
- Inhabitants who think that global warming is a serious problem for their 
country. (Consequently they do not consider it a problem for themselves yet). 
- Inhabitants who believe in effect of small and medium sized enterprises and 
multinational businesses have smaller EF. 
- The wealthier inhabitants have higher ecological footprint and from all the 
examined variables income influences the EF to by far the highest extent. 
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Technological Change and Environmental Sustainability: 
Limits of Techno-Optimism 
Zoltán Bajmócy – György Málovics – Zsuzsanna Tyetyák 
 
Technological change is often considered to be a means of achieving sustainable 
development, since it may increase eco-efficiency and substitute natural capital with man-
made capital. However there are several hinders of introducing such innovations, 
furthermore the more efficient use of natural resources does not necessarily result in their 
decreased consumption at the macro level. 
Present paper analyses the relation between technological change and environmental 
sustainability. It focuses on three main issues: fir t, eco-efficiency and substitution, second, 
uncertainty and reflexivity and eventually the rebound effect. In all the three fields we 
identify mechanisms that question the ability of technological change to induce a shift 
towards sustainability. In the existing structure – but not necessarily – technological change 
seems to be rather part of the problem than the solution in connection with sustainability. 
 
Keywords: technological change, sustainability, evoluti nary economics, uncertainty, 
rebound effect 
1. Introduction 
Technological change has been a core research topic in economics for decades now, 
however its exact relationship with natural environme t and sustainability is a 
relatively young (and by no means central) issue. At the same time, the two major 
schools that examine the economy-environment relation (environmental economics 
and ecological economics), have accumulated abundant theoretical and practical 
knowledge in this field. 
Beside scientific publications the issue is obviously present at political and 
public discussions as well. The political position concerning sustainability treats 
technological change unambiguously as part of the “solution”. More efficient use of 
natural resources or the reduction of the amount of waste appears in several 
documents as principal ways of the shift towards sutainability (Bruntland 1987, 
Stern 2006). 
In scientific debates a wide range of approaches ar articulated. At one end 
stands a view that considers technological change as the main opportunity for the 
shift towards sustainability. At the opposite end stands a viewpoint that regards it as 
the main cause of problems. In economics the “techno-optimist” approach is rather 
expressed by environmental economics, while “precaution” is propagated by 
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ecological economics. It is important to declare that in certain aspects the border 
between the two schools is quite blurred. But in conection with the role they assign 
to technological change with respect to sustainability their approaches and 
conclusions are sharply distinct (Málovics–Bajmócy 2009). 
In present paper we analyze the relation between technological change and 
environmental sustainability along three topics. In the first chapter we are dealing 
with the subject of eco-efficiency and substitution. The second chapter focuses on 
uncertainty and reflexivity, while in the third chapter we examine the rebound-effect 
and one of its special forms, namely the Jevons-paradox. At the end we draw our 
conclusion with respect to the relation of technological change and sustainability. 
2. Eco-efficiency and substitution 
The standard view of economics normally focuses on two basic aspects of 
technological change: the increasing productivity (change in the shape of the 
production function) and the new ways of substitution among factors of production 
(Mátyás 2003, Samuelson–Nordhaus 2000, Wentzel 2006). These characteristics of 
technological change provide possibilities in economizing with resources (also with 
natural resources). 
The more efficient use of the factors of production (economizing) is a basic 
interest of enterprises, at least in case when theypurchase them in the market1 
Technological innovations that enable economizing are stimulated by market forces. 
By increasing the productivity (eco-efficiency) of natural resources, the innovator 
will be able to reach a lower cost per piece compared to their competitors or will be 
able to provide more favourable solutions to the consumers (e.g. the significant 
reduction in the specific energy-consumption of lighting bulbs or the fall in the per 
kilometre fuel consumption of vehicles). But even in case of the significant 
improvement in eco-efficiency, the substitution of a given resource may become 
inevitable sooner or later. 
One of the most heated dispute in connection with the role of technological 
change focuses right on the relation of natural and rtificial (man-made) resources.  
If these types of resources were substitutable, than the concept of weak 
sustainability2 would be acceptable. In other words it would be enough to sustain the 
sum of the value of the two types of capital, to create artificial capital in the value of 
the terminated natural capital (Harte 1995, Gutés 1996, Kerekes 2006).  
                                                   
1 In present paper we can not deal with the pricing problem of natural resources in detail. However we 
must note that market prices do not necessarily indicate the scarcity of natural resources, or pricing may 
even be impossible (Gowdy 1997). 
2 According to the concept of weak sustainability natur l and man-made capital are basically 
substitutable. In order to fulfil the criterion of sustainability the sum of the values of the two capital-
types must remain constant. In other words, when th value of the natural capital decreases, it is enough 
to create man-made capital with the same value. 
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This substitution is direct if a new (more precise) d vice enables us to decrease the 
amount of waste (pollution), to utilize formerly un- tilizable resources or to recycle 
more efficiently (Solow 1997, Stiglitz 1997). A more important form is however the 
indirect substitution, when products that formerly were made from non-renewable 
resources are now produced from renewables with the help of processes with great 
capital-intensity (Solow 1997). 
But in case the natural capital can not be fully substituted, it constitutes an 
absolute external sustainability barrier, and a mini al level must be inevitably 
saved. According to our present knowledge nature provides such ecosystem 
services3 to the economy that practically can be substituted n ither by each-other, 
nor by man-made technology (UNDP et al 2000, Gustaffson 1998, Daily 1997, 
Gonczlik 2004)4. 
According to the standard economic arguments (on which environmentally 
economics builds to a great extent) technological ch nge that enables substitution is 
basically generated by market mechanisms (the changes i  the relative prices). The 
effects of relative prices on the direction and speed of technological change is 
analyzed in detail by the induced innovation theoris (Ruttan 1997). Fundamentally 
they reach back to the hypothesis of Sir John Hicks put forth in 1932, in which he 
argued that “a change in the relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to 
innovation, and to inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the use 
of a factor which has become relatively expensive” (Jaffe et al 2003, p. 470.). 
Therefore market mechanisms, by signalling the scarcity of given resources, 
provide an incentive to economic actors to use other (potentially yet unknown) 
resources. This process and the ability to increase co-efficiency lead to sustainable 
growth. 
However ecological economics is rather sceptic about the abovementioned 
interpretation of technological change. On the one hand it criticizes induced 
innovation theories on the basis of the achievements of evolutionary economics, on 
the other hand it questions the presumptions of the weak sustainability concept.  
Two main set of critical arguments towards induced innovation theories can 
be outlined. The first set of critics stand on the basis of positive feedbacks 
mechanisms linked to the use of technologies, which also infers the path-
dependency of technological change. The use of a given technological solution 
provides additional advantages to both the producer and the consumer. On the top of 
                                                   
3 The most important types of ecosystem-services are: production services (e.g. food, resources, 
fodder), regulating services (e.g. climate, flood protection, pollination), cultural services (e.g. 
education, recreation, inspiration for art) and provisi ning services (e.g. nutriment circulation)  
(MEA 2005). 
4 We must note that ecological economics does not necessarily propagate strong sustainability as an 
alternative for weak sustainability. This is because in the strong sustainability concept the criterion of 
sustainability is the constant value of natural capital, which presumes the existence of an objective 
valuing method. Ecological economics however question  that such a method could exist  
(Málovics–Bajmócy 2009). 
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this it generates negative externalities towards the ot er competing solutions. Thus 
the world of technological change can be characterized by positive feedbacks and 
dynamic increasing returns (David, 1985, Arthur 1989, 1990, Page 2006). Therefore 
technological change has such characteristics that tot lly “rewrite” the standard 
allocation problems of economics that presume constant or decreasing returns 
(Arthur 1989, 1990): 
- Non-predictable: the long-run market shares of the technological solutions 
can not be predicted, uncertainty does not "averages way". 
- Non flexible: a subsidy or tax adjustment to one of the technologies’ returns 
can not always influence future market choices. 
- Path-dependent (non-ergodic): different sequences of choices leadto different 
market outcomes. 
- Not path-efficient: such a situation may occur, when it is worth to ch ose one 
of the alternatives just because of the past decisions. In other words “lock-in” 
may occur, when a technological solution proves to be more valuable than all 
its alternatives just because enough people had already chosen it. 
 
This means that when consumers or companies chose from different  
(e.g. polluting or less polluting) technological soutions, they do not solely consider 
the characters of the given solutions (and their own preferences), but also the effects 
of the earlier decisions. New technological solutions does not appear with a “clean 
slate”, they must compete the positive feedback mechanisms backing the existing 
solutions. 
On the top of this several other factors may also strengthen positive 
feedbacks, such as institutional or infrastructural changes (Nelson 1995), and 
relational systems occurring parallel to (or in co-evolution with) the spread of the 
technologies (Witt 2003). The historically developed structures are not only able to 
select out the incompatible novelties, but are alsoble to shape the direction of the 
search process. A widely accepted opinion may occur with regard to the relevant 
problems and the desirable directions of research and development – a technological 
regime or paradigm (Dosi 1982, Kemp et al 1998). 
Therefore several barriers may hinder the spread of technological solutions 
with increased eco-efficiency or solutions that provide new ways of substitution. The 
replacement of the existing (optionally less advantageous) solutions can be seriously 
hindered by the historically developed structures, sy tems.  
The other set of critical arguments towards induces innovation theories 
question the implicit presumption under which economic actors would always be 
able to predict their needs, and enforce the emergence of the new solutions with 
optimal productivity characters. According to the evolutionary interpretation of 
technological change the global objective function, the definite set of choices, 
maximizing behaviour and rational decision making are indefensible presumptions 
(Nelson–Winter 1982, Dosi–Nelson 1994). 
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Uncertainty is an inherent element of the process of technological change.  
It is not solely a problem of information gathering but an integral part of the process 
(Hronszky 2005). This is a clear consequence of the abovementioned positive 
feedback mechanisms, but also well underpinned by the theories that analyse the 
process of innovations in depth (Marinova–Phillimore 2003, Fagerberg 2005). 
3. Uncertainty and reflexivity 
Uncertainty does not only appear in connection with the direction of technological 
change but also regarding the social and environmental ffects of innovations. The 
systemic nature of the biosphere and the high number of factors influencing certain 
technological situations (Ropolyi 2004) make it even theoretically impossible to 
predict the potential effects of the new solutions. I  addition, new solutions may 
alter the circumstances in which they emerged, and thus their own potential effects 
as well (reflexivity). A significant part of today’s new technological solutions aim to 
remedy the (often unforeseen) problems caused by the former solutions  
(Beck 2003). 
Therefore, we have a good reason to assume that new echnological solutions 
will have such (e.g. environmental) effects that cannot be estimated in advance. In 
addition, the time for the potentially necessary adaptation becomes even shorter 
because of the accelerating innovation activity. 
The handling of these effects becomes even more problematic if we consider 
the fact that many of the effects of new technologies cannot be perceived “in the 
usual way” (i.e. with our senses). These risks of mdernization – as Beck (2003) 
denominated them – are based on casual interpretations and come into being through 
the scientific knowledge on them. Thus their recognitio  (even the acknowledgment 
of their existence) and the search for solutions are to a high extent influenced by 
social processes and institutions. 
The shift in the discipline of technology assessment – a method for the 
research of the future effects of new technologies – illustrates well the 
aforementioned characteristics of technological change. The hard (expert) methods 
which were originally peculiar to the area systematically reached their limits, 
therefore the focus shifted towards the involvement of the widest possible range of 
stakeholders, and thus the consideration of the plurality of possible aspects and 
interpretations (Schot 2001, Hronszky 2002). In addition, the emphasis increasingly 
shifted from valuation to influencing (even in the early phases of development), 
since the possibilities of alteration – owing to the positive feedback mechanisms – 
may be seriously limited later. 
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4. The rebound effect 
We considered the rebound-effect to be the third significant area regarding the 
relations of technological change and sustainability. This notion refers to the 
phenomenon that the increase in the productivity of a given natural resource does 
not result in the decrease of the absolute use of the given resource to such an extent 
that could be expected on the basis of the eco-effici ncy gain. Moreover, in many 
cases productivity-increase goes hand in hand with the even more intense use of the 
given resource (this latter case is the so called Jevons-paradox). 
The growth in fuel efficiency in the case of cars for example went hand in 
hand with the growth in the number of cars and kilometres driven (Kemp et al 1998, 
York 2006). A growth in household size and electric household appliances, and also 
higher room temperature were observed parallel to the introduction of energy 
efficient solutions into households (Hanssen 1999). 
Fouquet and Pearson (2006) report the parallel growth f lighting-efficacy and 
the absolute energy need for lighting in the United Kingdom in very a long (several 
hundred years) time-scale. During this period lighting-efficacy has been multiplied 
by more than 700 times, still, energy use connected to lighting has been multiplied 
by 6600 (Table 1). Due to the relative cheapness of lighting an increased number of 
people could afford it, and new utilization methods (e.g. outdoor lighting) could 
emerge, which eventually resulted a sharp increase in the total energy consumption. 
Table 1. Changes in the price, efficiency and consumption of domestic lighting from 
1800 to 2000 













1800 100 1 100,00 1 1 
1850 40 4 26,80 4 1 
1900 26 7 4,20 86 3 
1950 40 331 0,15 1544 4 
2000 18 714 0,03 6641 15 
Source: Fouquet–Pearson (2006) and Herring–Roy (2007, p. 197.) 
 
Rebound-effect can not only emerge regarding the use of the resource at 
stake. The growth in the eco-efficiency of a given r source may be the source of 
effects emerging at higher levels of aggregation. Thus, we may distinguish different 
rebound-effect types, such as (Herring-Roy 2007): 
- direct, 
- indirect, and 
- economy-wide rebound effects. 
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In case of direct rebound effect the demand for the products and services of 
enhanced eco-efficiency grows as a result of the decline in the relative price of the 
used factors. This may enhance the total use of resu ces. First, we may buy more 
from a certain product (e.g. when the price of fuel/kilometre falls we have the 
chance to drive more), and second, the product or service may become accessible for 
new consumers (e.g. the spreading of air-conditioning). 
Indirect rebound effect refers to the phenomena when we spend our savings 
arising from efficiency increase on other resource-int nsive products or services 
(e.g. luxury goods). Households may spend their savings coming from more 
efficient heating on overseas holidays. The save in r source use coming from more 
efficient heating is thus lost because of the growing fuel use of airplanes. 
Similar processes may take place on the producer-sid  as well. For example 
an energy-efficiency increase in steel production reduces the relative price of steel. 
This may reduce the price of cars which enhances thir demand. This process 
expectedly enhances fuel use. 
Economy-wide effect refers to the process that technological development and 
changes in consumer preferences allow new (formerly not known) ways of factor 
use. Increasing eco-efficiency may significantly contribute to such new utilization 
forms, since economic actors in their investment decisions prefer technologies that 
are based on the relatively cheap factors. For example, the use of electricity became 
common in many areas where no non-renewable resources were used earlier (e.g. 
watches, escalators, air conditioning etc.). 
Articles on rebound-effect agree that users “take back” a certain part of 
savings coming from eco-efficiency increase (Alcott 2005, York 2006, Sorell 2009). 
But the literature is not at all unified regarding the extent of the rebound-effect and 
the casual relationship between efficiency increase and growing total resource use. 
It is practical to measure the extent of the rebound-effect as a percentage of the 
expected resource-saving (due to efficiency-increase). This extent is at almost every 
occasions above zero, but according to some authors only exceeds one hundred  
(and thus causes an increase in total resource use) in pecial cases. It is quite hard to 
conclude this debate, since on the one hand empirical cases supporting the Jevons-
paradox usually focus on energy intensive technologies with a wide range of 
utilization opportunities (Sorell 2009), and on the other hand empirical 
investigations are necessarily limited to a specific period, economic sector or 
country (or group of countries) (Alcott 2005). 
Still, numerous aforementioned examples and other empirical data (Polimeni–
Polimeni 2006) show that it is not at all rare that growth in resource-efficiency and 
absolute resource use go hand in hand. Still, it is quite difficult to prove any 
causality since the growth in absolute resource use may derive from a lot of other 
factors and the methodology of the empirical analyses dealing with the Jevons-
paradox is not conclusive in this respect (Alcott 2005, Sorell 2009). 
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What can be stated however is that saving opportunities deriving from 
enhanced eco-efficiency can never be fully realized. The increase in the absolute use 
of a given resource (and even more likely in the economy-wide absolute resource 
use) can especially be expected in case of resources with wide utilization 
opportunities and the strong path-dependency of the related technologies. Thus we 
can suppose that enhancing eco-efficiency is in itself not enough to generate a shift 
toward sustainability, moreover, it may even have an opposite effect. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
We reviewed the relationship between technological ch nge and sustainability in our 
paper. We analyzed three topics: eco-efficiency and substitution, uncertainty and the 
reflexivity of technological change and the rebound-effect. In all three fields we 
explored mechanisms that question the ability of technological change to generate a 
shift towards sustainability. 
Market mechanisms have a limited ability to enforce the occurrence of 
solutions with increased eco-efficiency or substitutes for the scarce resources. The 
main reasons for this are the positive feedback mechanisms that are linked to 
technological change. Furthermore, it is sensible to presume that the substitution of 
ecosystem services with man-made capital can not be simply solved in each case. 
On the top of this new technological solutions almost necessarily infer w, 
until that time unknown problems (new environmental problems among others). 
Therefore technologies that were originally created o remedy environmental 
problems generate the new problems partially themselve . This is caused by the 
inevitable uncertainty that characterises technological situations. 
The third range of problems are in connection with the macroeconomic 
(rebound) effects induced by enhanced eco-efficiency. A number of mechanisms 
exist in the economy that transfers the savings gained from the increased effici ncy 
towards a higher level of resource use. These processes lead to the increased use of 
the resource in several cases. This is ultimately due to the new utilization 
opportunities provided by technological change, the path-dependence of change and 
the maximizing behaviour of the economic agents. 
Therefore within the existing structure we can not expect that technological 
change (more eco-efficient or waste reducing and –treating solutions) would result 
in a shift towards sustainability. Within present circumstances – but not necessarily 
– technological change is rather part of the problem than the solution with regard to 
sustainability. 
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